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Abstract 
 
 
The debate on industrial development policies has in recent years moved to "how" 
governments should intervene and what goals to pursue, rather than "if" they should 
be pursued. Government intervention is often driven by goals that fall into three 
broad categories: solving market failures, promoting strategic objectives, and 
reaching meta-economic objectives such as access to knowledge, education, and 
health care an equal distribution of wealth, sustainable social and environmental 
development. 
Chinese territory is studied as an example of industrialization and economic growth 
promoted through meticulous planning and targeted industrial policies justified by 
strategic goals. However, over time, critical issues related to the spatial distribution 
of the industrialization have emerged, thus threatening the sustainability of 
economic growth. 
The aim of this work is to analyze the distribution of economic performances in 
China, at several administrative levels. The analysis is carried out using statistical 
permutation tests. Starting from the national level, territorial unbalances were 
analyzed in terms of economic performance in the period 1998-2010. Economic 
performance is measured using a composite index that includes five variables (GDP 
per capita, employment, density of enterprises, exports, and industrial output). In 
the second phase, the study proceeds with the territorial analysis in Guangdong 
province, emblematic case of the Chinese industrialization, using data at county-
district level. At this stage territorial unbalances are analyzed not only with respect 
to economic performances, but also with respect to the intensity of policy 
interventions (the variables used are specialized towns, development zones, 
innovation centers, ratio of revenues over expenditure of the local government, and 
investments in innovation). Finally, the last part of the work is focused on the case 
of Dongguan, a prefecture located in the heart of Guangdong’s industrial area. Here, 
 2 
 
territorial analysis is carried out at the town level and with respect to economic 
performance. 
The analysis returns the picture of a country marked by strong regional unbalances. 
Guangdong, which is one of the most industrialized provinces of China, shows a 
marked dualism between core and periphery, and unbalances among different areas 
not only in terms of performances but also in terms of intensity of policies. 
Nevertheless, Dongguan does not show unbalances in terms of performances and 
seems, on the contrary, uniformly industrialized. 
 
 
在最近几年，对有关产业发展政策的争论，从“如果”政策干预，转移到更注
重“如何”政策干预，以及随后所期望的目标。政府的干预往往是由三大宏观
经济目标所驱动：找到弥补市场失灵的方法；促进战略目标；实现经济荟萃
（“经济元”，多方位经济，不只是单单传统意义的经济），包括获得知识，
教育和医疗保健，财富的公平分配，从而达到社会发展和环境可持续性的经
济目标。 
中国的情况是特别值得关注的，因为在过去三十年中就已经出现，是被认可
的经济持续高速增长的国家。这种增长一直伴随着大规模的政府干预，有针
对性的战略目标实施，如特定工业区的开放发展，促进民族工业和战略性行
业，如高科技的支持。中国政策的分析强调市场失灵似乎并没有被列入首要
目标，而元经济目标已经列入政策议程，特别是自上个五年计划，在区域不
平衡地区更加明显。 
中国的经济区域的划分被研究为工业化和经济的增长是经过精心的策划和准
确的战略目标以及合理有针对性的产业政策实施一个例子。然而，随着时间
的推移，关系到工业化的空间分布的关键问题已经出现，从而威胁经济增长
的可持续性。 
我们建议做的这项工作是分析中国经济表现的分布，更多的是注重管理水平。
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该分析是通过统计学使用置换的方式。从国家层面出发，地域经济不平衡的
经济表现是在1998-2010期间。经济表现是通过使用一个综合指标测定，其
中包括五个变量（人均 GDP ，就业人数，企业密度，出口，和工业生产）。
更深入的一步，我们着手在中国的工业化的代表性区域--广东省进行分析，
充分利用城镇乡各层面的数据。在这个阶段，区域经济不平衡分析，不仅从
经济表现的角度来看，也从对于政策干预强度大小的角度（使用的变量是专
业的城市，开发区，创新中心，开支和收入之间的关系创新地方政府的投
资） 。最后，争论的最后一个环节专注于东莞——位于广东省心脏地段的
发达行政大区。区域经济的分析最主要还是在城市一级，主要体现经济表现
的差异。 
最终的结论是，尤为突出的体现是区域经济的不平衡区域能力的落差大，在
中国，广东省作为工业化程度最高最集中的省份之一，体现出了中心与边缘
之间有明显的双重性市场，不仅在经济表现方面，而且在政策强度方面。然
而，东莞并没有呈现经济表现的不平衡，与此相反，反应出统一均匀工业化
表现。 
 
 
Il dibattito sulle politiche di sviluppo legate all’industria si è negli ultimi anni 
spostato sul “come” intervenire e quali obiettivi perseguire, piuttosto che sul “se” 
intervenire. L’intervento di governo è spesso guidato da obiettivi riconducibili a tre 
macro-categorie: porre rimedio ai fallimenti di mercato; promuovere obiettivi 
economici strategici; raggiungere obiettivi meta-economici tra cui l’accesso alla 
conoscenza, all’istruzione e all’assistenza sanitaria, un’equa distribuzione della 
ricchezza, e uno sviluppo sociale e ambientale sostenibile.  
Il caso della Cina è di particolare interesse poiché è un paese che negli ultimi tre 
decenni si è distinto per l’enorme e continua crescita economica. Tale crescita è 
stata accompagnata da un massiccio intervento di governo mirato ad obiettivi 
strategici come l’apertura e lo sviluppo industriale di specifici territori, la 
promozione dell’industria nazionale e il sostegno di settori strategici come quello 
 4 
 
high-tech. Il territorio cinese è quindi studiato come esempio di industrializzazione 
e crescita economica promossa attraverso un’attenta pianificazione e politiche 
industriali mirate giustificate da ragioni strategiche. Nel tempo però, sono emerse 
criticità legate alla distribuzione sul territorio di tale industrializzazione che 
minacciano la sostenibilità della crescita economica. 
Ciò che ci si propone di fare in questo lavoro è analizzare la distribuzione delle 
performance economiche in Cina a più livelli amministrativi. L’analisi viene svolta 
attraverso l’utilizzo di test statistici di permutazione. Partendo dal livello nazionale 
è stato analizzato l’equilibrio territoriale in termini di performance economiche nel 
periodo 1998-2010. Le performance economiche sono state misurate attraverso 
l’utilizzo di un indice di sintesi che include cinque variabili (PIL pro capite, numero 
di occupati, densità delle imprese, esportazioni, e output industriale). In una 
seconda fase, si è proceduto all’analisi territoriale in Guangdong, provincia simbolo 
della forte industrializzazione cinese, utilizzando dati a livello di contea-distretto. 
In questa fase gli squilibri territoriali vengono analizzati non solo dalla punto di 
vista delle performance economiche, ma anche rispetto all’intensità degli interventi 
di policy (le variabili utilizzate includono il numero di città specializzate, 
development zones, centri d’innovazione, rapporto tra spese ed entrate del governo 
locale, e investimenti in innovazione). Infine, l’ultima parte del lavoro è dedicata al 
caso di Dongguan, una prefettura situata nel cuore dell’industria del Guangdong. 
L’analisi territoriale viene condotta al livello di città e rispetto alle performance 
economiche. 
Dal analisi svolta, emerge il quadro di un territorio segnato da forti squilibri 
territoriali, in cui anche una delle province più industrializzate della Cina, il 
Guangdong, presenta un marcato dualismo centro-periferia, non solo in termini di 
performance ma anche in termini di intensità delle politiche. Dongguan invece non 
presenta squilibri di performance e sembra, al contrario, uniformemente 
industrializzata.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
The debate on industrial development policies has in recent years moved to "how" 
governments should intervene and what goals to pursue rather than "if" they should 
be pursued (Rodrik, 2008). Government intervention is often driven by goals that 
fall into three broad categories: solving market failures, promoting strategic 
objectives, and reaching meta-economic objectives. The latter include social goods 
such as access to knowledge, education, and health care, an equal distribution of 
wealth, and sustainable social and environmental development (Chang, 1994, 2002; 
Amsden, 1989, 1994, 2001; Stiglitz, 2001; Di Tommaso & Schweitzer, 2005; Di 
Tommaso, 2006; Bellandi & Di Tommaso, 2006). 
The theoretical framework shows that these objectives and the role of the state in 
development policies have always been controversial topics that have long been 
discussed since Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759). 
The case of China is particularly interesting because over the last three decades it 
has shown an intense and continuous economic growth. Chinese growth has been 
accompanied by a rich government intervention aimed at strategic objectives such 
as the opening and development of specific industrial regions, the promotion of 
national industry, and the support of strategic sectors such as high-tech industry. 
The analysis of Chinese policies, however, indicates that market failures do not 
seem to be included among the priority objectives. On the other hand meta-
economic objectives have been recently included in the policy agenda, especially 
since the last few five-year plans when regional unbalances have become more 
evident. 
Chinese territory is studied as an example of industrialization and economic growth 
promoted through meticulous planning and targeted industrial policies justified by 
strategic goals. However, over time, China has experienced critical problems 
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related to the spatial distribution of industrialization. Industrialization and 
development seem to be unequally distributed over the territory. This issue is 
threatening the sustainability of economic growth and for this reason policies have 
been recently oriented towards the correction of these unbalances.  
The aim of this work is to analyze inequalities in China in the distribution of 
economic performances and show that intense and massive state intervention has 
failed in the purpose of distributing development and growth equally over the whole 
Chinese territory. The objective is to show that the territory is marked by deep 
territorial unbalances in terms of economic performances and that it is growing at 
different speeds. 
The analysis is performed at several administrative levels and is carried out using 
statistical permutation tests. Starting from the national level, territorial unbalances 
are analyzed in terms of economic performances in the period 1998-2010. 
Economic performance is measured using a composite index that includes five 
variables (namely GDP per capita, employment, density of enterprises, exports, and 
industrial output).  
In the second phase, this study proceeds with the territorial analysis in Guangdong 
province, an emblematic case of the intense Chinese industrialization. This 
province has been growing for more than three decades at two-digit percentage 
growth rates. Furthermore, it is an area in which planning and state intervention 
have been particularly intense. Opening-up policies, sectorial specialization 
policies, and innovation policies, among others, were tested in this region before 
being applied over the whole national territory.  
The aim in this phase is to assess if growth and industrialization have been spread 
uniformly over the territory. Additionally, the distribution of state intervention in 
the last decade is analyzed. The objective in this case is to verify in which areas the 
government is concentrating its policy efforts. 
The analysis here is carried out using data at county-district level. At this stage the 
territorial unbalances are analyzed not only with respect to economic performances, 
but also with respect to the intensity of policy interventions. Thus, the variables 
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used are specialized towns, development zones, innovation centers, ratio of 
revenues over expenditure of the local government, and investments in innovation. 
Performances are measured for 2008, while the intensity of policy intervention is 
measured for the periods 2003-2005 and 2006-2008. 
Finally, the last part of the work is dedicated to the case of Dongguan, a prefecture 
located in the heart of Guangdong’s industrial area. The aim here is to assess 
territorial unbalances in one of the most industrialized areas of Guangdong as well 
as the whole of China. Territorial analysis is carried out at the town level and with 
respect to economic performance in 2008. 
The work is structured in the following way. Chapter 1 is dedicated to the 
theoretical framework on the role of the state in development. Next, the review 
presents a description of the debate on the reasons why the state intervenes in the 
economy. Then, an overview of the historical thought focusing the attention on the 
reasons and objectives that drive governments towards intervention, is presented. 
Finally, the analysis concludes with the current debate on the use of policies to 
foster development and growth.  
Chapter 2 introduces the main character of this research - China. In this part of the 
work an overview of the main pillars of Chinese economic development is 
presented, making a comparison with the traditional models of development 
presented in chapter 1. Finally, the current situation of China is described, focusing 
attention on inequalities. 
Chapter 3 examines the assessment of territorial unbalances from a performance 
perspective. This chapter is fully dedicated to the description of the objectives, 
methodology and the results of the analysis. 
The work proceeds with Guangdong province in chapter 4. Here the economy of 
Guangdong is described, focusing on the last decades of growth and development. 
The main policies and programmes that have favored the rise of Guangdong, not 
only in the national context, but also internationally are here illustrated. Finally, the 
chapter concludes with the introduction of the current concerns of inequalities that 
undermine Guangdong’s socially sustainable growth.   
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Chapter 5 is dedicated to the assessment of territorial unbalances in Guangdong in 
terms of performances. As for the case of China, the chapter is dedicated to the 
description of objectives, methodology, and results of the analysis. 
Chapters 6 and 7 conclude the analysis on territorial unbalances in China. Chapter 
6 describes the image of Dongguan in terms of industrialization, development, and 
growth, trying to underline its importance in Guangdong’s process of 
industrialization. 
Finally, chapter 7 focuses on the study of territorial unbalance in terms of 
performances in Dongguan at the town level. Here, as in chapters 3 and 5, the 
description of objectives, methodology, and results of the analysis are presented. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART I 
Theoretical debate on 
development and features of 
the Chinese model 
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1 STATE INTERVENTION AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
 
 
1.1 REASONS FOR INTERVENTION 
The debate of industrial policies, of whether or not governments should intervene 
in the economy through policies is still ongoing and it has lasted for at least three 
decades. Nonetheless, the aim of this paragraph is not to mark the end of this debate, 
but rather to clarify what are the main motives that bring governments to use 
policies. 
In this section, an overview of the main reasons for intervention will be given from 
a theoretical perspective. In the literature, there are two main approaches. One is 
focused on market failures that generate inefficiencies. In these cases, the 
intervention of the government is justified by the fact that a set of services and 
mechanisms need to work. The other approach suggests that the government should 
intervene for other reasons despite the fact that the market fails. 
Before going into details, it is useful to specify the meaning of market failure and 
in which situations they are experienced. Market failures are the result of situations 
in which the market is unable to balance costs and benefits between the society and 
a private entity. Three main reasons for market failures have been identified in the 
literature: externalities, public goods, and non-competitive markets.  
Externalities are found in cases in which anyone’s activity produces positive or 
negative effects on someone else’s activity. Positive externalities usually are not 
rewarded and negative externalities do not contemplate the payment of a fee. 
Market failures happen because negative externalities might generate an 
overproduction, while positive externalities might generate an underproduction. 
This is particularly important because enterprises may be discouraged from starting 
new activities that could be desirable for the society. Since enterprises aim at 
maximizing their profits, they could decide not to carry out their activities when the 
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positive externality is not adequately remunerated by the beneficiary entity. In short, 
positive externalities that are not adequately remunerated may cause the 
entrepreneur to stop its activity. On the other hand, negative externalities not 
involving payment of any fee by the entrepreneur, can act as an incentive to remain 
in operation despite the negative effect suffered by other parties. To better 
understand these concepts consider the case of positive externalities when there 
may be companies that decide to undertake research and development. These 
companies could be discouraged by the fact that other entities take advantage of 
their research activities without the payment of any fee. In the case of a negative 
externality, a classic example is companies that discharge pollution: in the absence 
of a fee for the production of pollution, they will continue their activities. 
In these cases, the government intervenes trying to ensure that the positive and 
negative externalities are produced reaching a social optimum. For this reason, 
governments promote actions that involve the use of policy instruments (such as 
incentives, subsidies, taxes, fines, etc.) aimed at supporting those who produce 
positive externalities and to discourage the production of negative externalities.  
Another situation in which the government intervenes is in the supply of public 
goods, those goods that are non-rival and non-excludable. In other words, goods 
consumed by one person that does not preclude the chance to enjoy the same goods 
by another person at no additional cost. In addition, with public goods it is not 
possible to exclude those who do not pay for the use of the asset. Accordingly, it is 
reasonable to assume that if a product is available at no charge, individuals who 
wish to use it will be discouraged from stating the amount of money they are willing 
to pay for it. In this context, it is easy to encounter free-rider behaviors that will 
cause the market not to reach the socially optimal level of the public good in 
question. These types of goods includes the production of services in the field of 
health, education, justice, and culture. In these areas, the public sector intervenes 
offering a sufficient amount of the good or encouraging the private sector to 
produce it. Industrial policy is therefore called upon to intervene by ensuring that 
the goods are produced in a desirable amount. 
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Finally, in non-competitive markets, industrial policy intervenes to reach equilibria 
that the market would not otherwise be able to obtain. There are cases in which the 
existence of a monopoly is justified by efficiency. Sometimes natural monopolies 
are justified by some structural conditions that guarantee the efficiency of the 
market only if a single producer meets all the demand. There are also situations in 
which the natural monopoly is justified by the lack of a particular factor of 
production. 
In other cases, the limited number of firms in the market is determined by a 
competitive interaction. This interaction can lead to non-competitive situations as 
firms adopt strategic behaviors that allow them to remain in the market to the 
detriment of other competitors, thus reducing the number of those who participate 
in competitive dynamics. This is the case of attempted monopolization: actions that 
reduce access to the market or cartels. In cases such as natural monopoly, the 
monopolist will tend to offer a lesser amount of the good at a price higher than in 
competition, thus causing a loss of social welfare. In such a case, the policy 
objective is to correct the market failure trying to deliver the good to a level of 
social optimum. 
As mentioned before, there are also situations in which it is not the market failure 
that pushes the government to intervene (Bellandi & Di Tommaso, 2006). In 
particular, in some periods of economic history the governments of some countries 
have intervened following a different logic and pursuing either strategic economic 
goals (Chang, 1994, 2002; Stiglitz, 2001; Amsden, 1989, 1994, 2001) or objectives 
that fall in fields that differ from the mere economy (cultural, social, moral field) 
and that are defined as meta-economic objective (Di Tommaso & Schweitzer, 2005; 
Di Tommaso, 2006; Bellandi & Di Tommaso, 2006). 
With regard to strategic economic objectives, there are cases in which the state 
intervenes using policies that support domestic industry or by promoting their birth 
in a particular area or sector. These policies have been used in the past by the first 
countries that have emerged in Europe in terms of development, such as France and 
England, followed by countries that emerged a few years later (Italy, more recently, 
China and other Asian countries). Industrial policy plays a role in those areas that 
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are believed to be weak and in which the aim is to strengthen national industrial 
development. Finally, as another case, industrial policy focuses on strategic 
objectives when a single firm becomes the subject of politics. In this case, firms in 
difficulty considered as strategic for national development and sometimes in 
competition with major foreign companies, receive aid from the government. 
The objectives that go beyond the economic dimension, however, are the focus of 
industrial policies that aim at promoting access to goods considered essential, such 
as education, health, knowledge, or the redistribution of income between classes 
and/or generations. There are situations in which industrial policy action tries to 
curb territorial imbalances within a country. These imbalances are usually 
considered as harmful since they decelerate and limit the development capacity of 
a nation. Finally, industrial policy intervenes in order to assure the environmental 
and social sustainability of growth paths. 
Industrial policy therefore aims at encouraging or discouraging the production of 
those goods considered essential (education, culture) or harmful for the society 
(alcohol, cigarettes, etc.), offering answers when specific goods’ production should 
not be left to the interaction between supply and demand. In particular, this is the 
case of activities that society prefers to self-regulate in order to prevent them from 
being left to market dynamics. Industrial policy thus becomes a tool through which 
the territorial government promotes its model of society based on its own culture 
and morality. 
It should be noted that sometimes the model of society we want to propose 
corresponds to a part of the community represented by policy makers who are in 
the government. Thus, an elected government that has the task of identifying the 
objectives and policy instruments represents the collective interest. It may happen, 
therefore, that the interest promoted by certain policies corresponds to that of a little 
part of the society and not to that of an entire community. This mechanism results 
in many cases in a failure of policy, which strengthens the interests of part of the 
society and weakens the position of the class that is not able to influence the policy 
decisions of the government. 
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In addition, government bodies are in turn composed of a plurality of subjects, as 
well as of multiple levels of government, which tend to reach the maximization of 
their own utility. The industrial policy intervention may sometimes pay in lack of 
efficiency and effectiveness (Di Tommaso, 2006). 
However, over the years the opinion on, and contents of, industrial policies have 
undergone enormous changes. The next paragraphs will be dedicated to a brief 
overview of the historical evolution of economic thought on the use of industrial 
policies. 
 
 
 
1.2 ORTHODOX ECONOMICS VS. KEYNESIAN SCHOOL 
The debate on the intervention of government in the economy of a country has 
always been characterized by an alternation in the history of opinions for and 
against. 
The way to promote economic growth has always been the focus of debate, since 
the time when Adam Smith published in 1776 The Wealth of Nations. He argued 
that the feudal laws could not restrict the initiative of the individual since a nation 
can only grow if the competition is free of constraints. 
According to Smith, in fact, the market was a social institution, totally at odds with 
the principles and mechanisms that regulated feudalism, which was based on rigid 
hierarchies that governed trade mechanisms. The market is therefore understood by 
Smith as a connection of horizontal relationships whose only hierarchy is 
determined by the skill of the actors to organize productive activities and by the 
social position they occupy. Through these mechanisms, the individual asserts his 
rights in society. Smith argues that an economy based on the development of market 
forces needs a state strong enough to guarantee property rights and the presence of 
positive externalities such as health, justice, defense, education, etc.. For these 
reasons, Smith has always been opposed to all forms of protectionism and has 
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strongly promoted free trade (Bianchi, 1994). Monopoly, according to Smith, had 
to be avoided because it distorts the allocation of resources, thus returning a 
distribution of wealth that does not optimize the use of resources and created social 
inequalities (Bianchi & Labory, 2006).  
In The Theory of Moral Sentiments he inquires on the ability of the individual acting 
as a external observer. Smith’s famous metaphor of the “invisible hand” was 
initially seen as a divinely given miracle in the religious debate. Only in a second 
stage was it given another interpretation, as the hand that regulates the marketplace. 
In brief, Smith’s insignts can be summarized by saying that the markets are self-
correcting; they are not perfect, but they are superior to any other alternative; hence, 
there is no reason to think of the existence of market failure. 
Smith’s idea is that the outcome of a certain kind of behavior in a certain social 
framework returns certain definite and foreseeable results. The drive of individual 
self-interest in an environment of similarly motivated individuals will result in 
competition. In turn, competition will result in the provision of those goods that the 
society wants, in the quantities that the society desires, and at prices that the society 
is willing to pay. 
Self interest acts as a driving power to guide men to whatever good society is 
willing to pay for. Self-interest drives men to action, but on the other hand there 
must be something that prevents the pushing of profit-driven individuals from 
charging society up exorbitant amounts of money. According to Smith, what 
regulates the conflicts of the self interested actors on the marketplace is competition. 
Hence, a selfish man who takes advantage of the neighbor’s need, charging too 
much for his goods or refusing to pay a fair salary to workers, will soon find himself 
without buyers and employees. Thus, in Smith’s idea, the selfish motives of men 
are transformed into social harmony. 
The laws of the market, in Smith’s thought, do more than impose a competitive 
price on products. The mechanism of the market makes society change the 
allocation of its factors of production in order to fit its new desires. In this way, no 
planning authority is involved in the process and cannot establish a schedule of 
production. Self-interest and competition, acting one against the other, are the 
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means through which the transition can be accomplished. Furthermore the market 
also regulates the incomes of those that produce goods. If profits in one business 
are exceedingly high, then there will be a crowd of producers that will start that 
business until competition lowers surpluses. Conversely, if profits are too low, this 
will generate an exodus of producers from that business.  
Thus, according to Smith’s view, the market is self-regulating and less government 
is certainly the best. Smith’s theory is a docrtine of laisezz-faire. He specifies the 
things that the government should do in a society of natural liberty: protect the 
society against “the violence and invasion” of other societies; the government 
should provide “an exact administration of justice” for all citizens; the government 
has the responsibility of creating and supporting those public institutions that may 
be of advantage to a great part of the society. Thus, Smith’s recognizes the 
usefulness of investments in projects that cannot be carried out by the private sector 
and that are extremely advantageous for society. 
Smith is against the intrusiveness of government in the market, against contraints 
to imports and exports, and against laws that protect industry from competition. 
Nonetheless, it is necessary to point out that Smith is not against the government 
per se, but rather against any form of monopoly. According to his thought, any 
interference with the market, necessarily lowers the social welfare. The market 
forces, instead are able to generate the greatest number of goods at the lowest 
possible price. 
Thus, the market must be left without impediments and free to find its own “natural” 
level of prices, outputs, wages, and profits. Anything that interfers between the 
market and society does nothing but diminishes the wealth of the nation.  
In brief, Smith’s idea of development is mainly focused on growth and structral 
transformation of the economy and society. He sees optimistically the progress 
brought by the expansion of the markets and increase in trade exchanges, which in 
turn would return a greater division of labor. Smith’s theory supports the abolition 
of the old statutes and corporate institutions, and the elimination of feudal and 
protectionist practices. He is instead in favor of individual initiative and free market, 
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still giving the state a great importance in the creation of favorable conditions for 
development. 
The history reveals the fact that countries that have implemented their own 
transformation from agrarian economies to advanced industrial economies have had 
considerable support from the government to help businesses overcome 
coordination problems and problems due to externalities (Lin & Monga , 2011). 
The use of industrial policies, as has been widely described in the previous 
paragraph, is usually explained in two ways. On the one hand there is the approach 
that in some circumstances market mechanisms fail and the government is forced 
to correct these failures. On the other hand, there are contributions in the literature 
in which it is argued that in some cases government is called upon to intervene to 
pursue goals that are not dependent on “market failures” (Di Tommaso, 2006). 
Since the industrial revolutions of the nineteenth century occurred in the currently 
industrialized countries, state intervention has played a key role in the application 
of catch up strategies from other economies already industrialized (Chang, 2003; 
Lin & Monga, 2011). 
Until the Great Depression the idea of “trusting” the market had been in vogue. 
From that point, something changed in the economic thought, even though some 
economists still believed that if something happens in a market economy, it must 
be right (Krugman, 2009). 
The egemony of neoclassic theories came to a stop when in 1936 John Maynard 
Keynes published the General Theory. The ideas of Keynes started to gain 
consensus. He was not in favor of a complete control of the government in the 
economy. He was rather in favor of the idea that market economies need some form 
of regulation and control in order to avoid speculation, especially in the financial 
markets or high unemployment rates during depressions. 
Keynes accepts the idea that the market fails to provide basic social needs to the 
population, such as education, health care, etc. His ideas developed during the Great 
Depression. Thus, he believed that there was not any automatic safety mechanism 
to prevent the economy from falling into depression. Furthermore, not only could 
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the economy go up and down, but it could also stay down for an indefinite amount 
of time. Hence, a depression might not cure itself and might leave the economy in 
stagnation indefinitely. This was because, according to Keynes, once the economy 
goes into depression the incomes are contracted and savings are reduced. The result 
is not an excess in savings, but rather, a drop of savings. 
One of the consequences of this decline in saving was that the economy found itself 
in a situation of paralysis and could not move out of that condition. The mechanism 
was that without a surplus of savings, there could not be a push on interest rates in 
order to encourage borrowings. Thus, without borrowings and investment spending, 
there would be no encouragement to get out of this condition. In this way the 
economy would remain in a condition of “equilibrium”, even with massive 
unemployment. 
For this reason, the government should intervene in order to solve these failures. 
Through the use of fiscal policies or monetary policies, according to Keynes, it is 
possible to address budget surpluses/deficits or adjust money supply and interest 
rates. These policy tools, thanks to the multiplier effect, have outcomes also on the 
lives of the population: i.e. increasing money supply can produce effects on the 
issuing of money loans favoring the development of businesses. 
The role that Keynes assigns to macroeconomic policies and public intervention 
aimed at compensating the deficiencies of the market has strongly influenced 
policies during the period of the Golden Age, but also the policies of countries that 
in the first post-war decades proceeded to set development plans to reduce the gap 
that separated them from the developed countries or the backwardness of the 
regions within them. 
Accordingly, Keynesianism is in some way more pessimistic than Smith’s theories, 
mainly because of four features included in the theory (Hunt, 1989). First, the lasck 
of cinfidence in the ability of the private sector to achieve full utilisation of 
productive resources (Johnson, 1971). Second, in the theory, great emphasis is 
given to state intervention (Johnson, 1971; Lal, 1983). Thirdly, the role of 
investments is given a prominent role in the determination of aggregate demand and 
employment (Johnson & Johnson, 1978). Finally, part of Keynes’ ideas focus on 
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macroeconomic policies aiming at the elimination of micro-economic efficiency 
issues (Lal, 1983). 
 
 
 
1.3 MARXIAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH AND IMPORT 
SUBSTITUTION STRATEGIES 
The Marxian development approach matured during the western European 
development of the 18th century. Marx did not write about developing countries, 
which were almost entirely colonial at that time. His focus was the industrial 
revolution that took place in Western Europe and especially in England.  
At the base of the Marxian thought is the idea of Great Transformation. According 
to Marx, during the process of development, industry replaces agriculture. 
Agriculture grows absolutely, but shrinks as a share of GDP. In this way, after a 
reasonable time, industry will dominate the economy.  
In the peasant society as seen by Marx, peasants produce much of what they 
consume and consume much of what they produce. In this form of subsistence 
economy, market has a marginal role. Furthermore, peasants use simple tools, thus 
limiting the scale of production units. 
Thus, in general, Marxian tradition is very critical of the feasibility of creating a 
development process in a peasant-dominated social environment. 
As concerns its view of capitalism, according to Marx, the main characteristic that 
differentiate capitalism from previous forms of production is the capitalist’s drive 
to accumulate wealth through productive investment. Under capitalism two classes 
with opposing interests emerge in economic activities. They are capitalists, the 
more powerful, and proletariats. Capitalists also dominate the state and use state’s 
institutions to support their own interests. Furthermore, the capitalist that owns the 
means of production, uses its power to extract and appropriate surplus value from 
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the workers. The mechanisms composing this dynamic lead to the creation of the 
preconditions for the transition to socialism (Hunt, 1989).  
Accumulation of wealth leads the capitalist to search constantly for means and 
technical innovations that will enable him to raise his profits and win over other 
competitors. In this way, less inefficient capitalists will be destroyed by competition. 
As individual capitals expand, workers become more and more extraneous from the 
labor process and the capitalist class.  
Capitalist competition has an anarchic nature that leads to periodic crises caused by 
phases of overproduction or under consumption. In these periods of crisis, labor is 
dismissed and wages decrease. Finally, another crisis will occur when 
uncoordinated development of the productive forces approaches exhaustion. In this 
phase, the working class will appropriate the tools of production and initiate the 
transition towards a new egalitarian method of production (Hunt, 1989). 
That is to say that in Marx’s view, capitalists have a great role in society and 
production, while the role of the state is not predominant. Furthermore, change to 
new forms of production happens spontaneously following innovation, crises and 
transition.  
Despite in Marx’s work an organic treatment on the role of institutions is missing, 
it may be noted that, according to Marx, the institutions regulate social relations of 
production. He expresses the importance of institutions in determining the 
characteristics and the mutation of the economic system, particularly in reference 
to the effects of lease contracts in the long term, in reference to English law on 
common land, in reference to agriculture and the supply of work for the infant 
industries in eighteenth century. Particular emphasis is given to the English laws on 
factories in nineteenth century. 
Marx, like Smith, assigns great importance to the role of international trade and 
considers the world market as one of the levers essential for the formation and 
development of the capitalist economy. 
Marx sees the world market as one of the fundamental characteristics of capitalism 
and attributes great importance, particularly in relation to the birth of phenomena 
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such as the slave trade and colonialism. As Smith, Marx also is familiar with the 
conditions of impoverishment imposed by European countries to submissive 
peoples, but sees colonialism as a factor of progress for these countries as it would 
have the ability to destroy their archaic economic and social structures, thus 
allowing development of the productive forces. 
Though Marx was not an economist, his studies on industrialization in England had 
a great impact on the first generation of development economists like Gerschenkron. 
In his articles, Gerschenkron stresses the potential advantages of economic 
backwardness. 
Latecomers might be induced to jump some phases in order to catch up with the 
West. Their development is hence very different from that of the advanced 
economies. There may be differences in terms of the speed and character of the 
industrial development. This means that the latecomer has more difficulties to catch 
up with the advanced country. Furthermore the latecomer has to make changes in 
the institutional framework: i.e. sound banking institutions might make the 
difference in the process of development. The latecomer, in fact, lacks adequate 
supplies of capital. It also lacks skilled labor, entrepreneurship, and market 
institutions.  
Gerschenkron’s (1962) contribution establishes a relationship between the 
development of the latecomer and that of the advanced country. The economic 
backwardness of a country, seen relative to that of the advanced economy, may 
show different opportunities and potentials. It depends on the degree of 
backwardness of the country. In brief, the more backward the latecomer is, the 
greater the tightness between the actual state of economic activities and the great 
potential intrinsic in industrial development (Chu, 2010). In other words, the larger 
the degree of economic backwardness, the greater the jump to catch up needs to be, 
the more imbalanced the development process will be. 
In this framework, the development economics thought of Import-Substituting 
Industrialization (ISI) emerged. In order to strengthen development and achieve a 
planned transfer of economic resources from agricultural to industrial sector, it 
developed the idea of creating industries for goods that had been imported until that 
 35 
 
moment. This type of industrial policy aimed at substituting imports with national 
products through customs protection. In this way, national industry is fostered and 
develops. 
These policies were used particularly during the 1950s in the underdeveloped 
countries, but only after few years they started to show signs of ineffectiveness. 
Some of the problems were due to the fact that for an underdeveloped country, the 
market of each industrial product is very small and limited. Thus, with new 
technologies that have high fixed costs, the number of enterprises that can enter the 
market is very little.  
Furthermore, these situations imply the creation of monopolies or oligopolies, 
which might be dangerous for the economy.  
In the ISI, two stages have been recognized. “Easy” or “first” stage consists of 
industries for basic consumption goods such as beverages, textiles, shoes, cigarettes, 
wearing apparel, etc. The “second” stage puts more emphasis on production and 
transportation of products such as bicycles, trailer, motors, pumps, etc. 
ISI was thought to bring rapid industrialization, to produce financial savings on 
imports, to acculturate a peasant population in rhythms of industrial society, to 
increase demand complementarities across industries, and create a backward 
stimulus to agriculture. 
The ISI strategy brought some consequences both at the political, economic and 
social levels: corruption, exile of intellectuals, expansion of bureaucracy, decline 
of public services, decline of the agricultural sector, failure of industries, shortages 
and scarcities of goods, decline of the banking sector, domestic and international 
indebtedness, low or negative growth rates, widening of the gap with industrialized 
countries, dependence on western aid, growing internal inequalities, and declining 
levels of health and education. 
Some explanations were brought by different political wings. The “Left” 
explanation gave the responsibility of the failure to a number of factors such as the 
existence of core-periphery dynamics, corruption of national leaders, high costs of 
capital goods. 
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The “center” explanation claimed that the ISI strategy failure was due to the poor 
implementation of its dictates. The theory of ISI greatly differed from the practice. 
Finally, the ISI strategy was criticized by the “Orthodox” economists whose idea 
was that free trade could have brought better results since markets work better than 
governments’ regulations.  
 
 
 
1.4 WASHINGTON CONSENSUS, ITS FAILURE AND POST 
WASHINGTON CONSENSUS 
Contrary to what is thought conventionally, the industrial success of Western 
economies cannot be totally attributed to free market policies. The structural 
transformation of these countries is the result of the combination of industrial, 
commercial, and technological conditions that included the use of import tariffs, 
embargos on imports for the protection of infant-industries, promotion of industry 
through government-granted monopoly, state investments, subsidies, and public-
private investments.  
This happened especially in the USA and Britain, but also European countries have, 
at some point in their history, attempted to reach Britain through policies aimed at 
technological upgrading. France, for example, during the first industrial revolution 
attempted to facilitate the movement of skilled workers to the most technologically 
advanced countries in order to acquire new skills. The British government on the 
other hand, however, forbade the entry of skilled workers from other countries for 
over a century. However, when new technologies were an integral part of the 
machinery, the government put under control the export of "tools and utilities". In 
other occasions, the acquisition of new technologies was supported by governments 
through both legal and illegal means (Lin & Monga, 2011). 
State intervention has therefore always assumed various forms. In the early stages 
of the industrialization process, for example, Japan created many factories in 
various sectors (textiles, shipbuilding, mining, etc.). Many of them were soon after 
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sold at low prices and/or with additional subsidies, thus starting the process of 
industrialization and diversification of production. In this way, when public 
industries had poor performance, they were sold to private individuals and became 
successful because of the integration between management capabilities acquired by 
the state-owned firm and the process innovations that reduced the cost of labor 
(Otsuka, Ranis, & Saxonhouse, 1988). 
In the U.S., the government has always consistently offered strong incentives to 
private industry and academic institutions in order to do research and bring new 
ideas to sustain growth in the field of defense, energy, and healthcare. Although in 
the U.S. it has been discussed for decades about the need, or not, to use industrial 
policies, the reality is that the central government and federal governments have 
had a very important role in the industrial development of the United States. 
Even in Europe the discussion focuses on the need, or not, of industrial policies 
since the end of World War II. Many times in Europe it has been necessary to adopt 
collaborations between governments supported by the European Union to achieve 
business objectives (Lin & Monga, 2011). 
France has recently promoted development programs in which the public sector and 
the private sector coordinate to develop new technologies and thus new industries. 
The French government also has a long history of financial support to the private 
sector through subsidies, tax credits, and developmental government-run banks. 
Britain has instead strengthened in recent years, the government's support for 
business activities, in particular, for new businesses, improving access to credit; has 
strengthened the creation of knowledge and supported the learning of new skills 
and capabilities. 
For several decades, it was considered that planning was the appropriate instrument 
to coordinate or replace the investment decisions of entrepreneurs and that the 
fixing of prices, subsidies and protectionist barriers could foster industrialization 
and growth. The space left to the state and the market, the rigidity and pressure of 
economic plans, and the level of protectionism varied from country to country. As 
a result, confidence in the market to ensure increased production and business 
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efficiency, or effectiveness of programs of liberalization promoted by structural 
adjustment programs have met some criticism (Mynt, 1964; Hirschman, 1968; 
Bauer, 1972; Volpi, 2003). 
According to Zhang & Zhaoyang (2007) the poor performance of Latin America in 
the 50s and 60s ca be justified with the failure of the traditional theory of industrial 
policy. In addition, the rapid growth of East Asian economies forced the creation 
of the new theory of interventionism that was expressed in the "strategic trade 
policy", and provided to developing countries the base for the formulation of 
industrial policies and the implementation of interventions in the economy.  
Since the eighties the Anglo-Saxon literature has reduced the role of the State and, 
in particular, the  use of industrial policies in the markets (Bianchi & Labory, 2006), 
claiming that in an open environment it is necessary to allow that development 
occurs through the free functioning of the market. At that time, the term "industrial 
policy" was used to refer to actions restricting or replacing the market. 
During the Eighties, the economies of the world were divided between market 
economies and planned economies where industry was governed by public 
interventions. During the era of Thatcher and Regan, reforms where based on 
privatization and liberalizations and Europe had just started its process of 
enlargement. At this point Asia was just starting its miracle and China, in particular, 
was about to start its reform process experiencing new economic strategies such as 
the “Open Door Policy”. 
In 1989, Williamson coined the term Washington Consensus identifing a set of 10 
economic policies that at that time were advised to developing countries by the 
Washington-based institutions such as International Monetary Fund, World Bank 
and U.S. Treasury Department.  
The consensus, as originally drafted by Williamson, included 10 large groups of 
relatively specific advices on economic matters: 
 A fiscal policy discipline aimed at avoiding strong fiscal deficits relative to 
gross domestic product; 
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 The readjustment of public spending towards targeted interventions: the 
reccommendation was to limit the "indiscriminate subsidies" and instead 
promote measures to support growth and weaker sectors, such as fees for 
basic education, health and basic infrastructure development; 
 Reform of the tax system, broadening the tax base (the total sum of 
individual tax bases) and the lowering of the marginal tax rates; 
 Interest rates determined by the market and moderately positive in real terms; 
 Exchange rates of the local currency determined by the market; 
 Liberalisation of trade and imports, and in particular, the abolition of 
quantitative restrictions and perpetuation of duties at a lower level; 
 Opening and liberalization of inward foreign investments; 
 Privatization of state-owned companies; 
 Deregulation: abolition of regulations that impede market entry or restrict 
competition, except as regards the conditions of safety, environmental 
protection and consumer protection and a reasonable control of financial 
institutions; 
 Protection of private property rights 
This formulation was created on an attempt to summarize main economic policies, 
with particular reference to policy reform in Latin America. 
This new approach to policies for industrial development increasingly influenced 
the actions of international institutions, national and regional governments. Soon, 
the original Washington Consensus took the form of a liberal line of policy centered 
on opening of economies, the privatization of state-owned enterprises and the 
deregulation of economic activities (Stiglitz, 2002). It is in fact often identified as 
a shift from state-led to market-oriented policies (Gore, 2000). 
This approach did not worked as expected, since it did not lead immediately to 
growth and development (Bianchi & Labory, 2006). Even the most enthusiastic 
supporters of the Washington Consensus now agrees that growth has been below 
expectations in Latin America (Rodrik, 2006). 
With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, former 
socialist countries similarly made an audacious step toward markets. In Sub-
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Saharan Africa, governments moved with less confidence and speed, but there too 
most of the new policy agenda was adopted: state marketing boards were 
dismantled, inflation reduced, trade opened up, and significant amounts of 
privatization undertaken (Rodrik, 2006). Thus, what emerged in 1990s after an 
extensive period of reforms was that (Rodrik, 2006): (1), there was an unexpectedly 
deep and continued decline in output in countries making the transition from 
communism to market economies; (2) Sub-Saharan Africa failed to take off, despite 
significant policy reform, improvements in the political settings, and sustained 
foreign aid. Only few countries were successfully; (3) frequent and severe financial 
crises undermined stability od countries in Latin America, East Asia, Russia, and 
Turkey; (4)the Latin American recovery in the first half of the 1990s proved 
transitory; (5) Argentina fell into a deep crisis in 2002. 
Nonetheless, the period since 1990 was not a disaster for economic development. 
By the contrary, in terms of of global poverty, that period proved incredibly 
favorable. Rapid economic growth in China, India, and a few other Asian countries 
resulted in an absolute reduction in the number of people living in extreme poverty. 
The paradox is that China and India increased their confidence on market forces, 
even though their policies were extremely unconventional. High levels of trade 
protection, lack of privatization, extensive industrial policies, and lax fiscal and 
financial policies through the 1990s determined the economic growth of these two 
economies. Thus, they were far from being considered as of the Washington 
Consensus (Rodrik, 2006).  
Thus, in post-Washington Consensus era, the importance of the government in 
shaping policies bacame crucial. According to Stiglitz (1999) the government has 
to be a complement to markets. Implying with this sentence that the government 
should undertake those actions and activities that make markets fulfill their 
functions better. In some cases, the government have proved to be an effective 
promoter of growth, by supplying innovation or social needs. But, once it has 
completed its function, Stiglitz (1999) sustains that it needs to withdraw. 
Furthermore, the post-Washington Consensus signed the enlargement of needs and 
goals. Increases in GDP were not sufficient anymore. Rather, increases in living 
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standards, including in access to education and health, were intensively pursued. 
The range of needs enlarged including also the pursuit of sustainable development, 
including the preservation of natural resources and mantainance of healthy 
environment; equitable development, thus ensuring that all individuals in society 
benefit from development; democratic development, in which citizens participate 
making decisions that affect their lives (Stiglitz, 1999). 
Historiacally then, industrial policies have been widely used. Interventions were 
mostly used for the protection of intellectual property, support for basic research or 
for public procurement. At the local level, the settlements of industries in specific 
geographic areas were instead encouraged in order to boost new investments. In 
other cases, industrial policy has been banned for decades by the international 
debate because it was believed that, in open market conditions, industry and the 
economy in general should operate freely. Nevertheless, in the last three decades 
the words "industrial policy" are back in vogue and some, albeit few, governments 
have started to promote it. Most governments carry out various forms of industrial 
policy, even if they call it by other names (i.e. export facilitation, promotion of 
foreign investment, free-trade zones, etc.) (Rodrik, 2008). 
Thus, today the discussion is focused on “how” industrial policy should be carried 
out rather than on “whether” it should be carried out at all. When the dispute was 
focused on the “whether” of industrial policy, the debate on industrial policy has 
reached a stop. According to Rodrik (2008), by focusing on the “how” of industrial 
policy it is possible to move the debate forward. In particular, it is possible to design 
institutions that take into account and ameliorate the informational and political 
problems that have preoccupied industrial policy skeptics. It is possible to start 
seeing these problems not as insuperable obstacles, but as difficulties that a targeted 
policy has got to tackle. Governments cannot give up social or macroeconomic 
policies, when they face similar difficulties.  
As mentioned before, today industrial policies are intended as programs aimed at 
supporting, promoting, and expanding the market, as well as a mix of instruments 
available to public authorities to support the development of productive activities. 
Industrial policy is a set of actions that includes the definition of collective rules for 
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the protection of the market and the regulation of those activities offered under the 
restriction of competition. It includes support for innovation and structural 
transformation of the economy. It includes interventions in favor of the 
industrialization process in a territory or promoting competitiveness in favor of 
specific categories of businesses that are essential to the local development. It also 
includes sectorial vertical policies or related to specific companies that the 
government considers essential for the preservation of its economy. Nonetheless 
state interventions is also driven by other motives. 
Thus, Rodrik (2008) specifies that education and health interventions are motivated 
by human capital externalities, social insurance by asymmetric information, and 
stabilization policy by aggregate-demand (Keynesian) externalities (to list just 
some of the most important market failures). Empirical evidence on these market 
imperfections is imprecise, which is why there continue to be animated academic 
debates on their role and magnitude (Rodrik, 2008). 
Moreover, in each one of these areas bureaucrats have wide autonomy in 
implementing policies, while ignoring the nature of problems. According to Rodrik 
(2008), governments make budget allocations with little capacity to evaluate the 
impact of their decisions. Thus, basing their decision on bureaucratic routine rather 
than economic logic. Lobbies typically apply significant influence on the policy 
process. In the case of the US, Rodrik (2008) explains that in education, teachers’ 
unions have a loud voice on what should be done. In health policy, insurance firms 
and the medical doctors’ association often impose their requests. Tax and spending 
decisions are both subject to influence of lobbies. Apart all these limitations, the 
debates in these policy areas are rarely ever about “whether” the government should 
be involved; they are about “how” the government should run its policies.  
Thus, now the focus is on the objectives and the way through which they are reached. 
As Rodrik (2008) claims, industrial policy «is just another government task that can 
vary from routine to urgent depending on the nature of growth constraints a country 
faces».  
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1.5 THE INTERNATIONAL DEBATE TODAY 
Today the debate is mainly focused on the objectives that the government 
intervention should have in the economy. These goals can be briefly summarized 
as (1) solving market failures, (2) reaching strategic economic goals, (3) achieving 
meta-economic objectives. 
Market failures occur in some specific circumstances in which policy interventions 
have often been considered necessary. Typical situations in which markets fail can 
be broadly identified as concerns public goods, externalities, non-competitive and 
incomplete markets, and information. In these cases, markets failures come to the 
attention of policy makers when market outcomes are not those expected by the 
government. In other words, the government intervenes in the market when the 
market itself fails to reach the desirable goals for the society.  
In other cases, the government’s industrial policy has the aim of promoting the 
achievement of goals of strategic-economic importance. These goals are pursued in 
the name of the national interest and citizens’ welfare, thus going beyond the mere 
correction of market failures. In these cases governments identify a set of goals that 
have been defined to be strategic for the whole national economy. These goals can 
be grouped in different categories, such as the improvement of competitiveness, the 
acceleration of growth, structural adjustments, industrial development, industrial 
and economic independence, export promotion and import substitution, innovation 
and technological upgrading, the definition of measures to fight crisis, and recession 
(Di Tommaso and Schweitzer, 2013). These goals are usually pursued through the 
targeting of specific sectors considered for some reason to be strategic, such as coal, 
steel, textiles, automotive, shipping, defense, transport and construction. Recently, 
new trends have identified other sectors as being strategic, such as green industries, 
energy, ICT, aerospace, biotechnologies, etc. 
This type of intervention has been widely used in the past by countries aiming at 
the development of main strategic sectors. Among the others, European countries 
and Japan after World War II, and the US in the 1970s promoted policy 
interventions in specific sectors judged to be strategic and of national interest (Di 
Tommaso and Schweitzer, 2013). 
 44 
 
Finally, the last goal that government might be willing to achieve through its 
interventions is defined as meta-economic. With this term, we refer to a broader 
category of goals that has less to do with mere industrialization and growth. This is 
the case of state intervention aimed at the achievement of goals that go beyond the 
economic issues and rather include the distribution of wealth on the territory, 
reduction of any kind of disparities, environmental sustainability, and access to 
merit goods and satisfaction of basic needs. One typical example is equity in the 
distribution of social goals. Equal access to education or health can be favored by 
specific government intervention aimed at encouraging the production and 
diffusion of these goods. On the other hand, the government can discourage the 
production of goods named as non-meritorious, such as pollution. 
Broadly speaking, the government might be willing to pursue a general equity and 
balance in the society, thus smoothing all type of differences. Policies in this case 
would be focused not only on the decrease of wealth inequalities, but also on the 
reduction of social inequalities (thus concerning the access to voting rights, freedom 
of speech and assembly, the extent of property rights, the access to education, health 
care, quality housing, traveling, transportation, vacationing and other social goods 
and services), racial inequalities, gender inequalities, territorial inequalities, and 
inequalities in opportunities. 
While western countries have always privileged broad goals of development, 
performing lower growth rates, observing China, it is clear that the government’s 
first concern since the Opening-up has been the acceleration of growth pursued 
through long-term planning and industrial policies. Thus, governments play a great 
role in development, shaping the country and its future. 
As will be deeply described in the following chapter, China has always given a great 
importance to interventions aimed at the achievement of strategic goals: starting 
with more traditional sectors of the industry, then followed by policy of opening up, 
industrial development, acceleration of growth through targeting of specific 
territories, ending up, recently, with the development of specific sectors such as 
green industries, software and ICT.  
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On the other hand, market failures (and their solution) do not seem to concern the 
Chinese government, together with the meta-economic goals. Only in the last few 
decades it is possible to find an explicit declaration of intents in the five-year plans 
of the decrease of inequalities and provision of those goods not strictly connected 
to industrialization and growth. 
The aim here is not to define which model works better. The Chinese case has come 
to my attention since it is a territory in which industrialization has been promoted 
through industrial policy and planning (five-year plans) and justified for strategic 
reasons (Chang, 1996; Nolan, 2001; Di Tommaso & Rubini, 2012). On the other 
hand, it is becoming clearer and clearer that the Chinese interventions and planning 
had not considered collateral effects and that China has excluded from its objectives 
the resolution of market failures and only recently has started to pay attention to 
those goals that here have been named as “meta-economic”. 
 
 
 
 
1.6 THEORY ON INEQUALITIES 
Geographical differences are a structural feature of industrialization processes. 
Industry, capital, and labor do not evenly distribute with respect to territory. On the 
contrary, industrialization has always produced differences among geographical 
areas (Marshall, 1890; Weber, 1909; Lösch, 1940, Feldman, 1994; Krugman, 1991a, 
1995, 2011). 
In some cases, these differences are huge and tend to establish dual balances (e.g. 
urban vs. rural, north vs. south, east vs. west, coastal vs. inland areas, center vs. 
periphery) (Lewis, 1954; Boeke, 1953). In other cases, dualisms multiply and 
interconnect with each other, shaping a geography of production consisting of 
territories that show different levels of involvement in the processes of 
industrialization. From a dynamic perspective, it is clear that the processes of 
 46 
 
industrialization can stimulate agglomeration phenomena or relocation. Thus, the 
territory is continuously challenged by changes in balance and existing dualisms 
(Becattini, 1989; Swann et.al, 1988; Krugman, 1991b, 2011; Corò & Micelli, 2006). 
In other words, industrialization also means imbalance between territories. 
Furthermore, industrialization processes have historically proven to be able to be 
limited by such imbalances. 
In this framework descriptive analysis of the relationship between industrialization 
and territory can offer an important contribution to the debate by highlighting the 
existence of a plurality of paths which although relying on different spatial balances, 
have shown varying degrees of success and sustainability over time. 
Likewise, descriptive studies can offer important contributions to the analysis that 
also has objectives of a normative nature. It is possible and legitimate to argue for 
example that a process of industrialization "geographically balanced" is 
normatively more desirable than another process that instead determines, 
consolidates or emphasizes differences among territories. Cases of industrialization 
based on strong differences among regions may appear to policy makers, or even 
to citizens, not only "unfair" but also undesirable and socially unsustainable over 
time. 
Additionally, on the one hand historical experience of industrialization has 
highlighted the persistence or worsening of territorial differences, while on the 
other hand, economic policy measures have for a long time attempted to reduce 
these differences. For example this is the way policies in favor of territorial balance 
in Europe have always treated strong imbalances and differences between territories 
strongly connected to a high degree of industrialization (Di Tommaso, Sarcina & 
Bonnini, 2013). 
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1.7 FINAL REMARKS 
Government’s intervention is driven by its goals which can be summarized into 
three broad categories: resolve market failures, pursue strategic economic 
objectives, and achieve meta-economic goals. In history, every country and 
government has tried its own recipe mixing different policies trying to achieve one 
or more of them. China comes to my attention since it is a case of considerable 
economic growth, accompanied by heavy state intervention. However, to a closer 
look, it is possible to notice that intervention was mainly focused on the 
achievement of strategic goals, leaving aside the other two categories mentioned 
above. As described in the following paragraph, China is now reconsidering its 
policies and paying more attention to a broader range of goals to be achieved, such 
as meta-economic objective. 
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2 HOW CHINA DIFFERS FROM TRADITIONAL 
MODELS OF DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
 
 
2.1 RECENT ECONOMIC HISTORY OF CHINA 
In the history of China it is possible to observe an interconnected process of social, 
political, economic and ideological development. This is found in terms of the main 
objective of reaching wealth and abundance of goods in an egalitarian society. 
This view of the society in China took the name of Maoist Paradigm, because of 
the principles on which Mao founded its thought. It is inspired by Marxism and 
Leninism, and accompanied China in the transition to socialism. In particular, some 
basic theories of the Marxism-Leninism were re-developed in a way that they 
capture different aspects of the social, political, and economic life. 
The overview of the historical background of China presented here will make better 
understand the importance of the paradigm in the Chinese development. After 
several decades of wars and disorders in the country, China in 1949 was finally 
controlled by the Chinese Communist Party. China was at that time a country where 
heavy industrial manufacturing had decreased in production; consumer goods were 
at a very low level and the agricultural system was damaged.  These problems were 
further emphasized by the structural problems that China had aslo always 
experienced before the wars, such as shortage of resources endowments. Natural 
disasters due to rapid climate changes and the scarcity of arable land areas brought 
China to famines and crop failures several times. Also, the country was 
characterized by high levels of inequalities in the distribution of land and of 
incomes. In 1949 more than half of the whole arable land was owned by rich 
landlords and peasants (Hunt, 1989). 
When in 1949 the Chinese Communist Party took power, it had to tackle two main 
tasks: reconstruction of the capital stock and starting the transition toward socialism. 
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In the beginning of this process, the Chinese leadership developed a centralized-
authoritarian socialism based mainly on central planning. Agriculture was the main 
source of finance for state investments in the heavy industrial sector. The state used 
compulsory state buying quotas and influenced the terms of trade. In this context, 
output in agriculture and in the heavy industry grew rapidly. 
Soon, by the end of the ‘50s, the Chinese government understood that rapid and 
sudden growth could not be sustained for the long term. The growth that China 
initially experienced was mainly due to the fact that rural infrastructures were 
rebuilt and the land reform had produced a positive attitude among the population1.  
Furthermore, the population was increasing fast at about two percent every year. In 
particular, the rural population was suffering because of the increasing exploitation 
of agricultural resources that were used to finance the industrial sector. In turn, their 
per capita income was low and in continuous decrease. For these reasons the 
Chinese leadership perceived the need for change and realized its own capacity to 
rely on the experience of mass mobilization and of socialist administration gained 
before 1949 in the north of the country. It was believed that this experience had 
provided the foundations for an alternative development model in contrast to the 
Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist paradigms.  
At this point of the Chinese history, the figure of Mao emerged and his ideas started 
to be more and more supported. He claimed that the future of the Chinese 
Communist Party depended on the capacity of the Party to gain the support of the 
peasant masses. Its view was mainly based on the relevance of listening to the 
peasant needs and accepting their suggestions. By the end of the ‘50s and for the 
following two decades, policy statements and policy actions clearly showed the 
contents and significance of the Maoist thought. 
                                                     
1 The land reform allowed a redistribution of lands in favor of poor individual peasants; after the 
redistribution process, the reform promoted the creation of mutual aid teams in which resources of 
households were grouped together but cultivation was still run on an individual basis. Afterwards, 
basic cooperatives were created in order to concentrate land and resources while property rights did 
not change. Finally, at the end of the ‘50s, these cooperatives became larger and were included into 
advanced producer cooperatives in which resources were shared among participants. In 1958 these 
advanced cooperatives became communes - larger units of collective economy and government. 
 51 
 
In brief, the main points that have characterized the Maoist perspective are: (1) 
material wealth reached through economic development focusing policies on the 
abolition of income inequalities and on the establishment of socially owned 
productive properties, (2) creation of the economy’s productive capacity and 
formation of social production through social ownership of the means of production, 
social control of production decisions, and social control of the distribution of the 
product, (3) construction of a modern heavy industry sector, (4) social and 
economic transformation guided by the mass of the population which, in an 
underdeveloped economy like China, is mainly composed by peasants, and (5) 
promotion of economic and political equality between regions and the minimization 
of income differences among the population. 
Following these perspectives, Mao formulated a set of policies to be implemented 
in the country, ranging from agricultural taxes, price policy, and allocation of 
collective farm revenues on the basis of costs of production and management 
expenses. These policies were later followed by the mobilization of labor in the 
agricultural sector during the slack season in order to stimulate large-scale labor 
intensive capital formation and by the development of heavy and light industries in 
the rural areas. In this way, the development of a small and medium scale light and 
heavy industry was a pragmatic response to the structural problems that had always 
characterized China. During the Maoist era other policies were also implemented, 
such as the maximization of the aggregate rate of investment. the land reform (see 
note 1); promotion of new technologies in order to maximize the output especially 
in the state-owned heavy industries, price policy and tax policies aimed at the 
maximization of the surplus and at the expansion of the agricultural sector. 
It is possible to affirm that Chinese economic growth during this period of reforms 
had good performance both in agriculture and industry. This is particularly true if 
we consider the initial poor conditions of the country and the shortage of resources.  
Nonetheless, studies indicate that the initial high levels of growth were then 
followed by years of low increases in output especially in the agricultural sector. 
Some researchers (Hunt, 1989; Paine, 1976) claim that the decrease in output 
growth can be attributed to the fact that China, after few years of substantive growth, 
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had reached by the end of the ‘70s its self-sufficiency level thus satisfying human 
consumption requirements. Also, it has been assessed that after 1978 the reduction 
of inequalities came to a stop and the portion of the population in conditions of 
absolute poverty was about ten percent. Furthermore, great inequalities persisted 
among regions and within regions, though inequalities between neighboring 
villages and between members of the same production communes had a little 
decrease (Hunt, 1989). The type of centrally planned economy that was put in place 
from the 1949 until 1978, brought structural imbalances that favored industry over 
consumption (Yueh L. Y., 2010). It was the time for change. Living standards were 
not much better that twenty years earlier, state-owned sector produced almost all 
the industrial output, and average wages were lower. China gave strength to 
industry and generated innovation, but living conditions, technology advances and 
productive efficiency did not benefit from it. Chinese industrial growth is mainly 
due to a great increase in factors of production, rather than in the improvement in 
the efficiency of factors (Yueh, 2010). 
In 1978, economic development had become a top priority for Chinese government. 
In order to achieve this objective, the economy became market-oriented. At this 
time China started to grow at high rates of GDP (9% on average from 1978 to 2009). 
Chinese government implemented its reform strategy gradually and through a sort 
of experimentation that gave the possibility to test reforms regionally. In this 
context, the reform process started in the countryside, where township and village 
enterprises (TVEs) were created. This form of enterprise was able to transfer 
elements of industry into the rural economy. In this way, part of the surplus of labor 
found its allocation. Also, the Household Responsibility System gave the possibility 
to farmers to earn higher salaries derived from their work in the communes and 
based on their efforts. Between 1978 and 1985, agricultural production increased 
by 67% thanks to the increase in productivity caused by the incentives (Yueh, 2010). 
Furthermore, by the end of 1984 the control of the state on commodities was 
reduced greatly and limited to few products. 
In 1985, further reforms were taken in order to limit the intervention of the 
government in the definition of prices, thus allowing the market to define the 
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allocation of resources. Studies suggest that even after the liberalization of 
agricultural output, the process was not fully implemented and was performed in a 
discontinuous manner (Yueh, 2010). By the end of 1990s, agricultural output 
slowed down and decreased as a share of GDP from 30% in 1979 to 10% in 2000s. 
Nevertheless, these measures were judged successful and their use was further 
implemented in other fields of the economy. In 1984, the Chinese government 
introduced these types of reforms in the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Until that 
time, SOEs were characterized by inefficiencies due to unbinding budget 
constraints that caused companies to have no incentives to minimize costs. Most of 
them were subsidized loss-makers considered as social security tools to sustain full 
employment. Reforms allowed managers to have more decisional power and to 
receive part of the enterprises' profits. 
Furthermore, in 1984 the “dual track” pricing system was launched. With this 
system, SOEs were allowed to sell the excess of output. In this way, products could 
have a state-set price and a market price. The purpose of this system was to enable 
enterprises to tackle with market competition without creating abrupt cuts with the 
planned system. Together with these reforms the government introduced a great 
innovation to the institutional system which was called Contract Responsibility 
(CRS). It consisted of the possibility for firms to keep a certain quota of profits 
earned and re-invest them or use them to pay bonuses to employees. In this way, 
wages became later linked to performances and SOEs became more and more 
autonomous (Yueh, 2004 and 2010). These reforms were firstly perceived as 
successful, but in the late 1990s the first weaknesses started to arise. SOEs 
continued to demand subsidies from the government even though their profits 
increased. Furthermore, the reform did not change the budget constraints and most 
of the SOEs were experiencing losses. The CRS was abandoned in 1994 and 
replaced by a new reform - the so called corporatization. 
Corporatization was considered as a light form of privatization, the purpose of 
which was to favor the creation of market incentives through a clearer definition of 
property rights. Most of the SOEs were transformed into limited liability companies 
and by 2001, the SOEs decreased in number by about 50% with respect to 1994 
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(Yueh, 2010). By the end of 2001, most of the SOEs had been restructured, 
corporatized, sold, or out of business for bankruptcy. This was the result of the 
strategic realignment through which the Chinese government decided which sectors 
of the SOEs could be given away. This reform culminated with the highest rate of 
urban unemployment since the beginning of the reform process. Thus, there was 
still need to make some changes to the system. With this aim, in 2005, the Chinese 
government announced a new reform, the aim of which was to convert all non-
tradable shares into tradable shares in order to make them more attractive to small 
investors. The result was that the number of loss making SOEs diminished by more 
than half, the output value and value added of the SOEs increased, and profits 
improved by ten-fold in less than 10 years. In brief, the few SOEs still in business 
were more efficient compared to those in the pre-reform period (Yueh, 2010). 
Furthermore, in those years the Chinese Government initiated a process of 
liberalization of Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs)2 through which they 
became production units run like business enterprises. In this way, people who 
worked for TVEs could share the profits, thus increasing wages. By the end of 
1990s, TVE started to decline for several reasons including inefficiencies due to ill-
defined property rights, higher competition from domestic and foreign firms, WTO 
accession in 2001 and the rise of the private sector. TVE have been a great trigger 
for growth even though they had difficulties surviving in the second period of 
reform. It is believed that the initial success of the TVE was due to the surplus of 
labor in agriculture. The revival of the agricultural industry is now back in vogue 
because of the low income in rural areas and the high rate of population still living 
in the countryside.  
In this framework, privately owned firms were initially hindered by the notion of 
communal property that was at the basis of the Communist thought. In 1987, the 
Chinese government recognized the importance of privately owned enterprises and 
began to consider them as a «necessary supplement to the state sector» (Yueh, 2010). 
Nonetheless, private firms were still considered as business activity started by 
                                                     
2 TVE were economic units that were either collective owned or owned and controlled by rural 
citizens. In reality, before the reform was implemented, they were controlled by the local 
government.  
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people that for some reason were temporarily outside the economy such as 
unemployed, retired, and farmers. One of the reasons why the private sector did not 
take off was that the law system in this field was very poor and did not favor the 
development of new private businesses. In this perspective, in 1997, the 
government recognized the private sector not only supplemental, but also necessary, 
to the state sector and as a fundamental part of the economic system. The private 
sector started to be encouraged with laws giving equal protection to private and 
public sector. Nowadays, the number of private firms has increased thanks to a 
greater opening of the market. However, most of them are small and medium sized 
enterprises and still face difficulties with property rights protection.  
In 1978, the Open Door Policy was launched and market-oriented measures were 
started in order to attract investments, develop manufacturing skills and increase 
export capacity. In 1979 the Law on Joint Ventures was adopted. Through this law, 
foreign investments were granted a legal status. At the very start of this reform only 
Chinese-foreign joint ventures were permitted. The aim was to allow Chinese firms 
to learn from foreign investors. In a second phase of the reform wholly-owned 
foreign owned firms were permitted. 
One of the first steps made under this reform was to create the Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs)3. SEZs were first established only in four places as experiments 
through which the government could verify the effect of the policy before extending 
it to the rest of the country. They were created in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and 
Xiamen; all considered as strategic places because of their proximity to Taiwan and 
Hong Kong. In the SEZ, investors could find special conditions to settle their 
businesses, such as preferential tax policies, incentives, and infrastructures. 
Furthermore, China increased the level of government decentralization, thus 
allowing the local government to implement reform enjoying greater autonomy in 
decisions made on foreign trade issues.  
It was only after Deng Xiaoping’s visit in Southern China in 1992, that these 
reforms took off. The aim of SEZs was to promote international trade by favoring 
the development of export processing zones. In this way, foreign investments 
                                                     
3 See in depth paragraph on SEZs in Guangdong (par. 4.3.1) 
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increased by 15% in 10 years (from 15% of GDP in 1990, to 30% in 2000) and 
China affirmed its strength in the global market (Yueh, 2010). This was also favored 
by the fact that the burden of bureaucracy was enormously reduced and the cost of 
labor was extremely low.  
Nonetheless, there was still some constraint to the establishment of foreign firms in 
SEZs even after the accession of China to the WTO in 2001. This limited the 
investment of foreign firms that found it difficult to start their businesses in China 
and to penetrate the Chinese domestic market.  
Once the economic growth of China started, the Chinese government oriented its 
intervention to other fields, such us technological upgrading, strengthening of 
competitiveness, protection of infant industries, reduction of regional disparities. 
Finally in 2008, the global financial crisis decelerated the Chinese growth. At this 
point, China faced its weaknesses due to the strong dependency on foreign demand. 
The Chinese model showed fragilities in the outward-oriented industrial strategy 
and the government was finally engaged in the implementation of a new strategy 
aimed at stimulating the internal market (Di Tommaso et al. 2012). 
 
 
 
2.2 FEATURES OF THE CHINESE MODEL 
China represents a new model of development in several important respects: 
industrial upgrading efforts are often domestically driven, within this domestic 
market there is intense competition between both domestic and foreign firms, and 
this competition is driving and stimulating the upgrading efforts of domestic firms. 
The interest in defining the characteristics of the Chinese success comes both from 
those who fear and those who support the country. 
China is one of the Asian countries in which the rules of the Washington Consensus 
were not fully applied and that performed extremely well in terms of economic 
growth. Especially at the beginning of the reform during the 1980s and 1990s, 
People’s Republic of China maintained high barriers on imports. After the first 
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decade of enormous economic growth, the government agreed that it was the right 
moment to start a policy of trade liberalization. According to Rodrik (2006) it was 
the initial growth that gave the chance to the government to implement a trade 
liberalization policy while in other cases in which the rules of the Washington 
Consensus were applied trade liberalization was used as a policy tool since the 
beginning with the aim of starting the process of growth. On the other hand it is 
stated (Lee, 2006; Lee et al., 2006) that the reasons of the success of China and a 
few other Asian countries, such as Taiwan and South Korea, can be found not only 
in the application of policies in a determined sequence, but also to the fact that some 
of the policies prescribed in the Washington Consensus were actually not applied. 
In (Figure 2.1), it is possible to observe that China applied only partially the dictates 
of the Washington Consensus, thus creating its unique formula of growth.  
 
Figure 2.1. Washington Consensus vs. China's policy tools 
Elements of the Washington Consensus China’s policy tools 
Fiscal discipline Yes 
Reorientation of public expenditures Yes 
Tax reform Since 1994 
Unified and competitive exchange rate Since 1994 
Trade liberalization Started slowly after accession to WTO 
(2001) 
Openness to FDIs Only in some strategic sectors 
Privatization Partially implemented, some SOEs still 
active 
Deregulation Limited  
Secure property rights Partially implemented 
Financial liberalization Partially applied since the 1980s 
Sources: author’s elaboration on Rodrik (2006) and Lee et al. (2006). 
 
In addition, the Chinese government implemented other policies in fields not 
included in the Washington Consensus: exports were strongly promoted together 
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with the introduction of import tariffs, technological upgrading was extremely 
incentivized since the mid-1990s, and spreading of higher education was highly 
stimulated (Lee, 2011). 
As already widely explained in the previous paragraph (2.1), China paid much 
attention to the protection of local firms, especially infant industries, and to the 
promotion of exports. The turning point for the trade strategy happened in 2002 
when the Chinese government encouraged domestic companies to invest overseas 
with the «go global» strategy. In this way the Chinese government satisfied the need 
to create new brands, to access new markets, and to increase the stock of natural 
resources (Hess, 2006). 
China implemented a strong strategy in order to increase R&D expenditures and 
favor technological upgrading. In 2000, R&D expenditures were 1 percent of GDP, 
while in the last few years it has already increased by 0.7 percent. R&D and 
innovation are now replacing the role that FDIs had in the initial period as engines 
of growth. Additionally, local learning institutions have been recently established 
and the access to foreign knowledge has been increasingly encouraged. These 
strategies are considered as critical factors for growth and catch-up. In the initial 
stages of the Chinese development, the government favored the joint ventures 
partnerships in order to apply the strategy of «trading the market for technology». 
With this strategy, China skipped some stages of the development process, 
especially, in terms of production of certain technologies. In later stages, the 
government tried to link academic institutions to industrial businesses and stimulate 
the creation of knowledge and new technologies for commercial purposes.  
In terms of higher education, the Chinese government succeeded in increasing the 
number of enrolled students by 20 percent every year since 1998. Furthermore with 
the 211 Project, launched in 1995 and the «Invigorating the country through Science 
and Education Strategy» in the last decade Chinese scientific production has 
significantly increased. (Lee, 2011).  
In 2004, the combination of policies that had characterized the Chinese 
development was defined as the Beijing Consensus as opposed to the Washington 
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Consensus. Ramo (2004) stated in the book The Beijing Consensus that the Chinese 
growth had to be considered as a model for other countries of the world seeking 
development. He wrote that: 
China is marking a path for other nations around the world who are 
trying to figure out not simply how to develop their countries, but 
also how to fit into the international order in a way that allows them 
to be truly independent, to protect their way of life and political 
choices in a world with a single massively powerful centre of gravity. 
I call this new centre and physics of power and development the 
Beijing Consensus. (Ramo, 2004, pp.3-4) 
He declared that the three main pillars of the Beijing Consensus were development 
based on innovation, sustainability and equality as main objectives, self-reliance in 
international relations and policy decision-making. 
These ideas have been later discussed and opposed by a number of economists 
(Dirlik, 2006; Kennedy, 2010; Nathan, 2003; Nye, 2005) claiming that China’s 
economic growth has generated several problems such as pollution, enormous 
consumption of energy, inequalities, corruption, etc. Furthermore they believe that 
China’s growth cannot be replicated in other places because of some intrinsic 
features of the country (abundant workforce). They also criticize the mix of planned 
and market economy directed by an authoritarian government. 
Li et at. (2010) have tried to reply to these critiques by saying that there is no case 
of a country growing at these rates without facing problems. They support the idea 
of an authoritarian system as a feasible type of government since the Chinese one 
demonstrated a great flexibility and self-sufficiency. They see the Beijing 
Consensus as a counterpart of the Washington Consensus and, finally, they suggest 
a list of ten principles that summarize the main characteristics of their idea of 
Beijing Consensus: 
1. Use of localized policies shaped on specific characteristics of the region; 
2. Find the right balance between market and planned economy; 
3. Flexibility in design and implementation of policies; 
4. Independence and freedom from other countries in policy decision-making; 
5. Stable political environment domestically and internationally; 
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6. Self-sufficiency (after learning from other countries); 
7. Continuous technological upgrading especially in strategic industries; 
8. Development of domestic innovation (technological and institutional); 
9. Slow and thoughtful liberalization of financial markets; 
10. Harmonious society reached through letting people that get rich first help 
poor people to prosper;  
Finally Enfu and Xiangyang (2011) define the Chinese model as system made of a 
“quadruple structure”. In the first layer there are four pillars: namely, public 
ownership in a system in which also domestic and international private firms are 
allowed as long as they respect the qualitative and quantitative standards, labor 
value based on the principles of efficiency and equity, state adjustment in a market 
system - meaning the role of the state in achieving the optimum allocation of 
resources, and balance between innovation self-reliance and foreign technological 
upgrading. The second layer is the political framework in which the union of Party’s 
leadership, people and laws create favorable conditions for growth. The third layer 
is culture life which is believed to be the source of cohesion and creativity for the 
society. The fourth and last layer is represented by social development, meaning 
the idea of harmonious society pursued by the state. 
The concept of Beijing Consensus is now more and more used alternatively to the 
expression “China Model”. It has been named also Comcapitalism to indicate the 
fusion between China’s communist political legacy and capitalist economic 
practices implemented during the reform era (Zhang & Sun, 2012). Also in this case 
the authors identify some specific features that make this model different from 
others: China’s growth is driven by an internal motive deriving from the willing of 
the Communist Party to change policies gradually, high efficiency of the 
government due to the hierarchical organizational structure, experimentation of 
policies learnt and adapted from other countries’ experiences gave to this model an 
extraordinary capacity of adaptability and assimilability, gradualism in the 
implementation of liberalization in politics and economy, and lastly, economic 
growth as a top priority.  
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Finally, the expression of Beijing Consensus assumes in some cases different 
meanings. These terms sometimes identify the success of China in opposition to the 
problems that the Western countries are now facing. On the contrary, they are also 
used to identify the phenomenon of China’s increasing influence in the world 
economy, meaning the threat that it might represent in certain fields (Ortmann, 
2012).  
In conclusion, looking at the Chinese case in the light of what has been said in the 
previous chapter it is thus clear that the massive industrial interventions have been 
justified within the framework of the government-led strategy of growth (Di 
Tommaso & Rubini, 2012; Di Tommaso & Schweitzer, 2013). With its “national 
strategy” for industrialization, China has implemented three decades of national and 
regional policies all defined in long-run planning aimed at the acceleration of 
growth and industrialization. 
Since 1978, when the Deng era began, this idea of government intervention in favor 
of the strategic economic interest of the country has been one of the main 
characteristics of the Chinese industrialization process. Picking strategic sectors has 
been a decisive activity in the industrialization strategy promoted by the Chinese 
government. During the last three decades of massive continuous growth 
interventions have been promoted in those industries judged to be strategic for the 
future of the national economy. Furthermore, structural change interventions have 
been promoted in order to favor a shift toward those activities declared strategic. 
Industrial policy programs to protect and to encourage the development of strategic 
“infant industries” or to support “national champions” have also been pillars of the 
general strategy of Chinese industrial development.  
Also, the set of reforms launched in 1998, gave the start to an unprecedented period 
of growth. Reforms were aimed at solving the problem of bankruptcy of state-
owned enterprises and the banking system. The main changes that have affected 
China since 1998 are related to the establishment of a self-sufficient banking system, 
the establishment of corporations replacing the state-owned enterprises run by the 
government, the creation of a new legal system, the inclusion in the WTO, the 
development of a housing market, and the reduction of barriers to the movement of 
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people (OECD, 2013). Nonetheless, in the last few years growth seems to have 
slowed.  
Thus the definition of a set of priorities and strategic sectors on which government 
should focus its policy efforts is at the center of the country’s planning and 
industrialization strategy.  In the 12th five-year program for China’s Economic and 
Social Development adopted at the Fifth Plenum of the 17th Communist Party of 
China’s Central Party Conference Central Committee seven strategic industries 
were clearly listed (Di Tommaso & Schweitzer, 2013): 
 Alternative-fuel cars (hybrid cars, electric cars, fuel-cell batteries), 
 Biotechnology (biomedicines, new vaccines for disease prevention, 
advanced medical equipment, marine biology), 
 Green industries (energy-saving technologies, pollution control, clean 
coal, waste-matter recycling, seawater exploitation), 
 Alternative energy, including next-generation nuclear power plants, 
solar power, wind power, smart grids, bioenergy, 
 Advanced materials, including rare earth minerals, special glass, high-
performance steel and fibers, composites, engineering plastic, nano and 
superconducting materials, 
 Information Technology (IT), such as cloud computing, high-end 
software, virtual technology, new display systems, 
 High-tech manufacturing of products including aircraft, high-speed rail, 
satellites, and off-shore equipment.   
In this framework the Chinese Government has announced a set of policies to 
support basic research, R&D in some key technologies, education system 
modernization in some selected disciplines, and major state-level science and 
technology projects. The government has also announced targeted fiscal policies 
and an increase in investments in order to support domestic innovation and the 
industrialization of scientific research. Finally, the government is going to launch 
tax and financial policies to develop and reorganize the structure of the seven 
industrial groups including guiding and encouraging mergers and acquisitions to 
increase manufacturing industry concentration and efficiency. Considering all these 
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announcements, the Chinese government’s strategy clearly seems to go in the 
direction of promoting strategic industries in name of national interest. 
Nonetheless, OECD sounded the alarm of a problem of middle-income trap in the 
medium-term and suggests that this might be partly due to structural factors that 
need to be solved through reforms (OECD, 2013). In particular, OECD suggests 
increasing the efforts in innovation, reforms in the financial market, reforms of the 
land rights, changes in the labor market, reforms in the taxation system, and a switch 
to a sustainable use of natural resources. 
 
 
 
2.3 CHINA TODAY: BETWEEN INEQUALITIES AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 
For a long time, the debate on the problem of territorial imbalances in terms of 
industrial development has caught the attention of several researchers and policy 
makers. Industrial policy is identified as one of the factors that influence these 
imbalances. Policy intervention in fact, is sometimes used to mitigate the spatial 
diversity in an attempt to increase in some areas the concentration of elements that 
determine industrial development, such as labor, capital, infrastructure, and 
education. However, in some cases industrial policy has contributed to increase or 
generate these imbalances. 
China's case is emblematic because it is one of the places where the policy action 
was massive and was accompanied by very high industrial performance. Such 
performances, it is clear in the literature (Biggeri & Hirsch,2008; Fan C. C, 1995; 
Fan & Sun, 2008; Fan, Kanbur, & Zhang, 2009; Fan, Kanbur, & Zhang, 2011; Fang, 
Zhang, & Fan, 2002; Li & Fang, 2013; Naughton, 2002; Wei & Fan, 2000; Zhang 
& Kanbur, 2009), are not uniformly distributed on the whole territory. Fan et al. 
(2011) show that from 1952 to 2008, China has had three peaks in terms of 
inequality, especially during the Great Famine, at the end of the Cultural Revolution, 
during the current period of global integration. Similarly, the authors point out three 
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stages in which the Chinese territories had the lowest inequality: in 1952, at the 
beginning of the data series used in the analysis by the authors, in 1967, during the 
years of recovery after the Great Famine and before and in 1984, at the end of the 
period of agrarian reform and before the start of the expansion due to global 
integration. In general, inequality appears to have decreased in the periods in which 
policy makers supported the use of policies in favor of agriculture and the rural 
sector, but increased in the phases in which these fields were abandoned. 
It is possible to affirm that regional inequalities in China have been partially 
influenced by government policies. Fan et al. (2011) argue that there is a strong 
association between the policies put in place since the 1950s and the inequalities 
that still characterize the entire Chinese territory. In the 1950s, China has focused 
its development efforts on a single priority: heavy industry. Probably influenced by 
what was happening in the Soviet Union, the government limited the prices of 
agricultural products, in order to extract more resources to be allocated to the 
financing of heavy industry. In addition, the government imposed a system of 
household registration (hukou) in order to give stability to the labor supply in the 
agricultural sector confining people to work in their place of birth. Meanwhile, in 
urban districts, residents enjoyed easy access to food, housing, education, jobs in 
state- or collective-owned enterprises. 
The development strategy in which the industry was the driving force to the 
economy, culminated in the Great Leap Forward, which eventually led to the Great 
Famine in the late 1950s. The inequality between urban and rural areas reached its 
peak with the Great Famine and then at the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966-
1976). This strategy led to nearly three decades of economic stagnation. Fearing 
that it could bring to a new and more terrible famine because of the meager 
performance achieved in agricultural production with the system of collective 
agriculture, at the end of the 1970s the central government moved the strategy 
development towards more labor-intensive sectors: initially agriculture and then 
rural industries exports-oriented. The rural reform guaranteed farmers the right to 
cultivate the land and make their own independent production decisions. The 
reform stimulated an increase in agricultural production and farmers' incomes. 
Labor productivity increased, thus creating a surplus of labor in the agricultural 
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sector. Moreover, the increase in household income in rural areas led to an increase 
in the demand of manufactured goods. In turn, this led to new development 
opportunities for the labor intensive Town-Village Enterprises (TVEs). 
In the 1980s, China decided that the opening to the rest of the world is its own 
development strategy. In this way, the competitive advantage of coastal areas began 
to increase. The coastal areas benefited extensively and from the very beginning of 
the opening strategy undertaken by China because of their proximity to 
international markets and to the more advanced economies. In less than twenty 
years, China has become the largest recipient of FDIs among developing countries. 
As a consequence of this, the coastal regions have shown to experience rapid growth 
that has led to the increase of the gap between coastal and inner areas. 
In those years, China also started its transformation from a planned economy to a 
market economy. A number of policies were introduced in order to regulate the 
migration of people thus trying to solve the labor surplus in rural areas. This, 
however, caused a massive migration to urban areas where job opportunities were 
greater. Controls on prices became more and more relaxed until the mid-1990s 
when prices and quantities of most of the products were determined by the market. 
The government then carried out massive investments for the construction of roads 
and railways in order to reduce transportation costs. These investments, however, 
did not facilitate the reduction of regional disparities between rural and urban areas, 
which remained unchanged, while the disparities between the coast and inland areas 
increased (Fan et al., 2011). In order to provide additional incentives to local 
governments with the aim of developing local economies, the central government 
launched a tax reform that tied spending to local revenue. The fiscal 
decentralization increased competition among counties, promoting economic 
growth. Moreover, in this way, local governments could decide autonomously the 
territorial redistribution. 
At the end of the 1990s, to give a response to the financial crisis that hit Asian 
countries, the government launched the development plan for Western China, in 
order to fight the crisis and reduce inequality. In this phase numerous investments 
in infrastructure were promoted. Over the past decade the central government 
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abolished some taxes (on agriculture, education, etc.) in rural areas and provided 
subsidies to farmers to support agricultural production and the income of peasants. 
China is now a country that is gaining more and more weight in the international 
context (just think that in 2010 the IMF and the World Bank increased the voting 
power of developing countries such as China). The Chinese process of change, of 
industrial development and growth, is still ongoing. After three decades of 
continuous and uninterrupted growth, in 2008, following the blast of the global 
financial crisis, China experienced the first slight slowdown. Compared to other 
developed countries China felt the crisis in a different way - the GDP growth rate 
decreased very little with respect to the previous year (Figure 2.2). Chu (2010) 
suggests that this is due mainly to the institutional legacy of three decades of 
reforms and policies. The reforms that have characterized the Chinese model have 
been the reason why this system did not experience the threat of the global crisis. 
Furthermore, the stimulus given to the aggregate demand by finding a balance 
between the goal of constant employment level and fiscal debt level gave further 
stability to the economy. 
 
Figure 2.2. GDP Growth rates (annual %)
 
Source: Author’s elaboration on World Bank data 
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On the other hand, due to the 2008 global financial crisis, the Chinese government 
has realized for the first time the existence of weaknesses in a system strongly 
dependent on foreign demand. For this reason, China launched the so-called Go 
Domestic policies which are aimed at encouraging the development of domestic 
companies (Di Tommaso et al., 2012). This policy, combined with the previous go-
global policies, would also enlarge the potentialities of development of China in the 
long term.  
Despite its unrestrainable and unprecedented economic growth, China has been 
facing the challenge of increasing unbalances that have emerged in economic, 
political, social and environmental fields. Deng Xiaoping’s strategy of «let some 
people get rich first» has resulted in a society full of inequalities. The Gini Index 
went from 0.29 in the early 1980s to 0.43 in 2009 (World Bank, 2013). The great 
attention paid to the achievement of continuous and sound economic growth turned 
into an improvement of some areas while living standards have remained the same 
or even worsen in others (Biggeri, 2003; Biggeri & Hirsch, 2008; Stiglitz, 2008; 
Zhang & Sun, 2012). Promoting policies aimed at openness and industrialization 
was originally meant to allow some territories to make "controlled leaps forward" 
in which rules of capitalism have been applied, that were later progressively 
widened and gradually multiplied; territories of economic (and social) innovation 
in which capitalism was first experimented; territories that drove the 
industrialization and growth of the country. Places that after successful 
experimentations were allowed progressively to infect other areas and spread the 
intervention of policy. This is a process that is still ongoing and that has lasted for 
the past three decades in which the accelerated industrialization, structural change, 
and then the gradual process of technological upgrading has continued to live with 
the worsening of strong differences between regions (Di Tommaso e al., 2013; Di 
Tommaso et al., 2012; Rubini et al., 2013). 
Thus, the industrialization process fueled dualisms and inequalities involving the 
territories with different intensities and at different times. Studies demonstrate (Li 
& Fang, 2013) that industrialization is the most important cause of Chinese regional 
inequality at the county level and rural-urban and coastal-inland inequalities have 
increased (Biggeri, 2008). This is one of the most common criticisms that are made 
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against the Chinese industrialization model (Fan, 1995; Kanbur & Zhang, 1999; 
Wei & Fan, 2000, Wang, 2007). Such a model would risk collapse if unable to 
reconcile territorial differences increasingly evident and increasingly socially 
unsustainable. Thus, in recent years, the policy debate in China has started to show 
strong concern on the increasing inequalities (UNDP, 1999; Zhang & Kanbur, 
2009).  
As a communist regime, China must necessarily deal with the problem of 
inequalities in the name of social justice and of the “harmonious society”. 
Furthermore, growing inequalities in different fields (health, education, rural-urban, 
coastal-inland, etc.) are blamed to be the reason of growing social discontent and 
of slow poverty reduction (Zhang & Kanbur, 2009). These unbalances have, in fact, 
caused discontent among the population which in turn has generated concern in the 
government. The risk is a deep fragmentation of the territory if the government does 
not promptly solve this issue. Furthermore the Chinese Communist Party risks to 
lose its legitimacy since the uneven wealth distribution is against the political 
ideology of Communism (Zhang & Sun, 2012).  
Stiglitz (2008) suggests that now is the time to make some changes to the Chinese 
model since circumstances have changed and policies now in place are not effective 
anymore. The pragmatism that characterized the Chinese success needs to be 
replaced with a new economic model. 
Thus, policies in favor of territorial rebalancing are more and more an integral part 
of the overall design of Chinese growth. Already in the past few years policies were 
launched with the aim of reducing situations of excessive congestion of productive 
activity in some areas, or on the contrary, with the aim of reducing 
underdevelopment in zones that had remained in the margins of the processes of 
industrial growth (Di Tommaso et al., 2013; Di Tommaso et al., 2012; Rubini et al., 
2013).  
Now, the goal is to let the whole population enjoy the benefits of growth without 
differences between territories, social class or ethnicity. The true challenge is to 
address these problems while maintaining high growth rates and increasing 
development (Di Tommaso, 2012; Chu, 2010; Zhang & Sun, 2012).  
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The Chinese government already started making some changes since 2005. A 
healthy population can have positive externalities on the entire society thank to the 
reduction in the transmission of infectious diseases (Paci & Schweitzer, 2006). Thus, 
the government has started to focus attention on health care policies aimed, in 
particular, at the population of the poor rural areas. In 2009, health care insurance 
had already covered about 90% of the rural population. 
Supporting measures were taken also in favor of agriculture and employment of 
young graduates, rural migrant workers, and other unemployed (Zhang & Sun, 
2012). 
China is now moving away from export-led growth and supporting some other 
measures of development that favor the decrease in inequalities that, in turn, will 
be advantageous for the entire economy. Firstly, a reduction of the level of 
inequalities would cause an increase in consumption that would, in turn, bring 
benefits to small businesses that suffer from the lack of access to credit (Stiglitz, 
2008).  
Hence, the Chinese government has started to pay attention to goals that differ from 
the mere industrialization and growth. In its planning and policy strategy the 
government is starting to promote the wellbeing of the population. In the 11th five-
year plan (referring to the period 2006-2010), the Chinese government intended to 
shift its goals from the pursuit of economic growth in the name of the statement 
“getting people rich first” to “putting people first” (Fan, 2006). Thus the 
harmonious society has become one of the priorities reached through employment, 
social security poverty reduction, education, health care, environmental protection, 
and safety. In this new strategy framework Chinese leaders seem to continue to 
emphasize economic growth and industrialization as absolute priorities 
accompanied by a more harmonious distribution of the benefits (Fan, 2006). For 
the first time, the plan recognizes the existence of problems occurred during the 
rapid and massive economic growth such as environmental pollution and the rise of 
deep inequalities. Thus, emerges a distinction between economic growth and 
development. 
 70 
 
From the 11th Five-Year Plan onwards the policy targets are mainly related to 
conservation of resources, reduction of pollution, and the increase of human 
wellbeing. Specific targets for birth control, urbanization, social protection, and 
education have been identified. Furthermore, the issue of intra- and inter-regional 
inequalities has come to the attention of the five year plan. For this reason the 11th 
Five-Year Plan includes a focus on the promotion of “coordinated development 
among regions” with the aim of reducing inequalities and strengthening the 
development of slow-growth territories (Fan, 2006).  
It must be pointed out that inequalities in China refer not only to the mere 
distribution of income in different regions or provinces. They are also concerned 
with the substantial differences within and between urban areas. As demonstrated 
(Fang, Zhang & Fan, 2002), urban poverty declined from 1992 to 1995, but 
increased from 1996 to 1998, when major urban reforms were launched. They also 
state that rapid economic growth has been the major force behind reduction in urban 
poverty, but the poverty reduction impact would have been even greater if 
worsening income distribution had been avoided.  
The reforms implemented by the Chinese government on the one hand reduced 
workers’ lifetime welfare ties to their employers, thus providing them with a higher 
degree of freedom to change jobs and achieve higher earning potential. The reforms 
allowed market forces to determine workers’ pay according to their ability. The 
efficiency gains from urban reform are highlighted by a dramatic increase in per 
capita urban income with an annual growth rate of about 6% in the 1990s (Fang, 
Zhang & Fan, 2002). 
On the other hand, however, urban reforms and severe competition from other 
sectors have resulted in soaring financial losses of SOEs and collective-owned 
enterprises, and an increasing number of urban workers have been laid off. The two 
opposite forces of urban reforms may have contributed to the deterioration of urban 
income distribution from 1992 to 1998.  
Hence, in brief, urban reforms have released workers’ potential and increased 
efficiency as evidenced by the rapid income growth rate. But while many have 
benefited from new economic opportunities as a result of urban reforms, some 
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groups are facing new risk and vulnerability (Fang, Zhang & Fan, 2002). 
Furthermore, a poor welfare system has caused a rapid increase in expenditures on 
education, healthcare, and housing. This makes the poor more vulnerable to shocks 
and malnutrition and less likely to develop human capital, reducing their ability to 
catch up. Social inequality might cause people to live in a social setting in which 
they care about their relative positions in a society. High social inequality is often 
related to low happiness. In addition, large social inequality often leads to more 
crimes and social instability which, in turn, contribute negatively to investment 
environment and economic growth. Finally, the increasing gap of social 
development will reduce the effect of economic growth on poverty reduction. Thus, 
social inequality is as important as income inequality (Zhang & Kanbur, 2005). 
In the era of market reforms the old system of education and healthcare provision 
was cancelled. First, the increasing fiscal decentralization has reduced the central 
government’s redistributive power. Many local governments, in particular those in 
poor regions with insufficient revenues, have largely withdrawn from their role in 
investing in human development. Second, increasing competition has condemned 
SOEs as it is difficult to serve well the dual task of profit maximizing and welfare 
provision. As a result, a large number of SOEs have laid off employees and reduced 
welfare benefits. Third, weak governance at the village level made it difficult to 
finance public infrastructure in rural areas. Fourth, government could not mobilize 
vast manpower in public works as they did in the planned era because labor must 
be adequately compensated in the market economy. 
Zhang & Kanbur (2005) examined the spatial patterns of social development 
indicators. The changing distribution in outcome of education and public health has 
reflected the evolution of underlying institutions in the process of economic 
transformation. Social inequalities in rural, urban, inland, and coastal areas have 
increased since the economic reforms. In particular, the rural–urban gap in infant 
mortality rate is increasing and the gender gap in literacy is still large. 
Investments in education and research sectors together with the enhancement of 
knowledge diffusion are found to be key factors of the Chinese economic growth 
(Biggeri, 2003). A well-educated labor force is a key factor to ensuring China’s 
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success in incorporating the challenges of the market economy. In addition, 
increasing social inequality may increase social instability which in turn affects 
economic growth (Zhang & Kanbur, 2005). 
 
 
 
2.4 FINAL REMARKS 
China differs from traditional models of development. It has applied specific 
strategic policies to specific strategic industries, with the aim of accelerating 
economic growth and fostering industrialization. This has been pursued through 
long term planning that has given priority to growth, leaving aside other crucial 
issues. In the last few years in China it has become clear that the massive, 
continuous economic growth has produced side costs that cannot be tolerated in the 
long run. Thus, recently the government has started to focus on the solution of 
problems such as pollution and inequalities. In this work, I am going to focus on 
this last issue, territorial inequalities, since I believe that the solution of this topic 
could assure to China a stable and continuous growth in the future. This topic will 
be studied for the case of the whole China and then of Guangdong, since this 
province can be considered as a concentration of all the elements that characterize 
China, including inequalities.   
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3 TERRITORIAL UNBALANCES IN CHINA 
 
 
 
 
3.1 OBJECTIVE OF THE ANALYSIS: ASSESSMENT OF 
TERRITORIAL UNBALANCES IN CHINA 
For more than three decades, since 1978, China has experienced extremely high 
growth rates. This growth has been mainly based on industrialization rather than 
other factors. As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, Chinese policies have been 
mainly oriented to reach strategic economic objectives. The focus of the debate has 
recently moved to the way in which economic growth has involved most of the 
Chinese territory.  
In other words, policy makers and scholars are trying to assess if Chinese economic 
growth has been territorially balanced and industrialization has been spread 
uniformly all over the Chinese territory.  
Furthermore, it is central in the debate to understand which provinces have 
benefited the most from industrialization and which areas have experienced higher 
levels of growth than others. Also investigated is the ability of provinces to improve 
their situation moving from low-performance to high-performance level or vice 
versa, to worsen their situation moving from high to low-performance. 
Finally, considered the long path of growth that China has been following for more 
than three decades, there is little information about the trend of territorial 
unbalances. A decrease or intensification of territorial inequalities could give a clear 
view of the actual situation of Chinese industrial growth and could suggest future 
steps for policy agenda.  
This chapter tries to address these questions going through different stages of 
analysis. Firstly, there is the need to consider the Chinese growth in the last three 
decades. Although in literature there is already wide evidence of the Chinese 
economic growth, in this case the evidence will be brought through the use of an 
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alternative indicator that replaces the usual indicators of growth (e.g. gross domestic 
product). The idea is to give comprehensive information of economic growth 
through the use of several economic dimensions which represent industrialization, 
labor, export capacity, and population income.  
This will be the starting point for the subsequent step of assessing the existence of 
inequalities over the Chinese territory. It will be investigated by several means and 
at different levels. At first, it is important to assess the trend of performances in 
terms of heterogeneity from 1998 until 2010. In this way, it will be clearer if China 
has been experiencing a growth or decrease of territorial unbalances over the decade 
considered.  
Then, attention will be focused on the geographical distribution of performances in 
order to understand where higher performances concentrate. Literature suggests 
that the Chinese territory can be divided into four areas according to their level of 
economic performances4 (Fan, 1995; NBS, 2011; Barone et al., 2013). In this phase 
it is important to understand the path of provinces during the decade considered. In 
other words, it is interesting to find out which provinces have led growth for the 
whole period, which have been lagging behind and which have gradually improved 
in recent years.  
Finally the analysis will be concluded with the assessment of similarities among the 
areas previously defined. The aim in this phase is to understand if groups of 
provinces (selected according to different geographic characteristics and according 
to literature of reference) are similar in terms of distribution of performances. A 
negative answer to this question would confirm the thesis of a territory marked by 
great and widely diffused differences. 
Accordingly, from a statistical point of view, the work is developed in the following 
steps: 
1. Identification and calculation of the variables at national level and at 
province level from 1998 until 2010; 
                                                     
4 Further details on the areas will be given in the following paragraph (par. 3.6). 
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2. Calculation for the Index of Performance at national level. In order to do so, 
it is firstly appropriate to normalize all the variables and test each variable 
for normality distribution and subsequently, to apply the Liptak combining 
function for synthetizing the information of the variable obtaining the 
National Index of Performance for each year from 1998 to 2010; 
3. Calculation of the Index of Performance at provincial level and 
classification of provinces in four categories according to the value of the 
index. Quartiles of the distributions of the 31 provinces are used as threshold 
values; 
4. Calculation of the Gini’s Index of heterogeneity normalized with respect to 
the values of 1998; 
5. Grouping of provinces according to their geographical location in 4 areas 
and maps elaboration; 
6. Calculation of the Index of similarity among provinces. 
 
 
3.2 DESCRIPTION OF DATASETS 
The data used in this analysis were collected from China Statistical Yearbooks of 
several years from 1999 until 2011.  
Two datasets have been used for this analysis. Data refer to both the national and 
the provincial administrative level. At national level the units of analysis are 13 
(years, 1998-2013). At the provincial level the units of analysis are 31 (provinces) 
and the period considered goes from 1998 to 2010. In both datasets the variables 
considered are five for each year5:  
 Gross industrial output value which is the total volume of final industrial 
products produced and industrial services provided during a given period in 
                                                     
5 In 2004 and 2006 two variables were missing at provincial level. Specifically, the variable Gross 
Industrial Output for 2004 and the variable employment for 2006 could not be found in the statistical 
yearbooks. Hence, the values for these variables in these two years were obtained through the 
interpolation of the values of the most adjacent years for each province. 
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monetary terms. It reflects the total achievements and overall scale of 
industrial production during a given period6; 
 Exports refer to the real value for each province of commodities exported 
across the border of China. They include the actual exports through foreign 
trade, exported goods under the processing and assembling trades and 
materials, exported commodities processed with imported materials, 
exported commodities and articles for public use of the Sino-foreign joint 
ventures, cooperative enterprises and ventures with sole foreign investment7;  
 Density of enterprises identifies the number of enterprises above 
designated size per square kilometer in each province;    
 Per capita GDP refers to the value of the final products at market prices 
produced by each resident unit in the country (or province) during a certain 
period of time8; 
 Employment refers to persons aged 16 and over who are engaged in gainful 
employment and thus receive remuneration payment or earn business 
income. It includes all the persons working in government agencies of 
various levels, political and party organizations, social organizations, 
enterprises and institutions9; 
 
 
 
                                                     
6  Definition taken from “Explanatory Notes on main statistical indicators” in China Statistical 
Yearbook (2011), chap. 14. 
7  Definition taken from “Explanatory Notes on main statistical indicators” in China Statistical 
Yearbook (2011), chap. 6. 
8  Definition taken from “Explanatory Notes on main statistical indicators” in China Statistical 
Yearbook (2011), chap. 2. 
9  Definition taken from “Explanatory Notes on main statistical indicators” in China Statistical 
Yearbook (2011), chap. 4. 
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3.3 INDEX OF PERFORMANCE AT NATIONAL LEVEL 
The Index of Performance calculated using data at national level aims at providing 
a picture of the trend of the Chinese growth over the considered years.  
In this case, the Index of Performance is calculated using Liptak’s combining 
function. The choice of this function derives from the fact that in this case the units 
of analysis are years, rather than administrative units. Fisher’s combining function 
rewards units that excel even only in one or few dimensions. Liptak’s combining 
function is ideal in this case because the aim is not to reward units (in this case 
years) that excel only in one or few dimensions, but rather to obtain an indicator 
that shows good performances when all the variables take large values. Furthermore, 
Liptak’s combining function does not assume a linear relationship between the 
composite index and the single variables, as other functions or statistical techniques 
do (e.g. principal component analysis, factor analysis, etc.). 
Before proceeding with the calculation of the index, some tests for normality 
distribution were performed. Since the method is based on a non-parametric 
combination, it is usually not necessary to test for normality. Nevertheless, when 
normality is plausible the use of Liptak’s combination is even more justifiable.   
Thus, each variable has been tested with Shapiro-Wilk test (Shapiro & Wilk, 1965). 
At the significance level α=0.01, the results (Table 3.1) show that for all the 
variables the hypothesis of normality cannot be rejected. These results are also 
confirmed by the normal probability plots (Figure 3.1).  
Table 3.1. Results of the Shapiro-Wilk Test for Normal Data 
SHAPIRO-WILK W TEST FOR NORMAL DATA 
Variable Observations z Prob>z 
Employment 13 0.445 0.32808 
Export 13 1.327 0.09228 
Per capita GDP 13 1.296 0.09740 
Industrial Output 13 1.585 0.05646 
Density of enterprises 13 1.847 0.03241 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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Figure 3.1. Normal Probability plot for Performance variables (1998-2010) 
 
 
In order to create the Indices of Performance, it is firstly necessary to normalize the 
variables.  
Variables are indicated as 𝑋𝑣𝑗 where:  
𝑣 = variable (with 𝑣 = 1, … , 5) 
𝑗 = year (with 𝑗 = 1, … ,13) 
Each variable was normalized according to the following rule with respect to years: 
𝜆𝑣𝑗 =  
𝑋𝑣𝑗 −  min𝑗(𝑋𝑣𝑗) +  
1
13
max𝑗(𝑋𝑣𝑗) − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑗(𝑋𝑣𝑗) +
2
13
             
where: 
 𝜆𝑣𝑗 is the 𝑣-th normalized variable in the year 𝑗. 
 𝑋𝑣𝑗 is the 𝑣-th original variable in the year 𝑗. 
 min𝑗(𝑋𝑣𝑗) and max𝑗(𝑋𝑣𝑗) are respectively the minimum and maximum values 
taken by the 𝑣-th variable in the year 𝑗. 
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The result of the normalization is an indicator that takes values strictly included in 
the interval between 0 and 1. In order to avoid that the normalized variable takes 
the value 0 or 1, in the formula 1/13 and 2/13 were added to the numerator and 
denominator respectively because 13 is the number of observations (years) for each 
variable. In this way it is avoided the risk of getting forms of indeterminacy and 
infinite values  that would have occurred in the case of numerators equal to zero or 
with the argument of the logarithmic function equal to zero  (log(0) = ∞). 
Once the variables were normalized with respect to years, it became possible to 
apply the combining function of Liptak which can be formalized as: 
𝐶𝐻𝑁_𝐼𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑗 = ∑ 𝑤𝑣Φ
−1(𝜆𝑣𝑗)
5
𝑣=1
 
where: 
 𝐶𝐻𝑁_𝐼𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑗 is the National Performance Index for the year 𝑗 
 𝑤𝑣 is a weight (degree of importance) given to the 𝑣-th normalized variable. In 
this case it is assumed that each variable has equal weight, hence 𝑤𝑣 = 1/5 for 
each 𝑣. 
 Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
Liptak’s combining function combines values between 0 (zero) and 1 and it returns 
values included in the line of Real numbers (ℝ). Low performances correspond to 
negative values, while high performances correspond to positive values. The 
interval of admissible values is (-∞, +∞). 
The resulting National Indices of Performance have been plotted in the graph 
(Figure 3.2) in order to have a full picture of the national trend growth over the 
period 1998-2010. 
The graph shows an increase in industrial performances over the years, thus 
confirming the main literature on the topic and providing the base for the following 
analysis on inequalities. Furthermore, in 2010 the value of the index almost doubles 
that of 1998. 
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China has constantly increased its industrial performances over the last decades. As 
already pointed out in the previous chapter, according to the main literature the 
massive growth has been mainly due to the great process of reform implemented 
by the Chinese government. Furthermore, policies were particularly addressed to 
the achievement of high standards of industrialization. Thus, attention was focused 
on the development of industry and, in particular, of specific strategic sectors. 
Policies left out other objectives such as the equal distribution of the benefits of 
industrial development. The deliberate strategy of testing policies in few areas 
before expanding them to the whole country has exacerbated unbalances. 
Consequently, the concern over the unbalanced distribution of industrialization has 
recently started to increase.  
The following paragraphs are dedicated to the analysis of the uneven distribution 
of industrial performances. 
Figure 3.2. China Index of Performance (1998-2010)
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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Table 3.2. National Index of Performance (1998-2010) 
 CHINA INDEX OF 
PERFORMANCE 
CHINA INDEX OF 
PERFORMANCE 
NORMALIZED 
1998 -4.3939 0.0098 
1999 -1.7202 0.3488 
2000 -1.3033 0.4017 
2001 -1.0357 0.4356 
2002 -0.8459 0.4597 
2003 -0.6189 0.4885 
2004 -0.3406 0.5237 
2005 -0.1348 0.5498 
2006 0.1050 0.5802 
2007 0.4242 0.6207 
2008 0.8134 0.6701 
2009 1.6786 0.7798 
2010 3.3382 0.9902 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
 
 
 
3.4 INDEX OF PERFORMANCE AT PROVINCIAL LEVEL 
One of the ways in which it is possible to assess unbalances in the distribution of 
economic performances is to look at the provincial data. 
Before proceeding with the calculation of the Provincial Index of Performance 
(ProvIPerf) variables have been first carefully identified and selected for the years 
1998-2010. They were fully described in the paragraph 3.2.  
Firstly, the variables need to be normalized. Variables are indicated with 𝑌𝑣𝑝𝑗 where: 
𝑣 = variable (with 𝑣 = 1, … ,5) 
𝑝 = province (with 𝑐 = 1, … ,31) 
𝑗 = year (with 𝑗 = 1, … , 13) 
 
1. Each of the variables was normalized according to the following rule: 
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𝛾𝑣𝑝𝑗 =  
𝑌𝑣𝑝𝑗 − min𝑝(𝑌𝑣𝑝𝑗) +  
1
31
max𝑝(𝑌𝑣𝑝𝑗) − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑝(𝑋𝑣𝑝𝑗) +
2
31
             
where: 
 𝛾𝑣𝑝𝑗 is the normalized variable 𝑣 in the province 𝑝 in the year 𝑗. 
 𝑌𝑣𝑝𝑗 is the variable 𝑣 in the province 𝑝 in the year 𝑗. 
 min𝑝(𝑌𝑣𝑝𝑗)  and max𝑝(𝑌𝑣𝑝𝑗)  are respectively the minimum and maximum 
values taken by the variable 𝑣 in the province 𝑝 in the year 𝑗. 
Once this step was completed, the Provincial Index of Performance was calculated. 
The preselected variables were combined using Fisher’s combining function: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝐼𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑝𝑗 = − ∑  𝑤𝑣
𝑘
𝑣=1
ln(1 − 𝛾𝑣𝑝𝑗) 
where: 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝐼𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑝𝑗  is the Provincial Index of Performance in the province 𝑝 in the 
year 𝑗. 
 𝛾𝑣𝑝𝑗 is the normalized variable 𝑣 in the province p in the year 𝑗. 
  𝑌
 𝑤𝑣 indicates the weight that is given to each variable. It is assumed that each 
variable has equal weight. 
2. Once ProvIPerf was calculated, it has been normalized, in order to obtain 
for each county/district a value between 0 and 1 (excluded): 
𝛾′𝑝𝑗 =  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝐼𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑝𝑗 −  min𝑝(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝐼𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑝𝑗) +  
1
31
max𝑝(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝐼𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑝𝑗) − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑝(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝐼𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑝𝑗) +
2
31
 
where: 
 𝛾′𝑝𝑗  is the normalized value of the Provincial Index of Performance in the 
province 𝑝in the year 𝑗. 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝐼𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑝𝑗  is the Provincial Index of Performance in the province 𝑝 in the 
year 𝑗. 
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 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑝(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝐼𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑝𝑗) and max𝑝(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝐼𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑝𝑗) are respectively the minimum 
and maximum values taken by the Index in the province 𝑝 in the year 𝑗. 
An index very close to one indicates a high intensity of performance for a given 
county/district with respect to all the others; while if the index value is very close 
to 0, this means that the intensity of the performance is low. 
The use of Indices in this analysis brings some advantages that can be summarized 
as: 
 They are the synthesis of multivariate information, 
 The normalization facilitates the interpretation of the results, 
 They are non-parametric, thus their calculation do not require the 
assumptions of linearity and normality, 
 They are robust and flexible, 
 Their calculation is possible even in case of multivariate mixed variables 
(specifically, in the case of categorical and/or numerical variables), 
 Fisher’s transformation, due to the logarithmic transformation, rewards 
counties that excel even in only one variable 
 This method allows to give different weights (𝑤𝑣) to the variables of interest. 
 
 
 
 
3.5 GINI’S INDEX OF HETEROGENEITY 
Once the Provincial Index of Performance were calculated the observations have 
been divided in classes (A = low performance; B = medium-low performances; C 
= medium-high performance; D = high performance) with respect to quartiles of 
the index of performance of 1998.   
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In order to assess how performances have involved the national territory over time 
the normalized Gini’s index of heterogeneity was calculated. The formula used can 
be formalized as: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝐻𝑒𝑡𝐼𝑗 =
∑ (
𝑓𝑘𝑗
𝑛 )(1 −
𝑓𝑘𝑗
𝑛 )
4
𝑘=1
3 4⁄
 
where: 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝐻𝑒𝑡𝐼𝑗 is the normalized Gini’s Heterogeneity Index in the year 𝑗. 
 𝑘 are the categories in which the performances of provinces have been divided 
and classified as A, B, C, D. 
 
𝑓𝑘𝑗
𝑛
 is the relative frequency, hence the number of provinces classified as 𝑘 in 
the year 𝑗 divided by the number of observations 𝑛. 
 3 4⁄  is the case of maximum heterogeneity of the Gini’s Index. 
Once the index of heterogeneity for each year was calculated, it was normalized 
with respect to 1998 (which is the first year considered in the analysis) according 
to the following formula: 
𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝐻𝑒𝑡𝐼𝑗 =
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝐻𝑒𝑡𝐼𝑗
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝐻𝑒𝑡𝐼1
 
where 
 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝐻𝑒𝑡𝐼𝑗 is the normalized value of the Gini’s Index of Heterogeneity 
in the year 𝑗; 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝐻𝑒𝑡𝐼𝑗 is the value of the Gini’s Index of Heterogeneity in the year 𝑗; 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝐻𝑒𝑡𝐼1 is the value of the Gini’s Index of Heterogeneity in 1998 which is 
the first year of the dataset. 
The indices plotted show a slight decrease in heterogeneity over time since 1998 
(Figure 3.3). Thus, China is slowly going in the direction of performances 
distributed homogeneously over the territory.  
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At this point of the analysis, the yearly considered indices do not measure an 
absolute heterogeneity because, by construction10, the heterogeneity in 1998 is 
maximum and in the following years it is relative to that of 1998. This graph only 
aims at showing a trend in the distribution of performances in China. Nonetheless, 
it is possible to state that since 1978 heterogeneity in China has been at its highest 
levels and the situation seems to have remained unchanged over the years despite 
the heavy industrialization (Fan, 1995; Kanbur & Zhang, 1999; Wang, 2007; Fan 
& Sun, 2008; Fan et al., 2009; Barone et al., 2013). 
 
Figure 3.3. Gini's Index of heterogeneity normalized with respect to 1998 
 
 
Thus, now it is clear how heterogeneity has changed over time, but yet the extent 
of heterogeneity is unknown.  At this stage of the analysis the aim is to assess the 
trend of heterogeneity understanding if it increases or decreases with respect to 
1998.  
 
 
                                                     
10 The use of quartiles as threshold values in 1998 generates maximally heterogeneous groups. 
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3.6 GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF PERFORMANCES 
At this point of the analysis the 31 provinces have been divided into four groups 
according to geographic characteristics:  Eastern Coastal (10 provinces), Northern 
East (7) Western (7) Central (7)11.  The elaboration of maps gives the possibility to 
show the distribution of the indices of performances in each area and for each year. 
The level of performance in each area seems to stay approximately unchanged for 
the whole period considered. In particular, the coastal area has most of its provinces 
in the highest category of performances while western area has the lowest level. 
 
Figure 3.4. Geographical distribution of performances in 1998 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
                                                     
11 The provinces included in the Eastern Coastal region are: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei Shanghai, 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Hainan; the Central area includes: Anhui, Jiangxi, 
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guizhou, Chongqing; the provinces included in the Northern area are: 
Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Shaanxi, Shanxi; Western provinces are: 
Guangxi, Yunnan, Sichuan, Tibet, Gansu, Qinghai, Xinjiang. 
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Figure 3.5. Geographical distribution of performances in 1999 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
Figure 3.6. Geographical distribution of performances in 2000 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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Figure 3.7. Geographical distribution of performances in 2001 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
Figure 3.8. Geographical distribution of performances in 2002 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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Figure 3.9. Geographical distribution of performances in 2003 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
Figure 3.10. Geographical distribution of performances in 2004 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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Figure 3.11. Geographical distribution of performances in 2005 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
Figure 3.12. Geographical distribution of performances in 2006 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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Figure 3.13. Geographical distribution of performances in 2007 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
Figure 3.14. Geographical distribution of performances in 2008 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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Figure 3.15. Geographical distribution of performances in 2009 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
Figure 3.16. Geographical distribution of performances in 2010 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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This descriptive analysis given by the maps does not fully describe inequalities on 
the Chinese territory for the period 1998-2010. It is necessary to conduct further 
analysis aimed at showing the unbalances among areas taking into account the level 
of performance. This analysis should take into account the findings reached so far: 
growing performances and a slowly decreasing heterogeneity in China over time. 
Maps show that economic performances seem to be higher in the coastal area and 
lower in the inner provinces. 
Nonetheless, in this phase it is not clear how provinces differ from each other in 
terms of economic performances and how performances distribute in each area 
(Western-Coastal, Central, Northern, Western areas). 
The values of the Provincial Indices of Performance for each year from 1998 to 
2010 have been plotted in the graph (Figure 3.17) in order to show trends and 
dispersion in distribution. 
 
Figure 3.17. Dot-plot of Index of Performance at provincial level by year 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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The dot-plot shows a great concentration of provinces with very low performances. 
Most of the dots are in fact concentrated in the lowest part of the chart. Thus, most 
of the provinces show low performances for the entire period considered. 
Furthermore, there does not seem to be a great mobility from lower to upper level. 
Only in recent years, though, there seem to be a growing trend in performances for 
a few provinces (namely Shandong and Jiangsu). Guangdong province is the 
province that holds for the entire period the highest level of performance. However, 
from 2008 its performances have consistently decreased.  On the contrary, Xinjiang 
has the lowest performance for the whole period. Shanghai and Henan are included 
in the top-five provinces in terms of performances. They show high level of 
economic performances for the whole period. 
The graph in Figure 3.18 shows the persistence of each province in the same 
category of performance for the whole period 1998-2010. It was obtained 
calculating the Gini index of heterogeneity for each province with respect to years. 
A value of the index equal to zero indicates a persistency in the same category for 
the entire period.  
The result is that most of the provinces remain in the same category for the whole 
period. Thus, they do not improve (or worsen) their level of performance. Only a 
few provinces seem to change category during the period considered. Tianjin and 
Sichuan show a low value of the index which nonetheless might indicate a change 
of category only for a short time. 
These findings confirm the hypothesis of provinces that have experienced different 
degrees of growth. Furthermore, provinces do no to seem to have substantially 
changed their situation in a positive or negative way. Provinces have showed the 
same level of performances for the entire period without improvements in economic 
performances.  
The resulting picture gives the idea of a territory marked by unbalances that have 
remained unchanged for the whole period.  
In the last phase of the analysis, the idea is to show that, not only the mobility of 
provinces from one category to the other is practically null, but also that the 
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differences among the four areas indicated by the literature seem to persist for the 
decade 1998-2010.  
Figure 3.18. Persistence of provinces in the same category for the whole period 1998-2010 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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3.7 INDICES OF SIMILARITY AMONG PROVINCES 
As a last phase of the analysis, the aim in this paragraph is to assess the existence 
of four areas in China, that in the last decade have experienced different levels of 
performances. Furthermore, the idea is to show that these areas have remained 
different in terms of distribution of performances for the entire period.  
In order to compare distributions among areas, multi-sample permutation tests are 
performed. The resulting p-values are used as Index of Similarity that show how 
much the distributions of the categories of performance (A, B, C, and D) in each 
area are similar.  
It can be formalized as: 
𝐼𝑆𝑗 = p-value of the multivariate test for performance comparisons, where 
𝐻0: 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝐼𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝐶𝑗
𝑑
=
 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝐼𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝐸𝐶𝑗 
𝑑
=
 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝐼𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑁𝑗 
𝑑
=
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝐼𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑊𝑗   
and  
𝐻1: 𝐻0 is not true. 
𝐼𝑆𝑗 is the Index of Similarity in the year 𝑗 and 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝐼𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓  is the Provincial Index 
of Performance in the year 𝑗 in the areas named Central (C), Eastern Coastal (EC), 
North (N), and Western (W). 
The p-values do not show similarities among areas in terms of distribution of 
performances. The values of the Indices of Similarity are all below 0.018, thus 
below the level of significance α=0.10. 
This result can be interpreted as a lack of substantial similarities among areas. Thus, 
China shows to have great differences in terms of performances that persist without 
changes in the period 1998-2010. Chinese territories are different from each other 
and performances are not similarly distributed. 
This situation does not seem to change over time and differences seem to persist for 
the whole period. The distribution of performances is still heavily different among 
the areas considered. 
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Only in 2006, a little change in the Index of Similarity goes in the direction of 
decreasing differences among territories. 
These results complete the framework of the analysis of territorial unbalances in 
China. 
Figure 3.19. Index of Similarity among areas 
 
 
 
 
3.8 FINAL REMARKS 
This chapter has highlighted the structure of distribution of economic performances 
in China.  
Considered the massive industrialization that China has experienced in the last three 
decades, the aim here was to analyze the distribution of economic performances. 
What emerged from the analysis is that China has actually had a great economic 
growth in the period considered (1998-2010). Nevertheless, this growth has been 
accompanied by inequalities among Chinese provinces that have persisted almost 
unchanged for the whole period. In the period 1998-2010, a little decrease in 
heterogeneity has been observed especially until 2002 and from 2009.  
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Furthermore, from the analysis it emerged that most of the provinces have low 
performances for the whole period. Only few of them have experienced high levels 
of industrial performances and Guangdong province, in particular, is the province 
with the highest level of performances for the entire period.  
Finally, the groups of provinces, compared to each other, do not show similarities 
in terms of distribution, thus confirming the hypothesis of four areas that grow at 
different speeds.  
In short, the analysis confirms a massive increase in economic performances in 
China in the last decade. Nonetheless, signs of great inequalities that persist over 
time have been observed. The following chapter will focus attention on the province 
that has showed the highest index of industrial performances for the entire period. 
The idea is to continue the analysis on inequalities considering the case of the best 
performing province in terms of industrial growth in China, Guangdong, and assess 
its internal territorial unbalances.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART II 
Industrialization and 
Unbalances in China: the case 
of Guangdong Province 
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4 DEVELOPMENT PROCESS AND POLICIES IN 
GUANGDONG 
 
 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Guangdong province is located in the south-eastern part of China (Figure 4.1), close 
to Hong Kong and Macao, the two special administrative regions (SARs), 
respectively controlled by the United Kingdom (up until 1997), and by Portugal (up 
until 1999). It borders Guangxi province to the west, Hunan, Jiangxi and Fujian 
provinces to the east, and the South Sea of China to the south. Up until 1988, Hainan 
was also part of Guangdong province, then becoming an independent province. 
The particular geographic location of Guangdong has represented one of the main 
reasons driving the central government’s decision to choose the province as one of 
the first locations for experimentation of policies for the market economy. The 
proximity to Hong Kong and Macao, which represented two pillars of Western 
capitalism, has over the years favored diffusion throughout the whole province of a 
widespread entrepreneurial spirit and of knowhow coming from ‘the West’ (Di 
Tommaso, Rubini & Barbieri, 2013). 
With a total area of 177,901 square kilometers, Guangdong province represents 
1.87% of the entire People’s Republic of China (PRC) and 60% of its territory is 
mountainous (Huikang, 2002; Liang et al., 2008).  
Guangdong has four administrative levels (for which it is possible to obtain official 
statistics): the province level, the prefecture level, the county level, and the 
municipality level. The province is divided into 21 prefectures which in turn are 
divided into counties and districts (88 counties and districts in total). Out of the 21 
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Guangdong prefectures, 19 also have a third administrative level and are further 
divided into 23 city-counties, 41 counties, 3 autonomous counties and 54 districts 
(see table in the Appendix). The remaining two prefectures, Dongguan and 
Zhongshan, have a different structure since they have no county-level division. The 
most developed part of Guangdong is the central area, the so-called Pearl River 
Delta (PRD). 
Figure 4.1. Guangdong location 
 
Until the reform of 1978, Guangdong's economy had a very high level of 
government centralization. Such a system had been successful during the first years 
of the People's Republic of China (PRC) because it allowed the government to 
concentrate its resources in particular areas in order to overcome the lack of 
investments and savings that characterized the country's economy. In the early years 
after the founding of the PRC the country enjoyed a brief period of rapid growth 
which was followed by another around the 1960s, when the growth rates declined. 
The province of Guangdong had a period of remarkable growth after the First Five-
Year Plan (1953-1957) during which the central government imposed a socialist 
economy trying to solve the confusion that dominated the entire nation during the 
early years following the founding of the Republic. In these period great importance 
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was given to agriculture and light industry. This was due to the tropical climate 
particularly favorable for certain types of crops and the particular closeness to Hong 
Kong and Macao. Heavy industry also showed signs of significant growth mainly 
due to mining sector. 
In 1958-1962 the Second Five-Year Plan was introduced and Guangdong's 
economy suffered a setback mainly due to the policy of the "big push". This caused 
a reduction of consumption which was offset by a boost in investments especially 
in heavy industry (mainly in steel industry). As a result, the production in the light 
industry sector slowed down, inflation increased, and the economy of Guangdong 
suffered greatly. 
In subsequent years (1963-1965), the central government tried to repair the failures 
of previous years through measures aimed at recovering agricultural production, 
stabilizing the prices of consumer goods, and restoring the balance between the 
branches of industry while reducing of importance the heavy industry. Soon, the 
focus went back to heavy industry following the introduction of the Third (1966-
1970) and Fourth Five-Year Plans (1971-1975) (Yeung & Chu, 1998). These plans 
were intended to control consumption and give a slight boost to agricultural 
production and light industry but did not take into account the actual demand for 
such goods. Moreover these plans increased investments in heavy industry while a 
much smaller amount was assigned to light industry and agriculture. Once again, 
the economic growth of Guangdong suffered a setback. 
Therefore, prior to 1978, Guangdong's economy had a remarkable growth 
especially in the first years after the founding of the PRC. In particular, agriculture 
and light industry sector lead the province's economy. The policy choices made 
later, however, favored heavy industry at the expense of other sectors of the 
economy and caused the setback. In the long run, economic performances of 
Guangdong were below its real potential because of the fear of the central 
government that the geographical location of the province could favor military 
invasions from enemies. 
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Starting from 1978, a new era began for the economy of Guangdong and the whole 
of China. In December of that year, Deng Xiaoping returned to the political scenario 
of China. He encouraged reforms, particularly in some areas of China in order to 
recover from the economic stagnation and promoted the development of the 
provinces of Guangdong and Fujian in order to create a favorable environment for 
trade relations with neighboring Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao. The central 
government then instituted a series of reforms and a new policy of openness. With 
regard to Guangdong, Deng Xiaoping redefined the relationship of the province 
with the central government, giving greater autonomy to the province in the main 
economic fields: the definition of plans for socio-economic development, the 
approval of foreign investment projects and the creation of Special Economic Zones 
(SEZ ) in Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou, privileges and autonomy in the financial 
sector, the establishment of financial companies and more privacy on international 
loans, autonomy in managing the level of prices of local products (Cheung P. T., 
1998). 
The market economy in some areas of the economy was replaced by planned 
economy (a few years after the reform, most prices in China were determined by 
the market). Guangdong initially, was given ample space to promote growth of light 
industry with a focus on textiles, electronics, toys and footwear. Soon Guangdong's 
economy shifted from agricultural to highly industrialized (Maruya T., 1998). 
The proximity to Hong Kong contributed to the success of Guangdong in the years 
following the reforms of 1978. The proximity benefit was not only territorial but 
also cultural and linguistic. For centuries Hong Kong represented for Guangdong 
and for the whole China a route to the rest of the world. Hong Kong presented for 
foreign firms a strong incentive to establish their businesses in Guangdong and 
Hong Kong companies themselves believed it advantageous to invest in Guangdong. 
Many investors in Hong Kong, in fact, moved their plants to Guangdong to take 
advantage of the abundance of factors of production in the area. The geographical 
location and cultural affinity were crucial elements for the province of Guangdong 
in creating an economic link also with Macao and Taiwan, which in order to take 
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advantage of the abundance of factors of production (as for Hong Kong), moved 
their production facilities to the Chinese province (Maruya, 1998). 
Soon, however, Guangdong was in the middle of the Chinese political debate in 
which were opposed two major parties, the reformist leaders, liberal and market-
oriented, versus the conservative leaders. The first favored the process of reform 
and openness that was taking place in the province, accepting most of the 
requirements of the local government. Conservatives instead, demonstrated a 
degree of skepticism, especially for the speed at which the reforms were taking 
place and the continued demand for more power by the local government of 
Guangdong (Cheung, 1998). While trying to establish a balance between the two 
political orientations, Deng Xiaoping embraced more and more the reformists 
thought ensuring an ever greater autonomy to the province. A document issued in 
1981 strengthened the idea of continuing with the reforms with the process of 
opening to the outside and to grant greater autonomy and more powers to the 
province. 
In the early 1980s, after repeated warnings from the central government, some of 
the powers granted to the Guangdong were scaled back, because of the detection of 
trafficking and crimes related to the purchase of goods with favorable exchange 
rates in the SEZ and the resale on the market with high profits. Despite this, 
Guangdong did not seem to suffer any crisis thanks to the support of the reformists. 
Deng Xiaoping, in fact, during his visit to Guangdong in 1984, found that in the 
SEZs and coastal areas it was necessary to continue the reform process. Therefore 
he decided to open fourteen more coastal cities which were granted the status of 
SEZs, thus inciting further reforms. With a document issued in 1985 Guangdong 
Province was granted greater autonomy and powers and freedom in special policies 
for a further five years. 
In the early 1980s one of the main objectives of the development of Guangdong 
was the improvement of infrastructures. A great amount of resources were therefore 
invested for the construction of highways, subways, railways, power stations, etc. 
The province quickly become extremely advanced in terms of infrastructure thanks 
to the use of the latest technologies. As an example, the infrastructure created for 
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mobile phones networks represented a further advantage for investors (Maruya, 
1998). 
In 1988, a package of reforms concerning ten areas was launched: finance, foreign 
trade, labor market, taxation, business, education, science and technology, housing 
privatization, greater autonomy of Guangdong granted by the central government, 
and a limited "democratization" of the process of policy-making (Cheung, 1998). It 
was a wide reform and therefore difficult to be implemented. The only province 
that seemed to be able to succeed was Guangdong, but the political and economic 
difficulties of the entire nation by the end of 1988 made problematic the effective 
implementation of these reforms. Guangdong succeeded in extending the economic 
opening to a wider area of Pearl River Delta, which included twenty-eight cities and 
counties, and instituted the opening of new areas in other zones to the West and to 
the East of the province. The reforms that were actually implemented were only the 
liberalization of the housing market and the creation of a regional bank. 
The incident in Tiananmen Square in June 1989 shook the whole of China and 
exacerbated the already existing tensions between the central government and the 
province of Guangdong. The massive process of reform carried out until that 
moment gradually slowed because of funding cuts and a reduction in the autonomy 
of the province. The central government was at this point dominated by the 
conservative party that slowly abandoned the process of reform and the opening-
up. In this way, the government tried to move the management and coordination of 
the activities undertaken locally by the provinces at central level and to control 
experiments. Guangdong was soon eradicated its special status and never fully 
implemented the document containing the reform package of 1988. 
In 1992, Deng Xiaoping went back to Guangdong with the idea to resume the 
process of reform and opening-up. Among the interventions, the government 
invested in urban infrastructure and initially financed, in particular, transport 
infrastructure and energy that were used to promote the activities of the SEZs. In 
the second stage, it funded investments for the construction of houses in cities, 
commercial districts, and logistics facilities. In this way, the PRD was creating an 
environment more and more favorable to economic development. In subsequent 
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years, Guangdong's economy was increasingly growing so as to suggest to the 
leaders of the central government to extend the policy of opening-up to other 
Chinese regions (Yusuf, 2007). 
In 2001, the Northeast region of Guangdong showed difficulties that could lead to 
social and political consequences. State-owned enterprises had become 
increasingly less competitive, low-profit, and also showed a diminishing 
importance in trade with foreign countries. (Yusuf, 2007). In the last few years, the 
Chinese government launched a new strategy aimed at favoring the establishment 
of a flow of Chinese investments abroad - the Going Global strategy. This decision 
was mainly due to the need of entering new markets because of the excessive 
production, unemployed labor supply, high domestic saving rates, global financial 
imbalance, and need of resources (Hess, 2006, Lee et al., 2011, Di Tommaso et al, 
2013). Most of the Chinese investments go to Asian countries (in 2010, 65% of 
China’s total outward direct investments), but recently the amount of investments 
going to European countries has dramatically increased. Only in the initial phase of 
the Going Global Strategy, China’s favored destinations, such as African and Asian 
countries, as main destinations of outward direct investments. Guangdong province 
in 2010 was the fourth region in term outward foreign direct investments in China 
(Di Tommaso et al., 2013). 
 
 
 
4.2 ECONOMIC FACTS 
Since the moment in which China launched the opening policy and the reform 
process, Guangdong Province began a phase of strong growth outpacing other 
Chinese provinces. In 1978, Guangdong was ranked sixteenth place in terms of per 
capita GDP among the Chinese provinces and the local GDP accounted for 5.1% of 
the national total. Already in 1995, the high GDP growth led Guangdong to the fifth 
position of the same ranking and to have a local GDP amounting to 9.8% of the 
national total (Naughton, 2002). 
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Until the start of the reform process Guangdong province had often had 
performances that were below the national average. In a few years, the province 
managed to considerably grow in terms of GDP which grew on average in the 
period 1978-1994 by 14.2 %, while in the same period the national average GDP 
grew by 9.8%. In 1989, Guangdong was the province with the highest GDP 
(Maruya T., 1998). Other macroeconomic indicators behaved in the same way 
making the province jump to the first positions in terms of growth. Guangdong was 
the first province in terms of the amount of foreign capital used, exports, investment 
in fixed assets, and retail sales of goods. It was also strong for industrial and 
agricultural production (Figure 4.2). 
Table 4.1. Main economic indicators 
 GUANGDONG CHINA 
 1978 1990 2000 2010 2012 1978 1990 2000 2010 2012 
Population 
(10000 
persons) 
5064 6246 7499 10441 8636 96259 114333 126743 134091 135391 
Area (sq.km) 179813 9596961 
GDP (100 
million RMB, 
constant 
prices) 
186 1559 10741 46013 57068 3645 18668 99215 
40120
2 
519322 
Per capita 
GDP (current 
prices) 
370 2484 12736 44736 54095 381 1644 7858 29992 38449 
Number 
employed 
2276 3118 3989 5752 5966 40152 64749 72085 76105 - 
Agricultura
l Output 
(100 million 
RMB, current 
prices) 
86 601 1701 3755 4657 1397 7662 24916 69320 - 
Industrial 
Output (100 
million RMB, 
current prices) 
207 1902 16904 93463 
10505
0 
4237 23924 
16288
5 
69859
1 
- 
Exports (100 
million US$) 
14 222 919 4532 5741 98 621 2492 15778 20489 
Retail 
prices 
Index 
(1978=100) 
(%) 
100 255 417 472 507 100 208 354 406 - 
Average 
wages 
(RMB) 
615 2929 13823 40358 50577 615 2140 9371 36539 - 
Source: Author’s elaboration on Guangdong Statistical Yearbook (2013) and China Statistical Yearbook (2012) 
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At the beginning of the reform process Guangdong's economy was based mainly on 
the primary sector which constituted about 30% of GDP and on the secondary sector 
for 46.4%. Since the second half of the 1980s, there was a change in the trend 
accompanied by new policies undertaken by the government. Guangdong became 
more and more important in the industrial sector gaining about 49% of the total 
GDP of the province. Light industry in particular had an important role since it 
produced on average about 60% of total industrial output and grew by 10% in the 
early 1990s. At the same time, the heavy industry sector grew at high rates and in 
the first half of the 1980s had tripled the gross value of output with respect to 1978. 
The local government pushed the growth of agriculture and light industry. In the 
early 1980s, light industry had an average growth rate of 18.1%, while at the end of 
the 1980s it had reached 24.5%. The agricultural sector instead had an average 
growth rate of 7.5% between 1978 and in 1984 constituted about 22% of GDP 
(Maruya T., 1998). 
The industrial structure of Guangdong is also reflected in its employment structure. 
During the period of reforms the industrial sector followed by that of the services 
showed a huge capacity to absorb labor force (Maruya T., 1998). The agricultural 
sector however, not only seemed to be unable to absorb the supply of labor, but the 
number of workers employed in that sector in absolute terms declined. In fact, in 
1978, 74% of the workforce was employed in the agricultural sector, while in 1994 
people employed in this sector went down to 42%. On the other hand, the industrial 
sector and services increased the number of employees respectively of 19 and 12 
percentage points. 
Comparing the structure of employment in Guangdong with that of the whole of 
China, it is possible to notice some differences both in the entity and the direction 
of change. In Guangdong the change was more intense and the sectors affected by 
the migration of surplus of labor from the agricultural sector were different from 
those involved considering the whole of China. In Guangdong the industrial sector 
absorbed more workforce than the service sector, while at the national level the 
service sector absorbed more labor force. There were also differences in the 
relationship between the speed of growth and the changes in the employment 
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structure. In Guangdong, major changes occurred towards the end of the period of 
reform, that is, when economic growth was sustained. The opposite happened at the 
national level (Maruya T., 1998). 
In the early 1980s the economy of the province was driven by investments and 
exports (Maruya T., 1998). Investments in fixed assets increased on average by 36 % 
between 1980 and 1984 and then, in the late 1980s, the growth slowed down. The 
amount of fixed capital until 1980 was 15% of GDP. It increased to almost 30% in 
1984 and exceeded 50% in 1994. It therefore grew at high average rates which 
reached 12.9% between 1991 and 1994. 
Another important factor that contributed to the overwhelming growth of 
Guangdong was the rapid increase in exports. Between 1979 and 1994, exports 
grew by 38%, constituting 39% of the total value of Chinese exports. Therefore, the 
share of exports in GDP increased from 13% in 1978 to 95% in 1994. The annual 
rate of growth of exports from the beginning of the 1980s, the late 1980s and early 
1990s were respectively 6%, 29% and 35%. Furthermore, it is relevant to note that 
in Guangdong exports were much greater than imports, and created a large trade 
surplus. Trade surplus during the 1980s was 7-11% of GDP, while in the 1990s 
increased to 16-35%. The contribution of exports to economic growth, in fact, 
became higher by the end of the 1980s. 
Looking at China's trade balance, however, things did not go exactly as in 
Guangdong. Although China's trade increased during the 1980s and early 1990s, 
the trade balance was continually in deficit. At the end of the 1980s, the deficit 
became higher and slowed economic growth. It diminished when the Guangdong 
model of development was extended to other regions of China. This was due in part 
to the policy of openness that initially only covered the prefectures of Shenzhen, 
Shantou and Zhuhai. 
Before the launch of the reform process of 1978, the Chinese government controlled 
most of the output of the country. In 1978, about 87% of government revenue came 
from public enterprises and about 78 % of the workforce was employed in SOEs. 
Private companies and foreign companies were almost non-existent. The purpose 
of this control was to make China's economy self-sufficient. Foreign trade was 
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allowed only for a limited number of commodities that could not be produced in 
the country. 
With the reform process, the way in which public enterprises were operating in the 
area began to change. That was when the central government began to allow farmers 
to sell part of their crops on the open market and when the SEZs were instituted 
with the aim of attracting foreign capital and invigorate the export and import of 
high-tech products and knowledge. 
In 2010, Guangdong produced 13.4% of China's industrial production. In 2012, 
Guangdong’s exports accounted for 28.7% of national total while GDP constituted 
11% of the national total. 
As shown in the table (Table 4.2) Guangdong over time has gained more and more 
importance in the national context even though it is a small region when compared 
to others. Guangdong is the Chinese province that in 2010 had the greatest GDP, 
equal to 11.5% of the national total. 
Guangdong's GDP in 2012 grew by 8.2% over the previous year and in the last 
thirty years it has grown at an average rate of 13.5% (Table 4.2). Also the industrial 
output shows a remarkable growth in recent years. In 2012 it increased by about 11% 
and for the entire period 1980-2012 it had an average growth rate of 14%. 
Table 4.2. Guangdong's GDP and Gross Output Value in various years 
  
GDP 
(100 million 
RMB) 
Per Capita 
GDP 
(RMB) 
Gross 
Industrial 
output Value 
(100 million 
RMB) 
Annual GDP 
growth rate 
(%) 
Annual per 
capita GDP 
growth rate 
(%) 
Annual 
growth rate 
of Gross 
Industrial 
Output (%) 
1980 250 481 249 16.6 14.8 0.5 
1985 577 1026 535 18.0 16.2 6.0 
1990 1559 2484 1902 11.6 9.1 18.0 
1995 5933 8129 9721 15.6 12.0 17.6 
2000 10741 12736 16904 11.5 7.1 18.4 
2005 22557 24647 41662 14.1 12.7 19.2 
2010 46013 44736 93463 12.4 9.5 21.9 
2012 57068 54095 105050 8.2 7.4 10.8 
  Average growth rates (%) (1980 - 2012) 
        13.5 11.1 14.1 
Source: Author's elaboration on Guangdong Statistical Yearbook (2013) 
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As already mentioned, for a long time the GDP was reinforced by the secondary 
sector and to a lesser extent from the primary sector. In the mid-1980s a change in 
trend has brought a significant decrease in the importance of the primary sector. 
The services sector has slowly replaced the primary sector, growing at very high 
rates. Around 2001-2002 the tertiary industry exceeded the secondary sector in the 
composition of GDP. In 2002, about 47% of the GDP came from the service sector 
(Figure 4.2). 
GDP is mainly driven by the secondary sector. In particular, in 2012 the secondary 
sector contributed for almost 49% of GDP, the service sector at 46% and the 
primary sector only about 5%. From 1978 to 2012, the importance of the primary 
sector has decreased, while the tertiary sector has assumed an increasingly 
important role. 
 
Figure 4.2. Composition of GDP by Industry 
 
 
 
Within the industrial sector, light industry has traditionally had an important role. 
This role, however, gradually reduced, starting from the second half of the 1990s. 
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In 2012, light industry produced 37% of the total industrial output of enterprises 
above designated size (ADS)12 (Figure 4.3). 
Figure 4.3. Composition of Gross Output Value of Industrial Enterprises Above Designated Size 
 
Guangdong can be considered as the manufacturer of China. In particular, the 
sectors which in 2010 provided a major contribution to the output are the sectors of 
communication equipment, computers, and other electronic materials (Table 4.3). 
Guangdong is also a great producer of plastic products, furniture, and electrical 
machinery and equipment. It is also a major producer of refrigerators at the national 
level and also, aquatic products, bicycles and microcomputer. 
Table 4.3. Industrial Output by sector of enterprises Above Designated Size (2010, 100 million RMB) 
 CHINA GUANGDONG % 
Textile 28507.92 2623.69 9.20 
Leather, Fur, Feather and Related Products 7897.50 1543.69 19.55 
Furniture 4414.81 1098.51 24.88 
Plastics 13872.22 3310.21 23.86 
Paper and Paper Products 10434.06 1656.31 15.87 
Printing, Reproduction of Recording Media 3562.91 837.56 23.51 
Electrical Machinery and Equipment 43344.41 9353.08 21.58 
Communication Equipment, Computers and 
Other Electronic Equipment 
54970.67 19228.34 34.98 
Textile Wearing Apparel, Footwear, Caps 12331.24 2304.28 18.69 
Source: Author’s elaboration on Guangdong Statistical Yearbook (2011) and China Statistical Yearbook (2011) 
 
                                                     
12 Firms Above Designated Size (ADS) have a turnover that exceeds 5 million RMB. Official 
Chinese Statistics mainly provide data for firms ADS rather that the total. 
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The province of Guangdong exports a high percentage of its production. In 2012, 
the value of exported goods was 574 billion dollars (Table 4.4). Approximately 28% 
of China's exports are undertaken in Guangdong, while imports are 22.5% of the 
national total. Guangdong’s total value of imports and exports is the highest in 
China, even higher than that of the provinces of Jiangsu and Shanghai. In 2012 this 
value was equal to 984 billion dollars. 
Foreign trade in Guangdong grew in the period 1990-2008 to an average annual 
rate of 17.2%. Until 1999, before China became part of the WTO (World Trade 
Organization), Guangdong exported at an average annual rate of 15%. Between 
2000 and 2008, however the average annual rate was 19.5%. Exports in particular 
have grown at very high rates starting after 2001, with rates almost always above 
20%. In 2008, however, exports have grown over the previous year by only 9.5% 
with a deep decline in 2009, when exports decreased by 11.5 percentage points. 
This is of course due to the financial crisis that affected also the economies strongly 
connected to the US and Europe.  
In fact, excluding the Asian countries to which 60.6% of Guangdong’ exports are 
directed (Hong Kong receives 38.3% of the total exports), Guangdong’s favorite 
exports destinations are European countries (13.6%) and the United States (15.9%). 
Though it seems that after 2008, Guangdong province is gradually increasing the 
share of exports directed to Asia at the expenses of Europe and the United States. 
Only in 2008, the share of exports directed to Asia, Europe, and USA was 
respectively 53.4, 15.9, and 19.1. 
With regard to imports, these have grown considerably until 2008. The average rate 
of growth between 1990 and 1999 was 14.1%, while from 2001 to 2008 the average 
annual growth rate was of 18.4%. Also in this case, imports suffered a drop of -9.7% 
in 2009. About 75% of imports of Guangdong come from Asian countries, 
especially from Taiwan, Japan, Korea and the ASEAN13 countries. Relatively small 
percentages of goods are imported from the European Union (8%) and the USA 
(4%). 
                                                     
13 Association of South East Asian Nations, whose members are: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. 
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Table 4.4. Foreign trade in Guangdong, 1990-2012 (100 million US$) 
   Annual Growth rate (%) 
 
Total 
Imports 
and 
Exports Exports Imports 
Total 
Imports 
and 
Exports Exports Imports 
1990 418.98 222.21 196.77 17.8 22.7 12.7 
1995 1039.72 565.92 473.8 7.6 12.7 2.0 
2000 1701.06 919.19 781.87 21.2 18.3 24.8 
2001 1764.87 954.21 810.66 3.8 3.8 3.7 
2002 2210.92 1184.58 1026.34 25.3 24.1 26.6 
2003 2835.22 1528.48 1306.74 28.2 29.0 27.3 
2004 3571.29 1915.69 1655.6 26.0 25.3 26.7 
2005 4280.02 2381.71 1898.31 19.8 24.3 14.7 
2006 5272.07 3019.48 2252.59 23.2 26.8 18.7 
2007 6340.35 3692.39 2647.96 20.3 22.3 17.6 
2008 6834.92 4041.88 2793.04 7.8 9.5 5.5 
2009 6111.18 3589.56 2521.62 -10.8 -11.5 -9.7 
2010 7848.96 4531.91 3317.05 28.4 26.3 31.6 
2011 9133.34 5317.93 3815.41 16.4 17.4 15.0 
2012 9839.47 5740.59 4098.88 7.7 7.9 7.4 
 
  Average annual growth rate (%) 
(1990-2012) 
    16.2 17.2 15.0 
Source: Author's elaboration on Guangdong Statistical Yearbook (2013) 
 
Guangdong is a major trader of electronics and mechanics and high/new tech 
products (Table 4.5). In 2012, 68% of the total exports of Guangdong were 
electrical and mechanical products, 37% of which were electronic products, 17% 
were machinery and equipment. Also high-tech products and new technologies are 
extremely relevant in terms of exports. In 2012, 38% of the total exports were in 
this category. Guangdong is a great importer of new technologies and especially 
computers (respectively 45 and 15 of the national total). 
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Table 4.5. Value of Imports and Exports by product type, 2012 (100 million US$) 
 
Exports Imports 
% of 
total 
Exports 
% of 
total 
Imports 
Farm Produce 75 138 1.31 3.37 
Mechanical and Electrical Products 3895 2453 67.84 59.85 
      Metal Products 152 30 2.64 0.72 
      Machinery and Equipment 1010 460 17.60 11.23 
      Electric and Electronic Products 2151 1525 37.47 37.21 
      Transport Equipment 133 73 2.32 1.78 
      Instruments and Meters 251 337 4.38 8.22 
      Others 198 28 3.44 0.69 
  High and New-tech Products 2214 1861 38.56 45.39 
      Biotechnology 0 1 0.00 0.02 
      Life Sciences Technology 17 20 0.29 0.49 
      Photoelectric Technology 153 241 2.66 5.87 
      Computer and Communication 
Technology 
1693 539 29.49 13.16 
      Electronic Technology 316 930 5.51 22.70 
      Computer Integrated Manufacturing 
Technology 
18 64 0.32 1.57 
      Material Technology 12 23 0.21 0.57 
      Aerospace Technology 3 40 0.06 0.97 
      Others 1 2 0.02 0.04 
Author’s elaboration on Guangdong Statistical Yearbook (2013) 
 
 
 
 
4.3 OPENING TO THE WORLD: POLICY TOOLS 
4.3.1 Special Economic Zones 
One of the first steps in the opening process of China that began in late 1978 was 
the establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs). The SEZs have played a 
crucial role throughout the period of reforms. 
In the SEZs, the local government was allowed to conduct economic policy in favor 
of some particular regions, businesses and other stakeholders rather than others (Ge, 
1999). 
 117 
 
In Guangdong three SEZs were set up, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou, with the aim 
of experiencing a market economic system projected into the future and create a 
window for the province and for the whole country open to the rest of the world. 
Thus, on the one hand, the national economy could be linked to other countries in 
the world while, on the other, China did not completely open its economy. The 
SEZs acted thus as "experiments" where several methods, theories and economic 
instruments were tested. Once efficiency and success of these measures was 
reached, their use was then extended, if possible, to the rest of the country. In this 
way the opening process was made more efficient and gradual. The experiments 
that were conducted in the SEZs covered various fields: attracting and using foreign 
capital, purchase of foreign production and highly advanced technology, 
development of a solid economic structure, promoting foreign trade by competitive 
advantage, and gaining experience in the reforms of the system moving to a market 
economy (Ge, 1999). 
The SEZs were initially established in Guangdong, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou, 
aiming in particular at the achievement of three objectives: follow trends of the 
world economy, test different policies, acting as a laboratory, acquiring new 
technologies, and new management methods. The creation of employment, local 
economic growth, and the development of new towns and villages were considered 
secondary issues (Chu, 1998). 
The SEZs were initially structured in such a way that a series of activities that were 
far from the traditional economic activities were instead promoted, such as 
education, research and development, tourism, and culture. 
Consistent with the objectives of the SEZs, the industry was put at the center of the 
economies of the special areas. National enterprises, both public and private, were 
therefore allowed to interact with companies with foreign capital. Moreover, firms 
of special areas were encouraged to establish partnerships with other companies in 
the rest of the country, so as to enhance technology transfer and promote growth. 
Originally a series of preferential treatment to investors were offered such as taxes 
for foreign firms at rate of 15%, about three years of tax-exemption and for heavy 
investments five years of exemption, repatriation of corporate profits, etc. These 
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treatments were initially available only in SEZs, but some of them were then 
extended to other cities and regions in China. This extension made the SEZs 
attractive to the eyes of foreign investors (Chu, 1998). 
When Shenzhen was established as SEZ, it was one of the biggest. Nonetheless the 
household’s income in this area was formed mostly from work in agriculture and 
fisheries. Industry was poorly developed and manufacturing was concentrated in 
the production of a small number of articles. Exports were almost equal to zero and 
the contribution that this area gave to the GDP of the province was very low. 
Furthermore, infrastructure was almost nonexistent and the number of unskilled and 
semi-skilled workers was inadequate (Ge, 1999). For this reason, one of the main 
interventions during the startup phase of the SEZ was the creation and improvement 
of the infrastructures necessary for the development of this area. For this purpose, 
a high amount of economic resources was devoted in favour of the SEZ, both by 
local governments and central government.  
 
Table 4.6. Main Indicators of SEZs 
 
Shenzhen SEZ is now the best performing of Guangdong and in some respects of 
all China (Barbieri et al., 2009). Foreign trade accounts for about 47% of the 
regional total and the amount of foreign capital utilized accounts for 22% of the 
regional total. Shenzhen also hosts more than 15% of the total number of industrial 
enterprises above designated size located in Guangdong which produce 22% of the 
regional industrial output (Table 4.6). Shenzhen is mainly focused in the production 
of electronic devices, communication equipment and computers, while in Zhuhai 
there is a great production of electronic and electric devices and Shantou emerges 
in the production of textiles and plastic products (Di Tommaso et al., 2013).  
 SHENZHEN ZHUHAI SHANTOU 
Number of industrial enterprises ADS  5835 927 1880 
Gross Output value of industrial enterprises ADS 
(100 million RMB) 
21363.05 3072.56 2111.54 
Exports (100 million US$) 2713.56 216.37 61.63 
Imports (100 million US$) 1954.47 240.44 26.39 
Foreign capital actually utilized (100 million US$) 52.29 14.47 1.31 
Source: Author’s elaboration on Guangdong Statistical Yearbook (2013) 
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4.3.2 Development Zones 
The origin of the development zones can be found back in time, since the periods 
of enormous trade, especially made by Venetians and Marseilles. The expression 
"development zones" began to be used only around the 1970s, when they were 
defined by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO, 1980) 
as demarcated areas of a country where, to encourage development, was granted 
special autonomy from the central government. 
Over time, various forms of development zones were developed, each taking a 
different denomination. But one thing that all the development zones have in 
common, of whatever kind they may be, are the objectives with which they are 
established. The development zones generally aim at promoting exports, at 
encouraging development and the use of new technologies, at creating jobs and at 
supporting the development of advanced low areas (Wong & Tang, 2005). In order 
to achieve these objectives in the development zones often there are some forms of 
incentives to attract foreign investors and to facilitate international trade. It is 
generally a policy instrument that is not applied throughout the national territory. 
In the specific case of China, especially in Guangdong, the concept of development 
zones was introduced around the end of the 1970s, when the Special Economic 
Zones were established. In a while, several development zones were established 
throughout China with different incentives and levels of autonomy (Di Tommaso 
et al., 2013). They had a high degree of autonomy from the central government, 
special laws and regulations that allowed the creation of favorable conditions for 
foreign investors and for the export-oriented production (Wong & Tang, 2005). 
Satisfied with the success of the SEZs at the end of the 1980s, the Chinese 
government decided to expand the open-door policy to other areas (in addition to 
those which were already present in the SEZs) and in 1991 several development 
zones were introduced in Guangdong: Free Trade Zones (FTZ), Export Processing 
Zones (EPZ), Economic and Technological Development Zones (ETDZ) and High-
Tech Industrial Development Zones (HIDZ). 
The Free Trade Zones and Export Processing Zones are areas in which it is ensured 
a high degree of freedom in terms of imports and exports of goods and where there 
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are tax exemptions related to specific goods that are re-exported (Di Tommaso et 
al., 2009; Zeng, 2011; Di Tommaso et al., 2013). 
The Economic and Technological Development Zones are areas that are recognized 
by the central government and in which are adopted favorable tax regimes, for 
example, easing the tax burden for foreign investors. The purpose of these areas is, 
in fact, the attraction of foreign direct investments, consistent with the local 
industrial environment, thus providing incentives also to local companies for the 
use and dissemination of new technologies. In contrast to the SEZs, these areas have 
little autonomy in terms of choice of policies and in terms of administration (Di 
Tommaso et al., 2009; Zeng, 2011; Di Tommaso et al., 2013). 
The High-Tech Industrial Development Zones are areas recognized by the central 
government. Their main objective is to encourage the use of new technologies by 
businesses in order to increase the value added. In these areas, the Guangdong 
government uses specific programs to encourage research in high-tech sectors (Di 
Tommaso et al., 2009; Zeng, 2011; Di Tommaso et al., 2013). 
The incentives in these areas consist mainly of tax relief on profits, turnover, value 
added, imports, and local taxes. Some of the taxes are reduced, while others are 
totally eliminated. There are also exemptions for the first few years of business 
operation and for imports in the case of export-oriented enterprises. There are also 
facilities for the rent of the land on which the business is established. In the 
development zones there is also a focus in improving infrastructure and the 
efficiency of administrative procedures. 
In Guangdong, they are mainly located in the area of PRD, especially in the 
prefectures of Foshan, Guangzhou and Shenzhen (Figure 4.4). This means that 
different types of development zones can be found in the same area (e.g. Shenzhen 
has Duty Free Zones, Export Processing Zones and High-Tech Industrial 
Development Zones). 
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Figure 4.4. Distribution of Development Zones in Guangdong Province (2008) 
 
 
 
 
4.4 PEARL RIVER DELTA AS ENGINE FOR DEVELOPMENT 
The Pearl River Delta (PRD) is the most economically advanced area of Guangdong 
Province and one of the most developed of entire China. The region covers an area 
of 54,733 sq.km which corresponds to about 30% of the entire province. The 
official definition of PRD includes nine prefectures in Guangdong: Dongguan, 
Foshan, Guangzhou, Jiangmen Shenzhen, Zhongshan, Zhuhai, part of Zhaoqing 
(including the urban district of Zhaoqing, the cities of Gaoyao and Sihui) and part 
of Huizhou (including the urban district of Huizhou, Huyang county and Boluo 
county). Sometimes it is also used another definition named as the Greater Pearl 
River Delta, which also includes Hong Kong and Macau (Figure 4.5). 
In the Pearl River Delta lives about 53% of the total population of Guangdong. In 
this area is produced about 76% of the province's GDP. The primary sector 
produces only 32% of the provincial total, while the secondary and tertiary sectors 
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produce respectively 75% and 82% of the provincial total. In the PRD is 
concentrated 89% of the imports and 88% of exports of the province. Furthermore, 
the area hosts 82% of the total amount of foreign capital used in Guangdong in 2012 
(Guangdong Statistical Yearbook, 2013).  
This level of development of the PRD leads to think that the remaining part of 
Guangdong is much less advanced, and certainly less industrialized. However, the 
areas east and west of Guangdong and the mountainous areas14 in the last year have 
grown in terms of GDP at very high rates, respectively 10.2%, 10% and 8.6%. In 
these areas the primary sector is particularly developed. The East wing produces 
about 12% of the provincial total GDP in the primary industry, the west wing 
accounts for 29% and the mountainous areas for almost 21%. The secondary and 
tertiary industries, however, also show a significant weight in terms of growth. In 
2012, the secondary sector grew by 12.6% in the east wing, by 12.4% in the west 
and by 9.5% in mountain areas. The tertiary sector however, grew by 7.8% in the 
eastern area, by 9.9% in the West and by 9% in the mountains (Table 4.7). 
 
Table 4.7. Gross Domestic Product of PRD vs. non-PRD (2012) 
 GDP PRIMARY  SECONDARY  TERTIARY  
 
Value 
(100 
million 
RMB) 
Growth 
rate in 
2012 
(%) 
Value 
(100 
million 
RMB) 
Growth 
rate in 
2012 (%) 
Value 
(100 million 
RMB) 
Growt
h rate 
in 2012 
(%) 
Value 
(100 
million 
RMB) 
Growth 
rate in 
2012 
(%) 
PRD 
43720.8
6 
8.1 924.09 3.3 20952.91 6.7 21843.86 9.7 
East Wing 3699.38 10.2 338.42 4.9 1996.11 12.6 1364.85 7.8 
West Wing 4212.36 10.0 823.75 4.6 1746.07 12.4 1642.54 9.9 
Mountainous 
Areas 
3588.03 8.6 588.60 5.2 1589.38 9.5 1410.05 9.0 
Source: Author's elaboration on Guangdong Statistical Yearbook (2013) 
 
                                                     
14 The East Wing includes the provinces of Shantou, Shanwei, Chaozhou and Jieyang; in the West 
Wing are Zhanjiang, Maoming and Yangjiang; the mountain areas includes Shaoguan, Heyuan, 
Meizhou, Qingyuan and Yunfu (http://www.gdstats.gov.cn/tjnj/2009/bianzesm_e.htm last time 
accessed on October 24, 2013). 
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Figure 4.5. Pearl River Delta 
 
 
The high economic development that has affected the PRD in recent years is largely 
due to its proximity to Hong Kong, with who, already before the launch of China's 
opening policies in 1978, entertained strong strategic ties. Furthermore, as already 
discussed, some of the areas of PRD have been the areas in which the very first 
policies of opening-up were implemented. The aim was to use Hong Kong as a 
bridge connecting China to the external world; southern China would have been the 
laboratory in which to study the capitalistic approach of Hong Kong and the rest of 
China would have consequentially absorbed it. The relationship with Hong Kong 
has, however, been planned to be mutually beneficial and is effectively represented 
by the popular slogan ‘front shop, back factory’: the Hong Kong ‘shop’ had 
management skills, money and consolidated international relations, while the PRD 
‘factory’ could count on low-cost land and labor coming from inland China (Di 
Tommaso, Rubini & Barbieri, 2013; Yeung, 2010). After the opening up of the 
Guangdong economy, Hong Kong firms have increasingly moved their plants to 
the province and in particular to PRD, thus increasing their dimensions. 
 124 
 
The relations between Hong Kong and the PRD do not have only an economic 
nature. Many Hong Kong residents come from families rooted in Guangdong and 
this social linkage have caused over the years relevant population flows in both 
directions. As soon as China opened up to foreign contacts, these cultural relations 
were coupled with business relations, Hong Kong becoming the global platform for 
those having economic interests in Guangdong. For this reason, the PRD cannot 
work without the logistical support of Hong Kong, while the latter exists and 
flourishes, thanks also to its proximity to Mainland China (Di Tommaso, Rubini & 
Barbieri, 2013). 
In these last few years, the PRD has been facing a greater competition: on one hand 
new areas are emerging in China, reducing the primacy of the PRD in terms of FDIs 
and innovation. In particular, the biggest competitor in this sense is the Yangtze 
River Delta (YRD). On the other hand, emerging countries (such as India and 
Vietnam) and inland Chinese provinces (such as, among others, Hunan and 
Guangxi) have surpassed the PRD in terms of low labor costs, which for years was 
one of the main competitive advantages of the area. The YRD includes Shanghai 
and the provinces of Zhejiang and Jiangsu. Its economic development started 
relatively late (in 1984), when the cities of Shanghai, Ningbo and Wenzhou were 
declared open to foreign investment. Since then, its growth has been rapid and 
continuous. The advantages of YRD, apart from the closeness to Shanghai, are the 
availability of a qualified labor force, a widespread entrepreneurial spirit and a 
coordinated development of the different cities of the region. 
As regards the increasing competition from YRD, in 2002 YRD surpassed PRD in 
terms of FDI attraction and in 2005 in terms of export capacity. The YRD seems to 
show an increased orientation towards advanced manufacturing technologies and 
high-tech productions. This undoubtedly represents a concrete threat for the PRD’s 
future development that the government is trying to face with the measures 
presented in the following section. 
With regards to the second type of new PRD competitors, even if a low labor cost 
is still a key factor of Guangdong province’s advantage, there are new areas in 
inland China (and abroad) that can offer even lower labor costs.  
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Given the key role played by the PRD in the development of the whole province, 
in these last few years it has been at the center of several governmental programs. 
Among these, the ‘Outline of the plan for the reform and development of the Pearl 
River Delta (2008–2020)’ (hereafter Outline) and the ‘Coordinated plan for cluster 
development in the Pearl River Delta 2004–2020’ of the provincial government 
(hereinafter, Coordinated Plan). 
The Outline confirms the role of the PRD as a pilot area to test specific policies. 
Great importance is given to the increase in the innovative capacity of the region, 
especially in the high-tech sectors. This should be accomplished by supporting the 
circulation of knowledge and the technology transfer processes by means of 
strengthened linkages between firms and universities/research centers and by 
favoring the participation of local actors in international co-operation projects on 
innovation. The aim is to pass from the label ‘Guangdong made’ to the label 
‘Guangdong designed’ (OECD, 2010; Yeung, 2010). 
The Outline identifies specific targets to be reached by the PRD, such as the focus 
of the PRD on its manufacturing sector in the areas of nuclear and wind power 
facilities and devices, power transmission and distribution facilities, numerically 
controlled machine tools and ocean engineering equipment. By 2020, the advanced 
manufacturing activities should represent 50%of the total industrial value added 
and high-tech industries should account for 30% of total industrial value added. 
Furthermore the region is expected to develop ten China-based multinationals with 
annual sales of 20 billion US$, two or three auto producers of big dimension with 
output exceeding 100 billion RMB (about 15.7 billion US$) each and to host an 
extra-large petroleum and chemical industry, with two or three mega refineries and 
ethylene producers. 
The Outline also assigns great importance to the improvement of the social and 
welfare system and to environmental preservation. By 2012, the pension system 
should cover 95% of urban workers, 80% of migrants and 60% of rural residents 
(OECD, 2010; Di Tommaso, Rubini & Barbieri, 2013).  
Finally, the Coordinated Plan identifies some main objectives to be reached by the 
industrial development strategy. Such a strategy has to be based on sectorial support 
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for the identification of the sectors to which most of the support should be directed; 
and geographic support, for the identification of the ideal localization of specific 
industrial sectors. 
The economic and industrial development that has interested the PRD for the last 
three decades, in recent years, seems to slowly spread to the periphery, though with 
some difficulties and problems. 
 
 
 
4.5 THE SPECIALIZED TOWNS PROGRAMME 
This paragraph will be focused on one important policy intervention that is the 
Specialized Towns program. It was launched with the aim of rationalizing the 
location of businesses in the PRD and in particular to encourage the industrial 
development of remote areas of the province. In order to achieve these objectives, 
the local government decided that promoting the agglomeration of firms specialized 
in certain industry sectors could actually lead to greater industrial development, an 
increase of competitiveness and innovation allowing faster progress in science and 
technology. 
There is consolidated literature on spatial agglomeration demonstrating the 
advantages associated with the agglomeration of productive units within a delimited 
geographic area (Becattini, 1989; Marshall, 1920). Specifically, the benefits related 
to the agglomeration of firms concern an easier access to specialized resources, an 
increased ability to create knowledge and technological innovation (Cainelli & De 
Liso, 2004), a privileged access to specialized local institutions and public goods, 
and a higher efficiency due to local rivalry (Porter, 1998; Boari et al., 2003; Cainelli, 
Iacobucci, & Morganti, 2006). Finally, studies show that the location of firms in 
specialized areas lowers the degrees of vertical integration, thus reducing the 
opportunistic behaviors. This in turn would induce firms to rely on market 
transactions and would attract firms engaged in complementary activities (Cainelli 
& Iacobucci, 2012). 
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Empirical studies applied to the case of Guangdong show a positive relationship 
between agglomeration and productivity of an economy that until not long ago was 
planned by the central government (Fan & Scott, 2003). This positive relationship 
gained strength also during the period of reforms that took place since the 1980s 
and that seems to have supported regional economic development. 
The territory of Guangdong is characterized by high heterogeneity in the size of 
cities. There are in fact rural villages, medium-sized cities, but also big cities. The 
growth of these cities, in some cases, has been driven by the strong need of some 
major companies to develop specific areas closely related to their field of 
production. In other cases, the development of spontaneous agglomerations of 
specialized towns is linked to the privatization of "Township and Village 
Enterprises" (TVE), or the capacity of the land itself to attract investors (foreign or 
domestic). In some specialized towns there are in fact a great number of public and 
private companies, while in other towns, small and medium enterprises cooperate 
with each other, without the presence of a leader. In few other cases, there are 
agglomerations of specialized firms that do not cooperate with each other since their 
localization in certain areas was the result of private initiative and did not derive by 
collective strategic choices. 
The program of specialized towns was launched by the Department of Science and 
Technology (DST) in Guangdong in 2000 after they realized the existence on the 
territory of a phenomenon later called "one city, one product". Policy-makers in 
Guangdong launched new policy strategies that not only contemplated the presence 
of agglomerations of firms, but also favored growth, development and innovation. 
Therefore, the program of "specialized towns" was launched in order to promote 
this phenomenon of agglomeration already naturally present in the territory. 
Also, the initial intent of the program was to control and direct the flow of investors 
that, especially from the 1990s, was invading the province. In a second phase, the 
program had as its primary objective the promotion of the development of remote 
areas of Guangdong (around PRD) through the agglomeration and sectorial 
specialization (Barbieri et al., 2009; Di Tommaso et al., 2013). 
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The program promoted by the DST is based on some requirements that the towns 
have to meet in order to be officially recognized the title of "specialized towns" and 
subsequently to provide support for the development expected by the program itself. 
The requirements that a town should meet in order to enter the program and become 
a "specialized town" are: 
 From the administrative point of view, the area needs to be a “town” or a 
"county" or "urban district"; 
 30% of manufacturing output (or employment) must be produced in the town 
by a single industrial sector; 
 The annual value of industrial production must be more than 2 billion RMB. 
Once officially recognized, a "specialized town" receives funding from the DST 
and the local government. These funds should primarily be allocated to the creation 
of innovation centers which should allow companies to increase the quality and the 
technological level of products and therefore should lead to an increase in the 
reputation of the city itself (OECD, 2010; Di Tommaso et al., 2013). The officially 
recognized specialized towns are entitled to receive a funding of 300,000 RMB 
provided by the DST. 
In short, every specialized town recognized by the government receives financial 
support and other benefits with the objective of promoting further agglomeration 
and specialization and improve competitiveness and innovation. 
The aim of the government is to foster not only the development of STs per se, but 
also the collaboration among STs, in order to limit territorial overlapping and intra-
provincial competition,  to create ad hoc support centers specialized in quality 
control, to favor the creation of brands at the local level so as to increase the 
capacity of firms and STs to compete effectively on the international market, and 
to increase the diffusion of knowledge on the rules for patenting and for the 
protection of intellectual rights. 
The officially recognized STs are one of the main tools used by the local and the 
provincial government to foster industrial development. To date the number of 
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officially recognized Specialized Towns that entered the program is 363, though 
this number is constantly growing 15. Only in 2003 the total number of specialized 
towns was equal to 71, about one fifth of the current number. 
 
Figure 4.6. Distribution of Specialized Towns in Guangdong Province in 2003 and 2008 
 
 
In the early years of the program, the specialized towns were mainly concentrated 
in the PRD (Figure 4.6). In 2003, 62% of the towns were located in the PRD. In 
recent years, however, there was a change of trend, and a greater number of 
recognized specialized towns are recorded in the areas surrounding the PRD. This 
confirms the fact that the government intends to use this program to encourage 
agglomeration and industrial development of remote areas of Guangdong. 
Observing Figure 4.7, it is possible to note that between 2003 and 2009 the 
prefectures that recognized a greater number of specialized towns are those located 
                                                     
15 Source: http://www.potic.org.cn/client/specialtytown/specialtytown_index.jsp (last time 
accessed on October 24, 2013) 
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in remote areas (in particular, Shaoguan, Huizhou, Heyuan, Zhaoqing, Shanwei and 
Yangjiang). 
According to Di Tommaso et al. (2013), the weight of STs on the provincial 
economy has continuously risen over time. In the time span of only nine years (from 
2001 to 2010), STs have increased from representing 3.66%to 28.5% of provincial 
total GDP, and from 2 per cent to more than 33 per cent of the Guangdong 
population. The increase is equally impressive in terms of number of firms (from 
14,800 in 2001 to more than 950,000 in 2010) and industrial output of the 
specialized sector (from 42 billion RMB in 2001 to more than 132 billion nine years 
later). 
Figure 4.7. Number of Specialized towns in PRD vs. non-PRD 
 
 
Data indicate that STs have also been affected by the 2008–2009 international crisis, 
with reductions in 2009 compared to the previous year in terms of weight of STs 
on provincial GDP (-1.56%), number of industrial firms (-17.2%) and number of 
firms in the specialization sector (-30.9%). In 2010, however, all figures start to 
grow again, with a remarkable +25.7% in the value added of the specialized sector 
(Di Tommaso, Rubini & Barbieri, 2013). 
From 2001 to 2009, the number of high-tech firms has increased by more than 2,200 
per cent, with a slow but constant growth in their prevalence among the total 
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number of specialized firms. Furthermore, there has also been an increasing flow 
of local government funds directed to science and technology and a remarkable 
increase in the number of accumulated patents, which has jumped from 2,852 in 
2001 to almost 154,000 in 2009.  
It is also worth looking at the analysis of the structure of the specialized industrial 
sectors in terms of typologies of firms. There is a large prevalence of private firms, 
which in 2005 accounted for almost 77 per cent of the total number of firms 
operating in the specialized sector, for 50.5 per cent of industrial output, for 57.5 
per cent of employment and for more than 56 per cent of high-tech staff. In most 
cases, these private firms are mainly small and medium sized, with a relatively low 
presence of foreign-funded firms, when compared to the rest of the Guangdong 
industrial sector (Di Tommaso, Rubini & Barbieri, 2013). 
The recent policy strategy of the government is to encourage specialization in high-
tech industries and services. The PRD, in recent years, is in fact making a gradual 
transition. Thanks to the continuous upgrading of enterprises, the PRD is slowly 
reducing production in low-tech sectors and is increasing medium-tech sectors 
(Bellandi & Caloffi, 2008). 
More than ten years after the launch of the specialized towns program, some 
problems begin to emerge. The acknowledgment of the "specialized towns" is not 
enough by itself to stimulate and produce growth in the area. Measures to support 
businesses become increasingly necessary. In this regard, the DST is following 
three paths (Barbieri et al., 2009; Di Tommaso et al., 2013). 
First, considering that innovation in science and technology can facilitate the 
development of specialized towns, it is working in the promotion of innovative 
capability of the traditional sectors. The DST will therefore, on the one hand, create 
a network of cooperation between firms operating in traditional sectors and on the 
other wants to increase the skilled labor which is currently primarily low-skilled. 
The second path concerns the high-tech industry. The presence of this area in the 
specialized towns is still low. Furthermore, firms operating in high-tech sector are 
the result of foreign investments. For this reason, the DST encourages collaboration 
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between local firms and foreign companies with the aim of increasing the number 
of domestic firms that operate in the high-tech. A greater number of domestic firms 
allows greater control of the technological potential of the territory. 
Finally, the last strategy on which DST has been focusing in the last few years is 
the promotion of new towns in rural and mountain areas. The DST is recently 
started to give priority to industrial development trying to smooth the unbalanced 
development between the PRD and peripheral areas. For that reason in recent years 
it has been acknowledged a growing number of specialized towns in rural and 
mountainous areas. 
The program is therefore a tool that is used by DST not only to boost industrial 
development, but also to balance the regional inequalities, favor specialization in 
some sectors and improve the performances of traditional industries. 
Policy makers are well aware of all the benefits available to firms as a result of their 
agglomeration, their proximity and cooperation, and their joint action and collective 
support services.  
The formal acknowledgement of STs is, however, not sufficient to obtain the 
economies and advantages that the international literature traditionally assigns to 
the agglomeration of firms. It is also necessary to foster and consolidate the 
establishment of relationships among actors. This is particularly difficult 
considering that some STs, tend to overcome the administrative boundaries (city, 
prefecture and town) and become inter-sectorial, increasingly involving actors 
operating in other fields, with growing linkages among agriculture, industry and 
services (Di Tommaso, Rubini & Barbieri, 2013). 
In these last few years, the provincial government authorities are trying to increase 
the innovative capacity and to facilitate the technology upgrading of STs. The main 
policy lines recently followed by the DST are (Barbieri et al., 2009b; Di Tommaso 
and Rubini, 2005, 2006; OECD, 2010): firstly, support for the innovative capacity 
of traditional sectors. The aim is to facilitate the cooperation among firms, to 
improve workforce quality (the target sectors are mainly labor-intensive) and to 
support firms’ technology upgrading.  
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Secondly, the promotion of high-tech sectors. The number of high-tech STs is still 
relatively low, and in many cases there is still a prevalence of foreign-funded 
companies with control over technology. The government is particularly concerned 
about this situation, especially because recent policy measures pay great attention 
to the strengthening of the local productive system. Therefore, in the future the 
government will try to increase the position of STs in order to better control their 
technological potential. This will be done gradually by starting to encourage the 
collaboration among local and foreign firms and the promotion of capital sharing 
initiatives.  
Lastly, the promotion of ST establishment in rural and mountainous territories. 
Recent efforts of the Guangdong government have been dedicated to re-balancing 
the degree of industrial development among the various prefectures. The DST has 
already started to pursue this objective by formally acknowledging new STs in rural 
areas, especially in resource-based and agriculture-related sectors. A second 
measure moving in the same direction is the promotion of the relocation of high-
tech sectors and services to the central PRD area, while moving the low value-added 
industries towards the external area, as stated in the double relocation policy. This 
attempt to also re-balance the development of the province by means of STs is 
confirmed in the previously mentioned “Coordinated plan for cluster development 
in the PRD, 2004–2020”, launched by the Guangdong government to increase the 
competitiveness of the area by supporting the development of ad hoc clusters. In 
particular the plan clearly identifies specific industrial priorities to be reached in the 
next few years in terms of ST promotion. 
Even though STs are contributing to industrial growth of Guangdong, this policy 
has also showed to have some problems (Di Tommaso, Rubini & Barbieri, 2013). 
Firstly it seems that there is and under-utilization of measures supporting innovation. 
The formal acknowledgement of a ST is usually followed by the establishment of 
innovation centers serving all firms that operate in the town. The mere creation of 
these centers, however, is not a guarantee of their success. In many cases, in fact, 
these innovation platforms are under-utilized: on one side, large firms have their 
own internal Research and Development (R&D) resources, and on the other, often 
small firms do not believe in the utility and safety of external resources to promote 
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innovation, fearing information leakages and a consequent loss of competitiveness. 
This fear is also fuelled by the absence of clear regulation on the protection of 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs), delivering insufficient defense both at the 
national and international level. Furthermore, in some cases the publicly funded 
innovation centers fail to serve as reference points for the promotion of innovation 
in STs because they are not properly connected to the local production system and 
the external world, they do not employ adequately prepared personnel and they are 
not able to properly inform potential users of the benefits of their support measures 
(Barbieri et al., 2010).  
Secondly, there seems to be insufficient coordination in ST promotion. The 
intensive growth of STs, together with a severe antagonism among Guangdong 
towns, has caused the multiplication of ‘overlapping’ towns in the provincial area 
(Qian and Stiglitz, 1996). Many of them are directly competing with one another 
because they concentrate on similar productions. In some cases, the situation is even 
worse and STs operate not only in the same field, but also in the same specific phase 
of the productive process (Li & Fung, 2006). A strong improvement to the whole 
ST production system would derive from an increased effort on the part of 
government authorities in developing vertical specializations. This implies driving 
each ST towards the gradual concentration in a specific stage of the production 
process, while at the same time facilitating the establishment of vertical 
relationships among STs (supplier–customer and not competitor–competitor 
relationships). The result of this action would possibly be a reinforced industrial 
system at the provincial level and the reduction of internal competition among 
Guangdong ST, which would in turn bring to relationships between towns. These 
relationships have resulted in the creation of a complex furniture production system 
that has increased its overall competitive capacity, capable of selling furniture items 
all over the world.  
Finally, there are problems related to the impact of fast industrial development: the 
use of the ST promotion tool has undoubtedly been among the factors allowing for 
rapid development in Guangdong province (and in particular in the PRD). On the 
other side, there has been amazing increase in problems such as air, water and land 
pollution, resource scarcity, increased labor costs, decrease in the overall quality of 
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life and so on. For this reason, many ST governments are now designing sets of 
policies specifically aimed at fostering a harmonious development in the area and 
at decreasing the ‘side effects’ of rapid industrial growth. 
The local government has always been involved in the development of the 
Specialized Towns programme. After the launch of the ‘one city, one product’ 
policy, the Department of Science and Technology of Guangdong province strongly 
encouraged the local governments of STs to increase their role in local development. 
This became possible following the 1994 fiscal reform of the tax-sharing system, 
allowing local governments to share part of the tax revenue with the central 
government. This change has strongly stimulated local governments to play an 
active role in the development of the local economic system (Wang and Yue, 2010). 
In particular, the DST has identified specific goals for local town government 
actions (Barbieri et al., 2009b; Di Tommaso and Rubini, 2005; Bellandi and Di 
Tommaso, 2005; OECD, 2010; Di Tommaso, Rubini & Barbieri, 2013): to facilitate 
the creation of support institutions providing services for all firms in the town; to 
promote R&D, coherently with the national focus on industrial technological 
enhancement; to favor the diffusion of knowledge within the town, facilitating the 
flow of specific and reliable information on market scenarios, new technologies, 
local and international competitors and so on, to single firms. This measure is 
strategic in STs where there is a prevalence of small and medium-sized firms, for 
which access to the aforementioned strategic information is more difficult and more 
expensive to reach; to design and implement sector-specific professional training 
programmes. Once again, this indication is coherent with the overall priority set by 
the national and provincial governments in improving the quality and skills of the 
People’s Republic of China’s workforce as a way to raise the innovative capacity 
and the competitiveness of Chinese enterprises; to favor the diffusion of technology 
by supporting the relationships between firms and universities/research centers. The 
Chinese government works at reinforcing the university–industry connection 
(Barbieri et al., 2010); to increase the international visibility of towns by means of 
national and international events. In accordance with this, many towns have 
organized sectorial-specific trade fairs, attracting companies not only from China, 
but from all over the world.  
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Local governments seem to have followed the indications coming from the DST 
and have strongly supported the growth of their STs, implementing a wide variety 
of support actions, ranging from vocational training courses to branding policies at 
the town level and from the construction of town-level exhibition centers to the 
organization of big events at the national and international levels. 
A common feature of all these interventions is the intent of the local government to 
avoid supporting specific groups of firms, instead fostering the development of the 
town as a whole and, as was explicitly argued by one of the interviewed policy 
makers, maintaining a stable environment that can favor the social and economic 
development of the town. 
In order to facilitate the first application and subsequent diffusion of best practices 
among STs, there is a plan to select one ‘pilot ST’ to test the implementation of a 
sustainable urbanization process, integrated with and supported by technology 
upgrading, and sustainable growth both at the regional and national levels. 
Furthermore, policy makers are now trying to promote the evolution of the ST 
system in order to reach the so-called ‘one city, one policy’ objective, through the 
following objectives:  
 To simplify the political administration of STs by further decentralizing the 
town’s economic management to local authorities, 
 To optimize and strengthen the industrial structure of STs and to manage urban 
development, 
 To restore public accounts to good order in order to have the resources for the 
renewal of old infrastructures and the construction of new ones, 
 To promote quality enhancement, especially in traditional industries, 
 To help STs increase their GDP, their innovation potential and, more generally, 
their competitive capacity. 
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4.6 NEW POLICY PATHS: REDUCTION OF REGIONAL 
DISPARITIES 
After the opening of China, Guangdong province focused policy intervention 
mainly in some territories, used as labs for experimentation. Following these 
interventions, industrial development grew rapidly, while the gap between 
peripheral areas and the urban developed areas widened. Therefore, in recent years, 
the government announced that industrial policy measures would be redistributed 
in the area, trying to favor inner areas, not coastal and outside the PRD, in order to 
redress inequalities among regions. 
Since the late 1990s, Guangdong started to show problems of polarization, which 
tried to solve by promoting regional integration between PRD and the periphery 
through the "Mountain Area Development Program" and later with "the Anti-
Poverty Development for Rural Guangdong". Since 2005, under the administration 
of the new governor of Guangdong, the provincial government initiated the "dual-
track policy transformation" in order to further promote the upgrading of the PRD 
and promote more equitable development through the relocation of low-tech 
production from the PRD to the more peripheral areas. 
In general, the rapid economic growth of China has provided a greater emphasis on 
the topic of regional disparities in transition economies. The literature on China has 
reached a broad consensus that there is a growing gap between the coastal provinces 
and the inner regions, mainly due to the fact that the coastal provinces have greatly 
experienced the reforms of liberalization. Some researchers have focused on the 
effectiveness of policies such as the "Go West”, arguing that the inland provinces 
are facing more difficulties because they have been much more affected by the 
effects of globalization. Another part of the literature also argues that China has 
adopted a gradual approach to reforms, therefore the evolution and importance of 
regional inequalities are believed to be sensitive to shocks inherent structural 
reforms as China's accession to the WTO in 2001 (Liao & Wei, 2012; Sakamoto & 
Islam, 2008; Chen & Fleischer, 1996). 
Other authors have made use of spatial analysis to demonstrate that space and 
geography are not relevant to define the framework of economic inequality in China. 
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They argue that the evolution of regional inequalities in China is sensitive to the 
balance between provinces that cannot be simplified with the theories of 
convergence or divergence (Ke, 2010; Liao & Wei, 2012; Li & Wei, 2010). 
Research on Guangdong in particular, has identified a type of center-periphery 
economy focused on the PRD. Nevertheless, there are various interpretations about 
the evolution of intra- regional inequalities of Guangdong. Some studies focus on 
the industrialization of rural areas during the market reform in the 1980s and 1990s 
and have found a more balanced growth in the PRD (Weng, 1998). Other authors 
have highlighted the contrary: an increase in the gap between the PRD and the 
peripheral areas during the reforms of 1980s and 1990s (Gu et al., 2001).  
It should be noted a shortage of studies carried out at different levels of 
administration, except for Fan (1995). Furthermore the literature has focused on the 
inequalities of the 1980s and 1990s and then does not seem to have updates to the 
last decade (exception in this case for the work of Liao & Wei, 2012). 
Liao and Wei (2012) find a persistent gap between the PRD and the suburbs to 
which it is added the gap between rural and urban areas. In addition, they argue that 
only a few counties in the suburbs have benefited from spillover effects from the 
PRD. This study revealed that the effectiveness of policies aimed at reducing 
inequality has been limited by geographical barriers and by the effects of 
agglomeration. The recent efforts to decrease the gap did not achieve the desired 
effects because the policies used, such as that of "double relocation parks", were 
directed to specific locations on the borders. They argue that these policies had a 
low impact on the reduction of overall inequality of Guangdong, and in some cases 
even worsened the gap between urban and rural areas. The studies proposed in the 
literature often measure the gap using as indicator per capita GDP or per capita 
consumption.  
Previous studies (World Bank, 2011) showed that a large part of the poor population 
lives in areas east and west of the region of Guangdong. A small part instead is 
divided between PRD and the area to the north. It is clear also that the inequalities 
in Guangdong have geographical reasons. The natural geography of the province is 
such that the area of the PRD is endowed with a significant advantage over other 
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areas. The PRD has also benefited from the proximity to Hong Kong and Macao 
with which it has closer ties that allowed easier access to markets in the rest of the 
world. Economic activities are then concentrated in the PRD where GDP per capita 
is much higher than the other areas. This inequality has contributed according to 
World Bank (2011) to generate the gap between rural and urban areas and in terms 
of household income. 
As already pointed out, in the early 1990s the Chinese model of development has 
shown the first weaknesses. The rapid industrialization and urbanization in the PRD 
had concentrated the population and economic activities in urban areas creating 
significant congestion problems, lack of energy and pollution. For this reason, the 
government intervened in an attempt to de- congest the PRD and move low and 
medium tech production to the peripheral areas of the region. 
The OECD (2010) describes the intra-provincial disparities in Guangdong and the 
PRD is depicted as an area not evenly developed because, along with the 
metropolitan areas of Guangzhou, Foshan and Shenzhen, there are areas much less 
prosperous as Dongguan and Zhongshan. OECD, however, does not detect 
phenomena of spillover from the Inner PRD (Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, 
Foshan, Zhongshan, and Foshan) to the Outer PRD (Huizhou, Jiangmen and 
Zhaoqing) and very limited growth in peripheral areas outside the Inner PRD. 
 
4.7 FINAL REMARKS 
Guangdong province is here considered as an emblematic case. It combines all the 
characteristics of China: intense and continuous growth, deep industrialization, 
substantive government’s intervention, pursuit of strategic targets, long-term 
planning. All these elements are also accompanied by the rise of side effects that 
initially were not taken into account: environmental degradation, rise of inequalities. 
Guangdong province has for a long time showed several types of inequalities that 
now the government is trying to address through a re-shaping of planning and 
policies. In the following chapter, the work proposed tries to statistically define the 
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territorial unbalances that characterize the region, not only in terms of performances, 
but also in terms of policy intervention.  
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5 INDUSTRIALIZATION AND TERRITORIAL 
UNBALANCES IN GUANGDONG: AN 
EXPLORATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
5.1 OBJECTIVE OF THE ANALYSIS: ASSESSMENT OF DUALISM IN 
THE INDUSTRIALIZATION PROCESS 
The reference unit chosen for this analysis is the "Province". Specifically, emphasis 
is on one of the most industrialized, "open", and rich provinces in China: 
Guangdong (OECD, 2010; World Bank, 2011; Di Tommaso, Rubini, & Barbieri, 
2013). In order to increase understanding of the relationship between the industrial 
growth of this enormous province and all its territories, this analysis is based on a 
lower administrative level using data referring to prefectures, counties and districts 
of the province16. Economic performances and policy interventions are the two 
dimensions used in the analysis. 
The objective here is to test the hypothesis discussed in the literature (OECD, 2010; 
World Bank, 2011; Liao & Wei, 2012; Gu et al., 2001; Di Tommaso, Rubini & 
Barbieri, 2013) relating to a process of industrialization undoubtedly unique (in 
terms of intensity and speed) but geographically unbalanced. Furthermore it is 
believed that over time it established a clear dualism between central and remote 
areas of the province. 
With this objective, this study is developed in two phases that in succession aim at 
a process of analysis that intends to address the characteristics of the sub-regional 
disparities. 
In the first phase the province is divided into two areas that correspond to what can 
be considered the "center" and "periphery" (Figure 5.1). On the one hand, the central 
                                                     
16 Guangdong Province is one of the 22 Chinese provinces. It is further divided into 21 prefectures 
and 88 counties and districts. 
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area of the Pearl River Delta (henceforth "PRD") that is divided into 24 
counties/districts17; on the other hand, the rest of the provincial peripheral territories 
(from now on "non -PRD") that contain 64 counties/districts18.  
Referring to the two macro-areas, in this first phase of analysis the aim is to study 
differences in the geographical distribution of economic performance recorded in 
2008, the last year for which data are available for all counties. In parallel, the 
difference in terms of distribution on the territory of policy interventions in 2003-
2005 and in 2006-200819 is also analyzed. 
In order to do so, it was decided to start by comparing PRD and non-PRD through 
tests of stochastic dominance focusing on the level of performance and on the 
intensity of policy interventions. Specifically, two hypotheses were empirically 
tested:  
1) The hypothesis that the performance in the PRD in 2008 was greater than in 
the «non-PRD»; 
2) The hypothesis that policy interventions have been more intense in the 
«non- PRD» than in the PRD (in both periods examined).  
The specialized literature on this topic (Gu et al., 2001; OECD, 2010; World Bank, 
2011; Liao and Wei, 2012) in fact, emphasizes two issues. First, it seems obvious 
that the central part of the province («PRD») continues to grow its performance 
well above the rest of the territories of the province. Second, the authorities of 
national and provincial governments seem to be engaged in different programs of 
territorial balance with the goal of relieving congestion in the PRD and promoting 
industrialization in other areas of the province («the non-PRD»). 
                                                     
17 For the purpose of this analysis, the official definition of PRD is not used. Rather a broader 
definition in which PRD includes all the counties and districts of the prefectures of Guangzhou, 
Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Foshan, Huizhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Jiangmen and Zhaoqing (24 counties 
and districts in total) is used. 
18 Non-PRD includes all counties and districts in the remaining prefectures of Shantou, Shaoguan, 
Heyuan, Meizhou, Shanwei, Yangjiang, Zhanjiang, Maoming, Qingyuan, Chaozhou, Jieyang and 
Yunfu. 
19 The years used as threshold to define the end of the first period and the start of the second 
correspond to the end of the Tenth and the start of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan. The Eleventh Five-
Year Plan promotes the idea of «socialist harmonious society», which was defined as a society with 
a low rate of inequalities (Fan & Sun, 2008). This choice attempts to expose possible differences in 
the distribution and intensity of policy interventions between the two periods. 
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However, once these hypotheses are tested, this analysis will go further. After 
classifying all counties and districts of the province according to levels of 
performance and intensity of policy intervention, this analysis will further study 
how the two variables (performance and policy) take homogeneous/heterogeneous 
values within the two macro-areas (PRD and non-PRD). This analysis is also 
designed to verify the hypothesis found in literature (OECD, 2010; World Bank, 
2011) that the performance and policy interventions are distributed more 
homogeneously in the territory of the PRD than in the non-PRD. 
Figure 5.1.  Guangdong: PRD and non-PRD 
 
In fact what is being tested at this early stage is likely to confirm the hypothesis of 
dualism (center vs. periphery, PRD vs. non-PRD) highlighted in the literature even 
though it is somewhat inaccurate because it underestimates differences within the 
two macro-areas. That is the reason this analysis goes one step further by proposing 
a second phase in which the territory of the province is divided into seven sub-areas 
(Figure 5.2). The PRD will be divided into «Inner PRD» (8 counties/districts) and 
«Outer PRD» (14 counties/districts). The «non-PRD» will instead be divided into 
«East Coast» (14 counties/districts), «West Coast» (11 counties/districts), «Middle  
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Figure 5.2. Guangdong: Seven areas - Inner PRD, Outer PRD, West Coast, Middle West, North, North East, 
East Coast 
 
West» (9 counties/districts), «North» (16 counties/districts), «North East» (14 
counties/districts)20. The objective of the second phase of this analysis is to compare 
all seven sub-areas defined above for the periods indicated, again in reference to 
intensity and heterogeneity of performance and policy. As for the previous phase, 
inferential techniques, such as the two-sample tests of stochastic dominance and of 
heterogeneity to compare in pairs all sub-areas are used. In this case, however, the 
analysis consists of an exploratory study to define a ranking concerning the 
performance (for each of the three-year periods considered) and a ranking 
concerning the policy of the seven areas, both in terms of intensity and in terms of 
spatial heterogeneity. These rankings will be constructed by combining the p-values 
of the directional tests (test of stochastic dominance for the intensity, test of 
                                                     
20 Inner PRD includes all the counties and districts of the prefectures of Guangzhou, Shenzhen, 
Zhuhai, Foshan, Dongguan, Zhongshan; the Outer PRD includes all the counties and districts of the 
prefectures of Huizhou, Jiangmen, Zhaoqing; the East Coast includes all counties and districts of 
the prefectures of Jieyang, Chaozhou, Shanwei, Shantou; the West Coast includes all counties and 
districts of the prefectures of Zhanjiang and Maoming; the Middle West includes all counties and 
districts of the prefectures of Yunfu and Yangjiang; the North includes all counties and districts of 
the prefectures of Shaoguan and Qingyuan; the North East includes all counties and districts of the 
prefectures of Meizhou and Heyuan. 
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heterogeneity for the spatial heterogeneity) of all pairwise comparisons between 
sub-areas. 
 
 
5.2 DESCRIPTION OF DATASET 
The data included in the database have different sources. The primary source was 
the National Bureau of Statistics of China, especially data of Guangzhou Statistical 
Yearbook of various years, starting from 2001 until 2009. The database includes 
socio-economic data and is fully described in the following paragraph. The 
statistical unit corresponds to the administrative level of county/district. For this 
reason, some of the data were derived from the Statistical Yearbooks of each 
Prefecture.  
Furthermore, the database contains data on Specialized Towns, which were 
collected from the Department of Science and Technology (DST) and from the 
Association of Guangdong Province Professional Towns21 ; data on Innovation 
Centers and Development Zones were collected from DST. 
The data refer to 88 counties and districts, and 10 variables have been used to create 
the indices. 
 
 
 
5.3 METHODOLOGY 
5.3.1 Indicators of Performance and Indicators of Policy 
Intervention  
In order to create the Indicators of Performance and the Indicators of Policy 
Intervention the following steps were performed: 
                                                     
21  Data and information about Specialized Towns were mainly derived from the website 
http://www.potic.org.cn/client/specialtytown/specialtytown_index.jsp 
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1. Identification and calculation of the variables for each county/district. The 
five variables used for the Index of Performance refer to the year 2008, 
while the five variables used to calculate the Index of Policy intervention 
refer to the years from 2003 until 2008. 
2. Normalization and combination with respect to variables for each county in 
each year considered: 2008 for the Index of Performance and from 2003 
until 2008 for the Index of Policy Intervention 
3. Normalization of all the Indices obtained (both for policy and performance) 
and combination with respect to years for each county, of the Indices of 
Policy Intervention for 2003-2004-2005 and for 2006-2007-2008. 
4. Normalization of the resulting Indices of Policy Intervention for 2003-2005, 
for 2006-2008 and for the Index of Performance. 
A detailed description of the process applied for the calculation of the Indices of 
Performance and the Indices of Policy follows: 
1. In order to create the Index of intensity of the Policy intervention (IPol) the 
variables thought to be informative in terms of the policy intervention have first 
been carefully identified and selected for the period 2003-2008.  
A brief description of the component variables of the index of policy intervention 
follows: 
 Specialized Towns is the variable referring to the number of specialized towns 
in each county/district for every year from 2003 until 2008. 
 Development Zones is the variable that identifies the number of development 
zones in each county/district of the province for every year from 2003 until 
2008. As previously mentioned in paragraph 4.3.2, the definition given to 
development zones is very wide. What unites the development zones is the idea 
of offering various forms of incentives and benefits to investors. The 
expression “development zones” means Export Processing Zones, Free Trade 
Zones, the Economic and Technological Development Zones, and the High-
Tech Industrial Development Zones.  
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 Innovation Center refers to the number of centers of innovation in each 
county/district in the years from 2003 until 2008. The objective of Innovation 
Centers is to build a network of technology services available to all users and 
to also create a driving force to support the technological development of 
enterprises by developing new systems and mechanisms to achieve scientific, 
technological and economic breakthroughs.  
 Expenditures Over Revenues is the relationship between the expenditures 
and revenues of the local governments calculated for each county/district in 
every year from 2003 until 2008. The expenditures of local government refers 
to the distribution and use of funds that the government has raised, in order to 
meet the needs of economic construction and various other causes. It mainly 
includes the following items: expenditures for general public services, 
expenditures for foreign affairs, expenditures for national defense, 
expenditures for public security, expenditures for education, expenditures for 
science and technology, expenditures for culture, sport and media, 
expenditures for social safety net and employment effort, expenditures for 
medical and health care, expenditures for environment protection, expenditures 
for urban and rural community affairs, expenditures for agriculture, forestry 
and water conservancy, expenditures for transportation, expenditures for 
industry, commerce and banking. Local government revenues refer to 
governmental income generated by the provision of social products. It includes 
various tax revenues, such as domestic value added tax (VAT), domestic 
consumption tax, VAT and consumption tax from imports, VAT and 
consumption tax rebate for exports, business tax, corporate income tax, 
individual income tax, resource tax, city maintenance and construction tax, 
house property tax, stamp tax, urban land use tax, land appreciation tax, tax on 
vehicles and boat operation, ship tonnage tax, vehicle purchase tax, tariffs, farm 
land occupation tax, deed tax, and tobacco leaf tax, etc. Local government 
revenues also include non-tax revenue, such as special program receipts, 
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charge of administrative and institutional units, penalty receipts, and others 
non-tax receipts22. 
 Investment in Innovation refers to investment in innovation carried out in 
each county/district in every year form 2003 until 2008. It identifies the 
investments in the renewal of fixed assets and technological innovation of 
original facilities by enterprises and institutions23. 
In the construction of the index the variable indicating the presence of Special 
Economic Zones has deliberately been omitted because this characteristic concerns 
only three prefectures, and is not a widespread condition of the whole territory. 
Variables are indicated as 𝑋𝑣𝑗𝑡𝑐 where: 
𝑣 = variable (with 𝑣 = 1, … , 𝑘) 
𝑗 = year (with 𝑗 = 1, … ,6) 
𝑐 = county/district (with 𝑐 = 1, … ,88) 
𝑡 = time period (with 𝑡 = 1, 2) 
2. Each of the variables was normalized according to the following rule: 
𝜆𝑣𝑗𝑡𝑐 =  
𝑋𝑣𝑗𝑡𝑐 − min𝑐(𝑋𝑣𝑗𝑡𝑐) + 
1
88
max𝑐(𝑋𝑣𝑗𝑡𝑐) − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑐(𝑋𝑣𝑗𝑡𝑐) +
2
88
             
where: 
 𝜆𝑣𝑗𝑡𝑐  is the normalized variable 𝑣  in the year 𝑗  of the time period 𝑡  in the 
county/district 𝑐. 
 𝑋𝑣𝑗𝑡𝑐 is the variable 𝑣 in the year 𝑗 of the time period 𝑡 in the county/district 𝑐. 
 min𝑐(𝑋𝑣𝑗𝑡𝑐) and max𝑐(𝑋𝑣𝑗𝑡𝑐) are respectively the minimum and maximum 
values taken by the variable 𝑣  in the year 𝑗  of the time period 𝑡  in the 
county/district 𝑐. 
                                                     
22 Taken from Explanatory Notes on Main Statistical Indicators, Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 
(2013), http://www.gdstats.gov.cn/tjnj/2013/directory/008/explain.html. 
23 Taken from Explanatory Notes on Main Statistical Indicators, Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 
(2009), http://www.gdstats.gov.cn/tjnj/2009/table/6/e6_zbjx.htm. 
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The result of the normalization is an indicator that takes values strictly included in 
the interval between 0 and 1. In order to avoid the normalized variable taking the 
value 0 or 1, in the formula, 1/88 and 2/88 were added to the numerator and 
denominator respectively. 88 is the number of observations for each variable. In 
this way the risk of getting forms of indeterminacy and infinite values  that would 
have occurred in the case of numerators equal to zero or with the argument of the 
logarithmic function equal to zero  (log(0) = ∞) is avoided. 
Once this step was completed, attention focused on construction of the index of 
intensity of the policy intervention. Selected variables were combined using 
Fisher’s combining function24: 
𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑡𝑐 = − ∑   𝑋
 𝑤𝑣
𝑘
𝑣=1
ln(1 − 𝜆𝑣𝑗𝑡𝑐) 
where: 
 𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑡𝑐 is the Index of Policy intervention in the year 𝑗 of the time period 𝑡 in 
the county/district 𝑐. 
 𝜆𝑣𝑗𝑡𝑐  is the normalized variable 𝑣  in the year 𝑗  of the time period 𝑡  in the 
county/district 𝑐. 
 v = 1, 2, ..., k denotes the variable (with k = 5); 
  𝑋
 𝑤𝑣  indicates the weight given to each variable. For simplicity of 
interpretation, the sum of the weights of all the variables has been set equal to 
1. Giving more weight to a variable, means that this variable has a relatively 
greater importance than the others. In the analysis, it is assumed that each 
variable has equal weight. In this way, it is possible to avoid the risks deriving 
from giving a priori greater importance to one variable over another. 
3. Once IPol is calculated, it is normalized, in order to obtain for each 
county/district a value between 0 and 1 (excluded): 
                                                     
24 For an analogous application of the function, see Barbieri et al. (2012). 
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𝜆′𝑗𝑡𝑐 =  
𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑡𝑐 −  min𝑐(𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑡𝑐) +  
1
88
max𝑐(𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑡𝑐) − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑐(𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑡𝑐) +
2
88
 
where: 
 𝜆′𝑗𝑡𝑐 is the normalized value of the Index of Policy in the year 𝑗 of the time 
period 𝑡 in the county/district 𝑐. 
 𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑡𝑐 is the Index of Policy intervention in the year 𝑗 of the time period 𝑡 in 
the county/district 𝑐. 
 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑐(𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑡𝑐)  and max𝑐(𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑡𝑐)  are respectively the minimum and 
maximum values taken by the Index in the year 𝑗 of the time period 𝑡 in the 
county/district 𝑐. 
An index very close to one indicates a high intensity of policy intervention for a 
given county/district with respect to all the others; while if the index value is very 
close to 0, this means that the intensity of the intervention policy is rather low. 
The procedure described here was applied to six years, from 2003 to 2008. All 
databases contain the same number of observations and the same variables. 
Fisher’s combining function was then applied again on the six Indices of Policy 
referring to the years 2003 to 2008 in order to obtain two Indices: one for the period 
2003-2005 and the other for the period 2006-2008. 
𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑙′𝑡𝑐 = − ∑   𝑡
 𝑤𝑗
 
𝑗∈𝑡
ln(1 − 𝜆′𝑗𝑡𝑐) 
where: 
 𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑙′𝑡𝑐  is the Index of Policy intervention for the time period 𝑡  in the 
county/district 𝑐. 
  𝑡
 𝑤𝑗 indicates the weight that is given to each year 𝑗 for the time period 𝑡. It is 
assumed that each year has equal weight. 
 𝜆′𝑗𝑡𝑐 is the normalized value of the Index of Policy in the year 𝑗 of the time 
period 𝑡 in the county/district 𝑐. 
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4. Finally the Index obtained is normalized again in order to obtain values 
between 1 and 0: 
𝜆′′𝑡𝑐 =  
𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑙′𝑡𝑐 −  min𝑐(𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑙′𝑡𝑐) +  
1
88
max𝑐(𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑙′𝑡𝑐) − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑐(𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑙′𝑡𝑐) +
2
88
 
where: 
 𝜆′′𝑡𝑐 is the normalized value of the Index of Policy in the time period 𝑡 in the 
county/district 𝑐. 
 𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑙′𝑡𝑐  is the Index of Policy intervention in the time period 𝑡  in the 
county/district 𝑐. 
 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑐(𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑙′𝑡𝑐)  and max𝑐(𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑙′𝑡𝑐)  are respectively the minimum and 
maximum values taken by the Index in the time period 𝑡 in the county/district 
𝑐. 
As for the Index of Policy, the Index of economic Performance has been calculated 
through the following steps: 
1. In order to create the Index of Performance (IPerf) the variables thought to 
be informative in terms of the economic performance have been first carefully 
identified and selected for the year 2008.  
A brief description of the component variables of the index performance follows: 
 Density of Enterprises represents the density of industrial enterprises per 
square kilometer in each county district in the year 2008. The enterprises 
considered are only those classified by the statistical source as above 
designated size.  
 Exports is the real value of commodities (both trade and non-trade) exported 
across the border of China in each county/district in 2008. It mainly includes 
actual exports through foreign trade, exported goods in the categories of 
processing and assembling of customer's materials, compensation trade, 
exported commodities and articles for public use of Sino-foreign joint ventures, 
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and cooperative enterprises and ventures with sole foreign investment. Also 
included are export of samples and advertising articles25. 
 Industrial Output refers to the total volume of industrial products sold or 
available for sale in monetary terms during a given period, which reflects the 
total achievements and overall scale of industrial production in each 
county/district during 2008. It includes the value of the finished products in the 
enterprises, which are not to be further processed and have been inspected, 
packed and put in storage (where applicable), the income from external 
processing and the value gain of semi-finished products at the end of the 
reference period over the beginning26. 
 Per Capita GDP refers to value of final products at market prices produced by 
all resident units per capita in each county/district during 2008. 
 Employment is the number of persons who have work posts, work in and 
receive payment from units of state ownership, collective ownership, joint 
ownership, shareholding ownership, foreign ownership, and ownership by 
entrepreneurs from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, and other types of 
ownership and their affiliated units27 in each county/district in 2008. 
They are indicated with 𝑌𝑣𝑐 where: 
𝑣 = variable (with 𝑣 = 1, … , 𝑘) 
𝑐 = county/district (with 𝑐 = 1, … ,88) 
 
2. Each of the variables was normalized according to the following rule: 
𝛾𝑣𝑐 =  
𝑌𝑣𝑐 −  min𝑐(𝑌𝑣𝑐) +  
1
88
max𝑐(𝑌𝑣𝑐) − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑐(𝑋𝑣𝑐) +
2
88
             
where: 
 𝛾𝑣𝑐 is the normalized variable 𝑣 in the county/district 𝑐. 
                                                     
25 Taken from Explanatory Notes on Main Statistical Indicators, Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 
(2009), http://www.gdstats.gov.cn/tjnj/2009/table/16/e16_zbjx.htm. 
26 Taken from Explanatory Notes on Main Statistical Indicators, Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 
(2009), http://www.gdstats.gov.cn/tjnj/2009/table/12/e12_zbjx.htm. 
27 Taken from Explanatory Notes on Main Statistical Indicators, Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 
(2009), http://www.gdstats.gov.cn/tjnj/2009/table/5/e5_zbjx.htm. 
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 𝑌𝑣𝑐 is the variable 𝑣 in the county/district 𝑐. 
 min𝑐(𝑌𝑣𝑐) and max𝑐(𝑌𝑣𝑐) are respectively the minimum and maximum values 
taken by the variable 𝑣 in the county/district 𝑐. 
Once this step was completed, the index of performance was calculated. Selected 
variables were combined using Fisher’s combining function: 
𝐼𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑐 = − ∑   𝑌
 𝑤𝑣
𝑘
𝑣=1
ln(1 − 𝛾𝑣𝑐) 
where: 
 𝐼𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑐  is the Index of Performance in the county/district 𝑐. 
 𝛾𝑣𝑐 is the normalized variable 𝑣 in the county/district 𝑐. 
  𝑌
 𝑤𝑣 indicates the weight that is given to each variable. It is assumed that each 
variable has equal weight. 
3. Once IPerf was calculated, it has been normalized, in order to obtain for 
each county/district a value between 0 and 1 (excluded): 
𝛾′𝑐 =  
𝐼𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑐 −  min𝑐(𝐼𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑐) + 
1
88
max𝑐(𝐼𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑐) − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑐(𝐼𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑐) +
2
88
 
where: 
 𝛾′𝑐  is the normalized value of the Index of Performance in the county/district 
𝑐. 
 𝐼𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑐  is the Index of Performance in the county/district 𝑐. 
 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑐(𝐼𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑐)  and max𝑐(𝐼𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑐)  are respectively the minimum and 
maximum values taken by the Index in the county/district 𝑐. 
An index very close to one indicates a high intensity of performance for a given 
county/district with respect to all the others; while an index value is very close to 0 
means that the intensity of the performance is low. 
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5.3.2 Classification of Counties and Districts on the basis of the 
Indices 
In order to address the preliminary analysis two indices are used as variables of 
interest: the index of regional economic performance (IPerf) and the index of 
intensity of the policy intervention (IPol).  
For the purpose of this analysis the Performance Index only in reference to 2008 is 
used. As a reminder, the index is composed of the value of exports, the density of 
enterprises per square kilometer, the value of industrial output, per capita GDP, and 
the number of employed staff and workers. 
The index of intensity of the policy intervention was built using the variables in 
relation to each relevant year (2003-2008). This index is the result of the 
combination of: the number of Development Zones, the number of innovation 
centers, the number of Specialized Towns, the ratio of local government 
expenditures and revenues, and the value of investment in innovation. Once the 
annual indices were obtained, they were combined again in order to get a single 
composite index for the period 2003-2005 and one for the period 2006-200828. 
The counties and districts were then divided into four categories based on the value 
of the index, using the quartiles of the distribution of the total of 88 
counties/districts such as threshold values. Thus “low” intensity corresponds to 
values below the first quartile, “medium-low” to a value between the first quartile 
and the median, “medium-high” correspond to values between the median and the 
third quartile and “high” corresponds to values above the third quartile. Therefore, 
the categorical variable follows, by definition, a uniform distribution (hence it is 
maximally heterogeneous) because each category is observed with a percentage 
equal to 25%. 
It is worth noting that the analysis of the intensity and heterogeneity of phenomena 
within the PRD and non-PRD (or in the seven sub-areas on which the analysis will 
focus in the second phase) will therefore be carried out in relative terms. For 
example any great homogeneity in some regions shall be interpreted as low 
heterogeneity in comparative terms with respect to the heterogeneity that 
                                                     
28 See note 19 for a detailed explanation on the choice of the years. 
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characterizes the entire Guangdong Province, which is the maximum possible (by 
definition). 
 
 
 
5.3.3 Stochastic Dominance Test 
Once the four categories (for performance and for policy) were created and the areas 
in which the territory has been divided were defined, the analysis proceeded with 
the elaboration of stochastic dominance tests. They were applied both to compare 
PRD and non-PRD in the first phase of the study, and to make pairwise comparisons 
of the sub-areas of the second phase. The test considers the statistical units of the 
problem that are two areas and one observable ordinal variable. 𝑋1 and 𝑋2 denote 
random variables that represent the phenomenon under analysis in territory 1 and 
territory 2. Assuming that 𝑋1 and 𝑋2 can assume one of the four ordered categories 
𝐴1, 𝐴2, 𝐴3 and 𝐴4 (corresponding to increasing intensity of the phenomenon under 
analysis), denote with 𝑃𝑟{𝑋𝑗 = 𝐴𝑘} = 𝑝𝑗𝑘 , 𝑗 = 1, 2, 𝑘 = 1, … , 4,  the probabilities 
of the two distributions. Obviously ∑ 𝑝1𝑘𝑘 = ∑ 𝑝2𝑘𝑘 = 1. The test of stochastic 
dominance of 𝑋1 on 𝑋2 tests the null hypothesis 
𝐻0: 𝑋1
𝑑
=
 
𝑋2 (equality in distribution) 
against the alternative hypothesis  
𝐻1: 𝑋1
𝑑
>
 
𝑋2 (stochastic dominance) 
In other words, the test verifies whether the phenomenon tends to occur with greater 
intensity in the area 1 than in area 2 or if 𝑋1  is distributed on categories 
corresponding to greater intensity than 𝑋2, and then ∑ 𝑝1𝑘
𝑠
𝑘=1 ≤  ∑ 𝑝2𝑘
𝑠
𝑘=1  per s = 
1, 2, 3 and at least in one case the strict inequality holds. Thus a p-value lower than 
the significance level of the test will lead to rejection of the null hypothesis in favor 
of the alternative hypothesis of stochastic dominance. Generally, as p-values 
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assume smaller values, the more likely it is that the empirical evidence favors the 
hypothesis of stochastic dominance. 
Given the limitations of procedures known in the literature based on the likelihood 
relationship, a permutation test for ordered categorical data based on the Anderson-
Darling test statistic (Pesarin, 2001) is performed. 
 
 
5.3.4 Heterogeneity Test 
As previously described, in addition to the stochastic dominance, tests of 
heterogeneity were performed in order to compare the intensity of performance and 
policy in two areas. They were applied to compare PRD and non-PRD in the first 
phase of the study, and the seven sub-areas of the second phase as pairwise 
comparisons. Consider again the two areas and some observable ordinal variable 
on a given number of sub-areas which are the statistical units of the problem. As 
before 𝑋1 and 𝑋2 denote random variables that represent the phenomenon in the 
analysis in area 1 and area 2, with {𝑋𝑗 = 𝐴𝑘} = 𝑝𝑗𝑘, 𝑗 = 1, 2, 𝑘 = 1, … , 4,  , the 
probabilities of the two distributions. 
As known, 𝑋𝑗(𝑗 = 1, 2)  is said to be maximally homogeneous or minimally 
heterogeneous when its distribution is degenerate, in other words, when in sub-areas 
of the j area only one category is observed with probability 1 and all the other with 
probability zero. In contrast, 𝑋𝑗(𝑗 = 1, 2) is defined minimally homogeneous or 
maximally heterogeneous when 𝑝𝑘 = 1/4 with k = 1, ..., 4. 
In this analysis the index of heterogeneity29 of Renyi normalized30 was used where 
index values close to 1 indicate a lack of homogeneity in the distribution of 
                                                     
29 The concept of heterogeneity can be associated with the concept of concentration and that of 
diversity: namely, the attitude of the qualitative variable to assume different modes. See for more 
information: Arboretti et al., 2007; Arboretti et al., 2009. 
30 The index of Rényi of infinite order, used in the field of information theory, and that, for the area 
j, is calculated as: 
𝑅∞ = lim
𝛼→∞
[
1
1 − 𝛼
log (∑ 𝑓𝑘
𝛼
𝐾
𝑘=1
)] = − log [ 𝑚𝑎𝑥
1≤𝑘≤𝐾
(𝑓𝑘)] 
In this analysis it is used a normalized version of the index of heterogeneity of Renyi that is obtained 
with 𝑅∞
∗ = 𝑅∞/−𝑙𝑜𝑔(
1
4
). 
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performance and/or policy in the territory (and vice versa if the index is close to 
zero). 
For this type of test in two samples, given the distributions of 𝑋1 and 𝑋2, let us 
denote by 𝐻𝑒𝑡(𝑋𝑗) the degree of heterogeneity of 𝑋𝑗. The test then verifies the null 
hypothesis: 
𝐻0: 𝐻𝑒𝑡(𝑋1) = 𝐻𝑒𝑡(𝑋2) 
against the alternative hypothesis 
𝐻1: 𝐻𝑒𝑡(𝑋1) > 𝐻𝑒𝑡(𝑋2). 
The test statistic is based on the difference of the sampling indices of heterogeneity, 
hence those calculated on the observed relative frequencies 𝑓𝑗𝑘  that estimate the 
unknown probabilities 𝑝𝑗𝑘. For this test the index of Rényi of infinite order (see 
note 30) is taken into account. 
The test statistic is then given by 
𝑅∞1 − 𝑅∞2 = log(𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑘𝑓2𝑘) − log(𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑘𝑓1𝑘) 
Also in this case, small values of the p-value provide empirical evidence in favor 
of the hypothesis of greater heterogeneity (reduced homogeneity) in the distribution 
of  𝑋1. The procedure used is based on the permutation tests proposed by Arboretti 
et al. (2009). 
   
5.3.5 Indices for Relative Performance and Policy and Comparative 
Homogeneity Indices 
For the comparative analysis of the second phase of the study, the seven sub-areas 
in which the territory of Guangdong has been divided were compared for both the 
intensity of performance and policy and the heterogeneity, by performing all 
possible one-tailed test comparisons pairwise. 
For example, indicating with 𝜆𝑖𝑗 the p-value of the test of stochastic dominance 
relative to the hypothesis  𝐻1: 𝑋𝑖
𝑑
>
 
𝑋𝑗, with i, j = 1 , ..., 7 , for both the performance 
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and the policy, a 7×7 matrix of the p-values =[ij] has been built. Interpreting the 
p-value as indices of similarity it is then calculated, for each sub-area, the indices 
of relative performance and relative policy combining the p-values for each row of 
the matrix, using the formula of Fisher and normalizing the values between 0 and 
1. Formally 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥(𝑖th 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎) = − ∑ log (𝜆𝑖𝑗)
 
𝑗≠𝑖
 
and the normalized version is given by the transformation 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥(𝑖th 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎) − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑗[𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥(𝑗th 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎)]
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑗[𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥(𝑗th 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎)] − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑗[𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥(𝑗th 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎)]
 
Similarly the comparative index of homogeneity was calculated, which assumes 
high values in correspondence with the sub-areas that have less heterogeneity and 
consequently greater homogeneity. Formally 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑜(𝑖th 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎) = − ∑ log (1 − 𝜆𝑖𝑗)
 
𝑗≠𝑖 , 
where 𝜆𝑖𝑗  is the p-value of the test that verifies 𝐻1: 𝐻𝑒𝑡(𝑋𝑖) > 𝐻𝑒𝑡(𝑋𝑗) . The 
normalization of this index follows the rule already explained for the indices of 
relative performance and relative policy. 
 
 
 
5.4 RESULTS 
5.4.1 Phase 1: PRD vs. non-PRD 
Starting from the performance of 2008, the tests of stochastic dominance with a 
significance level of 0.10 show that the PRD has a higher performance than the non-
PRD (p-value = 0.0002). The comparison of the indices of heterogeneity indicate 
that there is a greater heterogeneity for the group non-PRD (Table 5.1). The tests 
for heterogeneity show that performances are distributed more homogeneously in 
the PRD compared to non-PRD (p-value = 0.0334). It can therefore be said that the 
PRD and non-PRD have inequalities that are worth highlighting. The PRD is an 
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area where the performance is higher and more homogeneously distributed, 
whereas in the non-PRD, there are disparities in the distribution of performance, 
which tend to be lower compared to the PRD. 
Table 5.1. Renyi's indices of heterogeneity normalized 
 PRD non-PRD 
Performance 2008 0,5000 0,8390 
Policy 2003-2005 0,3888 0,8390 
Policy 2006-2008 0,3888 0,8390 
Source: author’s elaboration   
 
With regard to policy interventions, both in the 2003-2005 period and in the period 
2006-2008, it seems that the PRD has been the recipient of a lower level of 
intervention with respect to the non-PRD (respectively p-value = 0.0039 and p-
value = 0.0169). The index of heterogeneity of Renyi in both periods shows a 
greater heterogeneity within the non-PRD (Table 5.1). From the tests of 
heterogeneity, results show that the non-PRD has a less homogeneous distribution 
of the interventions compared to the PRD (respectively p-value = 0.0095 and p-
value = 0.0035). In both periods considered, the PRD, despite having received less 
intervention, it was distributed within the territory in a more homogeneous way. 
The non-PRD instead has enjoyed a greater number of interventions which, 
however, were not homogeneously distributed throughout the territory. 
 
 
 
5.4.2 Phase 2: Seven Groups 
In this second phase, as planned, the territory of the province is divided into 7 areas. 
The PRD: in Inner PRD (I-PRD) and Outer PRD (O-PRD); the non-PRD: North 
(N), North East (NE), Mid-West (MW), West Coast (WC) and East Coast (EC). 
In 2008, the Inner PRD shows a level of performance higher than all other areas 
(Table 5.2), while the Outer PRD and the East Coast show higher performance only 
when compared to North and North East. Finally, the Middle West has higher 
 160 
 
performance than North East (p-value = 0.0911). The tests of stochastic dominance 
do not reveal significance in all other cases. 
Table 5.2. Matrix of the p-values of the stochastic dominance test (row vs. column) on pairwise comparisons 
of the sub-areas: Performance 2008 
 IPRD OPRD WC MW N NE EC 
IPRD 0 0,0008 0,0004 0,0006 0,0001 0,0002 0,0007 
OPRD 0,9992 0 0,1236 0,2394 0,0261 0,0092 0,2877 
WC 0,9996 0,8764 0 0,7258 0,3120 0,1937 0,7419 
MW 0,9994 0,7606 0,2742 0 0,1425 0,0912 0,5493 
N 0,9999 0,9739 0,6880 0,8575 0 0,4573 0,9193 
NE 0,9998 0,9908 0,8063 0,9088 0,5427 0 0,9466 
EC 0,9993 0,7123 0,2581 0,4507 0,0807 0,0534 0 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
Therefore, a ranking of the seven areas in terms of performance, through the use of 
the p-value resulting from the test has been developed. The result is that the Inner 
PRD is the area in which the performance is higher compared to the other areas. 
The remaining areas in rank order are: Outer PRD, East Coast, Midwest, West 
Coast, North and North East. This highlights a persistent dominance in terms of 
performance of the entire PRD on the other areas. The areas North and North East 
show lower performance compared to all other areas. 
The tests for heterogeneity in this second phase study the distribution of the variable 
by county within each macro-area. These tests show that the performance of 2008 
of the Inner PRD is distributed more evenly over the territory than the other six 
areas (Table 5.3). Also in North East performances are more homogenous, but only 
with respect to the East Coast (p-value = 0.0613). In all other cases, no significance 
was found. Observing the comparative index of homogeneity obtained by the 
combination of the p-value resulting from the tests, the Inner PRD is the area in 
which the performances are distributed more homogeneously. The remaining areas 
in rank order are: North East, Outer PRD, North, Midwest, West Coast and East 
Coast.  
The scatter diagram (Figure 5.3) shows that the Inner PRD is the area with the 
highest performance and at the same time the area with the performance most 
homogeneously distributed across the territory. The area North East, on the contrary, 
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has the lowest performance and a higher degree of homogeneity compared to the 
other areas. East Coast is instead an area in which the performances are among the 
highest (after Inner PRD and Outer PRD), but are distributed unequally in the area.  
Table 5.3. Matrix of the p-values of the directional test of heterogeneity (line vs. column) on the pairwise 
comparisons of sub-areas: Performance in 2008 
 IPRD OPRD WC MW N NE EC 
IPRD 0 0,9956 0,9941 0,9951 0,9941 0,9956 0,9996 
OPRD 0,0044 0 0,6642 0,4950 0,4856 0,5289 0,8988 
WC 0,0059 0,3358 0 0,3677 0,3208 0,2754 0,6237 
MW 0,0049 0,5050 0,6323 0 0,5290 0,4805 0,8588 
N 0,0059 0,5144 0,6792 0,4710 0 0,5034 0,8928 
NE 0,0044 0,4711 0,7246 0,5195 0,4966 0 0,9387 
EC 0,0004 0,1012 0,3763 0,1412 0,1072 0,0613 0 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
In the 2003-2005 period, it is possible to observe that the Outer PRD has an intensity 
of the policy intervention greater than all other six areas of Guangdong (Table 5.4). 
The Middle West area instead shows an intensity of interventions higher than the 
Inner PRD, the West Coast, the North East and the East Coast. Finally, the North 
area presents levels of policy interventions greater than Inner-PRD, West Coast and 
North East. From the ranking derived from the combination of the p-values of the 
test of stochastic dominance, the predominance of the Outer PRD compared to the 
rest of the region is further highlighted. The Outer PRD seems in fact to have a very 
marked policy intervention. The remaining areas ranked in order are: Middle West, 
North, East Coast, Inner PRD, West Coast and North East. 
Table 5.4. Matrix of the p-value of the test of stochastic dominance (row vs. column) on the pairwise 
comparisons of sub-areas: Policy 2003-2005 
 IPRD OPRD WC MW N NE EC 
IPRD 0 0,9995 0,6268 0,9808 0,9375 0,5073 0,7927 
OPRD 0,0005 0 0,0002 0,0522 0,0027 0,0001 0,0006 
WC 0,3732 0,9998 0 0,9959 0,9531 0,4076 0,7337 
MW 0,0192 0,9478 0,0041 0 0,1151 0,0047 0,0373 
N 0,0625 0,9973 0,0469 0,8849 0 0,0283 0,2375 
NE 0,4927 0,9999 0,5924 0,9953 0,9717 0 0,8533 
EC 0,2073 0,9994 0,2663 0,9627 0,7625 0,1467 0 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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Figure 5.3. 2008 performance: relative intensity vs. comparative homogeneity 
 
 
 
The tests of heterogeneity show that the Outer PRD is more homogeneous than the 
North, North East and the East Coast (p-value = 0.0205, p-value = 0.0389, p-value 
= 0.0110) and that the West Coast is more homogeneous than the East coast (p-
value = 0.0753) with regard to the distribution of policy interventions in the period 
2003-2005 (Table 5.5). In all other tests no significant differences in terms of 
heterogeneity were found. The ranking of the indices of comparative homogeneity 
completes the picture and shows that the Outer PRD is the area with the greatest 
level of homogeneity, followed by West Coast, Inner PRD, Middle West, North 
East, North and finally the East Coast which is the area with the lowest degree of 
homogeneity. 
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Table 5.5. Matrix of the p-values of the directional test of heterogeneity (row vs. column) on the pairwise 
comparisons of sub-areas: Policy 2003-2005 
 IPRD OPRD WC MW N NE EC 
IPRD 0 0,2789 0,4895 0,6108 0,8638 0,7944 0,8877 
OPRD 0,7211 0 0,7161 0,8164 0,9795 0,9611 0,9890 
WC 0,5105 0,2839 0 0,6078 0,8872 0,8358 0,9247 
MW 0,3892 0,1836 0,3922 0 0,8119 0,7186 0,8174 
N 0,1362 0,0205 0,1128 0,1881 0 0,3857 0,6008 
NE 0,2056 0,0389 0,1642 0,2814 0,6143 0 0,8169 
EC 0,1123 0,0110 0,0753 0,1826 0,3992 0,1831 0 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
Figure 5.4 shows that the Outer PRD is the area in which the intervention was more 
concentrated and was distributed uniformly over the whole territory. The North East 
area has been little affected by policy interventions which are distributed in a rather 
homogeneous way in the area. The East Coast area has a high policy intervention, 
but it is distributed very unevenly. 
Table 5.6. Matrix of the p-value of the test of stochastic dominance (row vs. column) on the pairwise 
comparisons of sub-areas: Policy 2006-2008 
 IPRD OPRD WC MW N NE EC 
IPRD 0 0,9996 0,6722 0,9676 0,9829 0,8388 0,7570 
OPRD 0,0004 0 0,0002 0,0722 0,0183 0,0011 0,0006 
WC 0,3278 0,9998 0 0,9915 0,3604 0,7799 0,6307 
MW 0,0324 0,9278 0,0085 0 0,3515 0,0356 0,0283 
N 0,0171 0,9817 0,6396 0,6485 0 0,0713 0,0426 
NE 0,1612 0,9989 0,2201 0,9644 0,9287 0 0,3332 
EC 0,2430 0,9994 0,3693 0,9717 0,9574 0,6668 0 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
In the period 2006-2008, the policy interventions seem to be concentrated on the 
Outer PRD. From the test of stochastic dominance, results show that the Outer PRD 
has a level of interventions greater than in all the other six areas (Table 5.6). The 
Middle West has instead more interventions than the Inner PRD, the West Coast, 
the North East and the East Coast. Finally, the North area records levels of 
interventions higher than the Inner PRD, the North East and the East Coast (p-value 
= 0.0171, p-value = 0.0713, p-value = 0.0426). In all other cases tests have not 
returned significant differences in terms of intensity of interventions. In the ranks 
derived from the combination of the p-values results show that the Outer PRD is 
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the area with the most extensive policy intervention of Guangdong. It is followed 
by Middle West, North, North East, East Coast, West Coast, and finally Inner PRD. 
Figure 5.4. Policy 2003-2005: relative intensity vs. comparative homogeneity 
 
 
 
With regard to the distribution of policy interventions, pairwise tests of 
heterogeneity performed on the seven areas in the Inner PRD show that the policies 
are spread more evenly than in the North, North East, and East Coast (Table 5.7). 
The same thing happens to the Outer PRD and West Coast that have interventions 
distributed more evenly than in the North, North East and East Coast.  
Once the indices of comparative homogeneity have been calculated, results show, 
however, that the Outer PRD is the area with the greatest homogeneity, followed 
by the Inner PRD, from the West Coast, Middle West, East Coast, North and North 
East. 
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Table 5.7. Matrix of the p-value of the directional test of heterogeneity (row vs. Column) on the pairwise 
comparisons of sub-areas: Policy 2006-2008 
 IPRD OPRD WC MW N NE EC 
IPRD 0 0,4840 0,5294 0,7774 0,9431 0,9626 0,9097 
OPRD 0,5160 0 0,5484 0,8164 0,9780 0,9775 0,9611 
WC 0,4706 0,4516 0 0,7525 0,9446 0,9601 0,9266 
MW 0,2226 0,1836 0,2475 0 0,7854 0,8034 0,6936 
N 0,0569 0,0220 0,0554 0,2146 0 0,6213 0,4007 
NE 0,0374 0,0225 0,0399 0,1966 0,3787 0 0,3144 
EC 0,0903 0,0389 0,0734 0,3064 0,5993 0,6856 0 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Policy 2006-2008: relative intensity vs. comparative homogeneity 
 
 
What emerges then (Figure 5.5), is that in 2006-2008 the Outer PRD is the area 
where there is the highest intensity of interventions that are distributed very 
uniformly. Compared to the previous three years, the interventions decrease in the 
Inner PRD. The area is in fact affected by fewer interventions which, however, are 
distributed in a homogeneous way. In the North East the interventions increase but, 
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they are unequally distributed. The North East in fact loses homogeneity compared 
to the 2003-2005 period and becomes the most heterogeneous of the region. 
 
 
 
5.5 COMMENTS ON THE RESULTS 
What emerges from this analysis is that Guangdong is an area that shows significant 
differences both in terms of performance and in terms of distribution of policy 
interventions. 
In the first phase of the analysis (two areas) results show that the central area of the 
PRD is different from the rest of Guangdong, since it presents the highest 
performance but is also most homogeneously distributed within the territory. 
In the second phase of the analysis (seven areas), with regard to performance, the 
Outer PRD contaminates the homogeneity of the PRD which had emerged in the 
previous phase; the Inner PRD alone is more homogeneous compared to all other 
areas, including the Outer PRD. The core of the Pearl River Delta, the Inner-PRD, 
has performance distributed uniformly in all counties and districts. The areas 
instead, in which there are lower levels of performance are those of the North and 
North East. In these areas, the low performances are distributed in an normally 
homogeneous way. 
For policy interventions going from the 2003-2005 period to the 2006-2008 period 
it is possible to notice some changes both in terms of intensity of policy intervention 
and by their geographical distribution. The Outer PRD remains the area with the 
greatest consistency and the highest level of intervention. The Inner PRD loses 
instead, in terms of intensity, while it slightly improves in terms of homogeneity. 
In the North East the intensity of intervention increases.  
The decrease of interventions in the Inner PRD and the corresponding increase in 
North East seem to confirm an actual movement of the interventions from the 
"center" to the "periphery" as desired by policy makers with the objective of 
rebalancing territorial inequalities (OECD, 2010; Di Tommaso, Rubini & Barbieri, 
 167 
 
2013; World Bank, 2011; Wang, 2007). However, it seems that this is happening in 
ununiformed manner, since the interventions in these areas are distributed unevenly. 
Moving from the first to the second period in fact, the North East loses in terms of 
homogeneity of interventions becoming the most heterogeneous area of the region. 
Finally, the results of this study seem to finally show a correspondence between 
performance and intensity of the policy intervention. Excluding the Inner PRD 
(Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7), which shows high performance despite the low policy 
intervention that is recorded in both the three-year periods, the Outer PRD and 
Middle West show performances on average high with an intensity of interventions 
that are higher than in all other areas. In contrast, the North East, which until 2005 
was the area that received the lowest level of intervention, shows very low 
performance. Another exception should be made instead for the coastal areas, West 
Coast and East Coast, which do not have a high intensity of interventions in both 
three-year periods, but show moderately high performance.  
In conclusion, this study helps to document how this Chinese Province continues to 
grow while living with the dualism between center and periphery (PRD vs. non-
PRD ) that had characterized the first phase of industrial development begun in the 
late 1970s during the era of reform and opening to the market (OECD, 2010; World 
Bank, 2011; Di Tommaso, Rubini & Barbieri, 2013). The process of 
industrialization was incredibly intense and fast but it has not affected the entire 
province. The result is a heterogeneous geography of production, made up of 
territories that continue to be involved in the industrialization process in different 
ways and with different intensities.  
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Figure 5.6. Relative Intensity of Policy 2003-2005 vs. Intensity of Performance in 2008 
 
The excessive congestion in the central areas and the marginalization of many 
peripheral areas are continuing to characterize the pattern of industrial growth of 
this area of China. Nevertheless, as shown here, this region depicts an image of 
industrialization that does not end in the inequality of center-periphery. Rather, it 
highlights a number of differences between territories. Differences that policy 
makers in government would like to reduce or at least try to rationalize. In fact, the 
industrial policy measures aimed at territorial balance have long been announced, 
included in the planning and tested. 
These interventions, however, as is clear from this analysis, seem to be 
heterogeneously distributed in the area and that have shown an overall failure to 
reduce the differences. In this scenario, it seems that there is still a lot of work needs 
to be done and that the social sustainability of a process of territorially unbalanced 
industrial growth remains one of the uncertainties of the future. 
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Figure 5.7. Relative Intensity of Policy 2006-2008 vs. Intensity of Performance in 2008 
 
 
 
 
5.6 FINAL REMARKS 
This analysis of Guangdong depicts a clear image of dualisms and unbalances that 
characterize this province in terms of both performances and intensity of policy 
intervention. The territory seems to have developed at different speeds and some 
areas have been left behind. Furthermore, policy makers are trying to recover from 
this unbalanced situation by concentrating policy efforts in the most depressed areas 
of the province. 
The study of territorial unbalances in Chinese industrialization process continues 
with the analysis of Dongguan prefecture. It is located in the PRD, the most 
industrialized area of Guangdong. The aim here is to zoom in the local dimension 
and analyze territorial unbalances at town level.
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6 DEVELOPMENT AND INDUSTRIALIZATION: A 
TOWN-LEVEL ANALYSIS IN DONGGUAN 
 
 
 
 
6.1 OVERVIEW OF THE TERRITORY 
Dongguan is geographically located in the middle section of the Guangzhou-
Shenzhen economic corridor in the Pearl River Delta of Southern China (Figure 
6.1). It is located 60km south of Guangzhou and 97km North of Shenzhen.  
Figure 6.1. Dongguan location 
 
Dongguan has a long history since its first populations started to inhabit the coastal 
areas more than a thousand years ago. Its historical background contains several 
notable episodes, the most important of which is the destruction of 1.4 thousand 
tons of British opium in 1839, which triggered the first Opium War against Britain. 
This war led eventually to the cession of Hong Kong to Britain. 
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After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Dongguan was 
governed by Dongguan County Revolutionary Committee before the formal 
establishment of the Dongguan county government in July 1980. In 1985, the city 
was promoted by the State Council to become a county-grade city under the 
jurisdiction of Huiyang and was included in the Pearl River Delta Economic Area. 
Finally in 1988, it was promoted to be a prefecture city under the jurisdiction of 
Guangdong Province. Unlike most of the prefecture level cities in China, Dongguan 
does not have any county level administrative units. The original Dongguan area 
was divided into 32 administrative towns within its 2,465 km2. Guancheng is the 
political and economic center of Dongguan. The other thirty two towns administrate 
587 administrative regions (Yeung, 2001). 
During the Mao era, Dongguan experienced a long period of decline in terms of 
growth followed by a slow recovery by the early 1970s, when the relative political 
stability at the end of the Cultural Revolution brought to a continuous positive 
annual growth in all sectors of industrial and agricultural production.  
Before the reform of 1978, most of the towns based their economies on farming and 
fishing while manufacturing activities were almost non-existent. The population of 
400,000 was far from being one of the poorest in China although it was not very 
prosperous (Yang, 2006).  
After the Open Door Policy in 1978, Dongguan became an export-oriented 
manufacturing based economy through processing and assembling-induced 
industrialization. During the first stage of the economic reform up to the late 1980s, 
it also became an outward-oriented commercial agriculture. In the late 1980s, 
Dongguan invested greatly in the construction and improvement of infrastructure; 
especially, in transportation, power supplies, and telecommunications (Yeung, 
2001). These investments increased the attractiveness of Dongguan to larger-scale 
foreign investment. 
In the second phase of the reform Dongguan focused on higher value-added and 
higher technology productions and increasingly supported the service sector 
especially since the mid-1990s. The result was that the GDP and per capita GDP 
growth rates increased dramatically each year reaching between 1978 and 1997 an 
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average annual growth rate of 14% for GDP and 13% for per capita GDP (Yeung, 
2001a). The highest annual growth rate in GDP and per capita GDP was recorded 
in 1990, right after the events of Tiananmen Square. 
Dongguan today has a population of nearly 7 million (Table 6.1), 5 million of which 
are migrants working in the thousands of firms spread all over the prefecture (Yang, 
2006). 
Firms produce any kind of product in huge volumes and that is the reason why 
Dongguan has been labeled as the world’s factory (Yang, 2007; Gill & Kharas, 
2007). 
Dongguan is defined as one the “Four Little Tigers” of Guangdong Province 
together with the municipalities of Zhongshan, Shunde and Nanhai, because they 
have been the fastest growing cities in the Pearl River Delta after the 
implementation of the Open Door Policy (Eng, 1997; Yeung, 2001). Dongguan’s 
GDP has grown at an annual average rate of 17% between 1981 and 1991 and about 
20% in the last two decades (Fitzgerald, 1995; Yeung, 2001; Gill & Kharas, 2007). 
In 2008, GDP was about 370 billion RMB contributing 10% to the regional total 
and ranking fourth among the prefectures of Guangdong. Per capita GDP was above 
53,000 RMB (Table 6.1). 
 
Table 6.1. Main Socio-Economic Indicators for Dongguan 
 
DONGGUAN GUANGDONG 
% OF 
GUANGDONG 
Population 6,949,800 95,440,900 7% 
Area (sq.km) 2,465 179,813 1% 
GDP (million RMB) 370,253 3,569,646 10% 
Per capita GDP (RMB) 53,285 37,589  
Gross Output value of Industry ADS (million 
RMB) 
663,282 6,542,461 10% 
Number of enterprises 5,954 52,603 11% 
Actualized Foreign Investment (million USD) 2,447 19,167 13% 
Exports (million USD) 65,642 404,188 16% 
Source: Author’s elaboration on Guangdong Statistical Yearbook (2009) 
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Dongguan’s economy is now mainly based on the tertiary and secondary sectors 
while the primary industry seems to have almost disappeared (Figure 6.2). 
Dongguan is now heavily based on telecommunications equipment (OECD, 2010). 
Textile is also very important for Dongguan’s economy together with the 
production of furniture, paper making, food processing, beverage, and electrical 
machinery. Furthermore, it is worth noting that Dongguan provides about 30% of 
the regional output in paper making and 22% of the provincial total in both furniture 
and beverage (Table 6.2). 
From 1978 to 1991, the local governments located in Dongguan collected over 2 
billion USD for processing fees and land use from enterprises subcontracting from 
abroad and from foreign investors. These are the main source of local government 
revenue that the local government invested in transportation, energy, 
communication and land formation for plant site construction (Eng, 1997). 
Thus, seeing the rapid economic growth driven by export-oriented foreign 
investments, in literature this phenomenon has been defined as “Dongguan Model” 
(Yeung, 2001; Yang, 2006).   
Figure 6.2. GDP by sector of industry in Dongguan's towns in 2008 
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Table 6.2. Gross Output Value of Industry Above Designated Size of Dongguan 
 
Gross Output 
Value of Industry 
ADS (100 million 
RMB) 
% of 
provincial 
total 
% of 
prefecture 
total 
Processing of Farm and Sideline Food 200.53 13% 3% 
Food 60 8% 1% 
Beverage 107.89 22% 2% 
Textile  226.69 13% 3% 
Textile Garments, Footwear and Headgear 232.24 13% 4% 
Leather, Fur, Feather, Down and Related Products 190.81 16% 3% 
Furniture 180.53 22% 3% 
Papermaking and Paper Products 401.47 30% 6% 
Cultural, Educational and Sports Articles 173.04 20% 3% 
Rubber Products 57.94 18% 1% 
Plastic Products 344.88 14% 5% 
Electrical Machinery and Equipment 731.46 10% 11% 
Communication Equipment, Computers and Other 
Electronic Equipment 
1773.74 12% 27% 
Instruments, Meters and Machinery for Cultural 
and Office Use 
232.3 17% 4% 
Source: Author’s elaboration on Guangdong Statistical Yearbook (2009) 
 
 
 
 
6.2 INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE REGION 
 
6.2.1 FDIs and Exports 
In the last few decades the decentralization of the upper level government to the 
town-level government and the particular institutional setting in Dongguan have 
provided the towns with a great amount of incentives and high autonomy aimed 
especially at the attraction of foreign investors (Yang & Liao, 2010). Thus, 
manufacturing activities are found to be concentrated in small geographic regions 
such as the towns. 
The major sources of foreign investment inflows are Hong Kong and Taiwan which 
contributed for 51% between 1979 and 2003. Japan, United States, and the 
European Union accounted for only about a quarter. In 2003, although Dongguan’s 
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share of China’s GDP was 0.8%, its actualized HK and TW investments accounted 
for 6.3 and 7.8%, respectively in the national total. In 2005, the number of TW and 
HK industrial enterprises in Dongguan ranked the first among the 21 cities in 
Guangdong. Thus, Dongguan’s growth has been generated through its links with 
the regional and global economy (Yang, 2007; Yang & Liao, 2010).  
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, both the Hong Kong and Taiwanese investments 
in Dongguan were characterized by export-oriented and labor intensive 
manufacturing sectors such as toys, footwear, and textiles. In the late 1990s, some 
differences started to emerge. Taiwanese investments started to focus on 
communications and computer-related electronic equipment while Hong Kong 
remained concentrated on plastics, textile and apparel production (Yang, 2006). 
Apparently, since the early 2000s Taiwanese investments have accelerated and 
passed the Hong Kong investments, thus becoming the major driving force for the 
region’s economic development. 
The development of electronics and furniture clusters would not have occurred 
without the involvement of and investment by Taiwanese firms. Similarly, firms in 
Hong Kong (China) have been instrumental in the growth of the apparel and toy 
clusters. Hong Kong and Taiwan invested firms tend to demonstrate different paths 
of sectorial transformations. Although both Hong Kong and Taiwan investments 
focused on labor-intensive sectors such as textile and footwear, Taiwan investment 
has shifted towards computer and electronic communication industries since the 
mid-1990s (Yang & Liao, 2010). More important than the financial investment 
made by foreign firms - a total of over US$15 billion in the last two decades - has 
been the technical know-how, knowledge of the market, and relations with 
customers that these firms have provided. The result is that, in 2004, Dongguan’s 
exports totaled over US$35 billion. Imports, mostly parts and components from 
other countries in East Asia, were nearly US$30 billion (Gill & Kharas, 2007). In 
1998, Dongguan became the third largest city in China in terms of the value of 
exports (after Shanghai and Shenzhen) (Yang, 2006). 
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Figure 6.3. FDIs in Dongguan's towns 
 
Dongguan is not only a global processing and manufacturing base, but also an 
important export base (Yang, 2007). Many of its electronics products (including 
PCs and peripherals, electronic displays, LCDs, CPUs, scanners, keyboards, etc.) 
reach the rest of the world, making this area one of the biggest exporter of drives, 
scanners, and keyboards. International computer companies are more and more 
considering Dongguan as a sourcing base. 
During the Maoist era in the 1960s, the export value had an intense slowdown due 
to the political and economic atmosphere that was governing China at that time. 
Even though the statistics regarding this period do not give full information, it is 
believed that agricultural products and traditional products contributed to 30% of 
average annual export growth rate and favored an increase in export by 53% 
between 1955 and 1977. 
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Figure 6.4. Exports in Dongguan's Towns 
 
 
 
 
6.2.2 Specialized Towns 
In the initial stages of development Dongguan has been greatly favored by its 
location and factor prices. As already mentioned, in the first decade after the 
opening-up of China investors from Hong Kong and Taiwan established their 
businesses in Dongguan. Small and medium enterprises started to flourish and a 
great amount of manufacturing operations were carried out in this area. Investors 
were mainly attracted by Dongguan’s proximity to their homeland, and the plentiful 
availability of cheap land and the abundance of inexpensive workforce. 
Furthermore, the location of plants was usually chosen according to the incentives 
offered by individual town or administrator (Yang, 2007). 
Dongguan’s rapid growth during the 1990s seems to be attributed to the use of 
economies of scale in the production of intermediate goods and differentiated 
products, thus generating agglomeration effects within industries. Knowledge 
spillovers and lower logistics costs resulted from the advantage of being located 
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close to input suppliers and export traders. This in turn resulted in the development 
of industry clusters of global importance, in particular in the production of knitwear, 
footwear, furniture, and toys. Furthermore, since the mid-1990s, the 
telecommunication cluster has dominated Dongguan’s industrial landscape. About 
95% of the components used for the manufacture of a personal computer were 
produced within Dongguan’s borders. In addition, for several products Dongguan’s 
factories were producing about 40% of the global production (Gill & Kharas, 2007). 
Figure 6.5. Specialized Towns in Dongguan in 2008 
 
The launch of the program of the Specialized Towns gave an institutional setting to 
the phenomenon already in progress. In 2008, 13 of the 32 towns of Dongguan have 
been identified as specialized towns. They are spread all over the area of Dongguan 
(Figure 6.5) and they are specialized mainly in logistics and electronics, but also in 
business services, textile and garments, papermaking, food, furniture, optical digital 
products, and molds (Table 6.3).  
Hence, for instance, clustering of the garment manufacturing activities in Dongguan 
have made Humen develop into a national wholesale center for garments and 
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textiles while Qingxi (acknowledged as specialized town in 2012) has become a 
point of reference in computer production for the whole China (Yang & Liao, 2010). 
Evidence show that foreign investments especially from Hong Kong and Taiwan 
go hand in hand with the development of the specialized towns and the phenomenon 
of agglomerations (Yang & Liao, 2010). 
 
Table 6.3. List of Specialized Towns in Dongguan up to 2008 
TOWNS SPECIALIZATION YEAR OF ESTABLISHMENT 
Zhangmutou Business services 2005 
Changping Logistics 2001 
Shatian Port logistics 2007 
Chashan Food 2008 
Zhongtang Papermaking 2005 
Dalang Knitwear 2003 
Humen Garments 2002 
Houjie Furniture 2001 
Liaobu Optical digital products 2007 
Chang’an Electronic hardware 2002 
Shilong Electronic information 2000 
Shijie Electronics 2001 
Hengli Molds/dies 2008 
Source: Author’s elaboration on Association of Specialized Towns of Guangdong Province (2011) 
 
 
 
 
6.2.3 Side effects in Dongguan’s industrialization process 
The growth and structural transformation of the magnitude and at the pace 
experienced by Dongguan has created side effects that need to be managed. Growth 
in manufacturing is intensive in infrastructure and resources. Dongguan’s annual 
consumption of electricity and water in 2004, 35.2 billion kilowatt hours and 1.5 
billion cubic meters respectively, has exceeded that of many countries. The 
conversion of land to industrial use is putting stresses on the environment. In 2004, 
Dongguan discharged 225 million tons of industrial waste water, nearly 200,000 
tons of sulfur dioxide emissions, and nearly 30,000 tons of solid industrial wastes.  
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Agglomeration may lead eventually to congestion. Land is no longer as cheap in 
Dongguan as it once was, and labor is no longer as accommodating or as easily 
available. Shortages of labor, especially skilled labor, are being reported with 
increasing frequency. It is not only the physical landscape that is transformed (Gill 
& Kharas, 2007). 
Growth may also fundamentally alter the social fabric and institutional foundations 
of governance. The drive to capture profits and economic rents associated with scale 
economies, while central in attracting investment, ideas, and contacts, may also 
engender corruption and crime. Dongguan in the 1990s was often described as 
having the atmosphere of a frontier gold-rush city. No direct statistics are available, 
but according to Gill & Kharas (2007) media accounts and case-based research 
suggest that corruption was common, whether in acquiring land for construction of 
factories or in facilitating the evasion of taxes and labor and environmental 
standards. Crime rates were higher than in other parts of China. And the uneven 
distribution of the economic surpluses generated by the growth - attributable partly 
to market-based incentives that reward individual effort, but also partly to uneven 
influence - has led to large disparities in income, itself a possible source of social 
tension. Household surveys indicate that the average per capita income among 
Dongguan’s 1.6 million registered urban residents was 20,564 RMB in 2004. 
Successful local entrepreneurs whose incomes were unlikely to have been captured 
in the households surveys undoubtedly earned much more. A typical migrant 
worker in Dongguan’s factories, on the other hand, earned less than 10,000 Yuan 
working much longer hours with fewer protections and much less access to public 
services (Gill & Kharas, 2007).  
Finally, what makes the Dongguan story particularly interesting, however, is the 
extent to which the city has been striving to address these challenges. 
Environmental and labor standards are increasingly being enforced: in 2004, 90 
percent of the industrial waste water in Dongguan met discharge standards, as did 
86 percent of the solid wastes, and 93 percent of sulfur dioxide emissions met 
emissions standards. Through the Labor Bureau, Dongguan is trying to ensure the 
protection of worker rights and facilitate worker-firm matches. And the city is 
investing its sizable revenues from land rents and local taxes - over 1 billion USD 
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in 2004 - in relieving congestion and improving infrastructure such as roads, port 
facilities, and industrial parks (Gill & Kharas, 2007). 
 
 
 
6.3 FINAL REMARKS 
Since the opening up of China, Dongguan has demonstrated to have the 
characteristics for a rapid and continuous process of industrialization. Due to its 
geographic location and institutional factors it has always been favored by investors. 
Its process of industrialization has resulted into some side effects that the local 
government has tried to solve. The following analysis will give further evidence of 
the high level and balanced distribution of performances that now characterize the 
towns of this prefecture. 
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7 CASE STUDY: DONGGUAN AS A MODEL OF 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
 
 
7.1 OBJECTIVE: ASSESSMENT OF INEQUALITIES 
In the chapter 5 the existence of deep inequalities among territories of Guangdong 
was assessed. The industrial policies and planning that have characterized the 
country and in particular this region have resulted in inefficiencies in distributing 
wealth and services on the whole territory. 
On the other hand, it appears that, an area that has always been interested by 
industrial policies and has been helped by its geographic location is now the most 
industrialized with very high performances that are more homogeneously 
distributed on the territory with respect to the other areas considered. This is the 
case of the Inner Pearl River Delta. 
The idea behind this following paragraph it to try to find some more evidence of 
the real existence of areas developed and industrialized in a homogeneous way. 
With this in mind, the analysis focuses on the case of the prefecture of Dongguan 
which is located in the Inner Pearl River Delta and is considered one the 
manufacturing hubs in the world. Goods leave this place to reach the rest of the 
world. This prefecture is widely considered one of the manufacturers of the world.  
Despite the importance of this area in the economic development of the whole 
region (and country), only a small amount of research has been conducted in 
Dongguan, especially at the town-level. Most of the literature dedicated to the case 
of Dongguan, consists of Chinese official internal reports, which are not accessible 
to the public. Furthermore, the literature in English is mainly focused on FDIs 
(Yeung, 2001a, 2001b; Yang, 2006, 2007; Yu & Wong, 2011; Yang & Liao, 2010). 
Hence in this case study, the aim is to test the findings of the previous analysis; 
namely that a process of industrialization terribly intense and fast has also created 
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areas in which inequalities do not represent reason of concern, because of strong 
economic performances homogeneously spread on the territory. 
In this case the study focuses only on economic performances. This is because of 
two main reasons. First, the data available do not permit to calculate an index of 
policy intervention analogous to the one in the previous section. Second, the aim 
here is to test the hypothesis of homogeneous performances rather than policies. 
In order to do so, the unit of analysis in this case is the towns of Dongguan 
Prefecture. They are divided in two groups according to their closeness or 
remoteness to features that have favored development. On the one hand, the first 
group (henceforth «PHR») consists of 21 towns that are located within 3 kilometers 
from a Highway and/or a Railway and/or in which there is a Port31. The second 
group (from now on «non-PHR») consists of the remaining 11 towns that are not 
located close to the main transport infrastructures32 (Figure 7.1). The decision of 
taking into consideration the closeness to highways, railways and ports comes from 
the awareness that transportation plays a great role in development. This factor is 
found to be one of the causes of high and rising spatial disparities, especially in 
China (Fan, Kanbur & Zhang, 2009). In the last two decades, transportations in 
Dongguan were among the main recipients of investments aimed at the 
improvement of connections to Hong Kong, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou. The roads 
of Dongguan were transformed from narrow and rough to highways connecting 
most of the 32 towns of Dongguan to the rest of the province and Hong Kong. The 
most significant improvement was the construction of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen 
Highway. More than 50km of highway passing through ten different towns of 
Dongguan connect Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Hong Kong through the 
Tiger Gate Bridge (Yeung, 2001).  
                                                     
31 The towns falling in the first group are Humen, Chang’an, Shatian, Houjie, Daojiao, Nacheng, 
Wangniudun, Wanjiang, Gaobu, Machong, Guancheng, Dongcheng, Shijie, Chashan, Shilong, 
Hengli, Changping, Huangjiang, Zhangmutou, Xiegang, and Tangxia. 
32 The towns that are located far from the main means of transportation are Hongmei, Dalingshan, 
Zhongtang, Shipai, Liaobu, Dongkeng, Dalang, Qishi, Qiaotu, Qingxi, and Fenggang. 
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Figure 7.1. Towns in Dongguan 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
Through the 1990s, roads were used more frequently than railways and waterways 
to transport cargos. This means of transportation was found to be more convenient 
due to the fact that cargo trucks were able to provide a door to door delivery service 
with no need of transshipment. Hence, this was considered as more efficient than 
the water and rail routes. Furthermore, until the end of the 1990s, the development 
of railways was rather fragmentary and the five major ports located in Dongguan 
acted only as a support to cargo and passenger transportation (Yeung, 2001).  
In the last few years, roads, rails, and waterways have played a growing role in the 
movement of Guangdong’s outputs. Road networks are critical for the movement 
of raw materials, manufactured inputs to industries, for the shipment of outputs to 
logistics hubs, air cargo terminals, and coastal container ports located in Shenzhen, 
Guangzhou and Hong Kong. Ports also provide a substantive access to global 
markets, thus improving PRD’s orientation to exports. Finally, rails still provide a 
limited contribution to the movement of outputs in and out of the region (OECD, 
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2010). Nonetheless, Dongguan counts on the combined use of roads, railways, and 
ports. 
As for the previous analysis relative to counties and districts of Guangdong, the aim 
is to confirm that this area, located in the Inner PRD, does not have differences 
among towns in the distribution of its high performances. Thus, the aim is to assess 
the existence of differences in the geographical distribution of economic 
performance recorded in 2008.  
In order to do so, the two groups of towns are compared in terms of the level of 
performances through the use of stochastic dominance tests. The alternative 
hypothesis tested here is that the performances in «PHR» towns in 2008 were 
greater than in «non-PHR». According to the literature on this topic, closeness to 
the main means of transportation might have generated more benefits to «PHR» 
towns rather than to «non-PHR», thus creating disparities in the distribution of 
performances (Fan, Kanbur, Zhang, 2009; Yeung, 2001; OECD, 2010).  
Once this hypothesis is tested, the analysis goes further with the heterogeneity test. 
In order to proceed with this test the towns of the prefecture are classified according 
to their levels of performance. As for the previous analysis (chap. 3 and chap. 5), 
towns are divided into four categories according to the value of the index, using 
quartiles as threshold values. 
With the heterogeneity test, the analysis focuses on the study of the two areas in 
terms of homogeneity/heterogeneity. Also in this case, the aim is to test what was 
found in the previous analysis by county/district, namely the homogeneity of the 
areas of the Inner PRD. Thus, the hypothesis tested is that the heterogeneity of the 
two groups is significantly different from one another. On the other hand, the 
alternative hypothesis here is that the heterogeneity of the «PHR» towns is greater 
than that of the «non-PHR». 
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7.2 DESCRIPTION OF DATASET 
The data included in the database were collected from the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China and in particular from Dongguan Statistical Yearbook 2009. The 
statistical unit corresponds to the administrative level of town. The database 
includes socio economic data for all the 32 towns of Dongguan in 2008. The 
variables used for this analysis are five and are the same used for the previous 
analysis by county/district. 
 
 
 
7.3 METHODOLOGY 
The case study on Dongguan approximately follows the steps that were previously 
covered for the analysis by county/district. Thus the formalization of the analysis 
will not be repeated in this paragraph. Here is a brief review of what has been done 
in this case: 
1. Index of Performance. The creation of the Index of Performance. In order to 
do so, five variables were selected. As before, the variables used are density of 
enterprises, export, industrial output, per capita GDP and number of employed. 
They were normalized and combined using the Fisher’s combining function 
and normalized again, 
2. Categories. The towns of Dongguan were divided into four categories 
according to the value of the Index of Performance. In order to do so, the 
quartiles of the distribution of the total 32 towns were used as thresholds values. 
As before, “low” intensity corresponds to values below the first quartile, 
“medium-low” to a value between the first quartile and the median, “medium-
high” correspond to values between the median and the third quartile and “high” 
values above the third quartile. The categorical variable follows therefore by 
definition a uniform distribution (and therefore it is maximally heterogeneous) 
because each category is observed with a percentage equal to 25%, 
3. Territorial groups of towns. Definition of the two groups of towns according 
to their closeness/remoteness to the main means of transportation, namely ports, 
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highways and railways (see par. 7.1 for a detailed description of the two 
groups),  
4. Stochastic Dominance Test. The analysis proceeds with the elaboration of the 
stochastic dominance test, making a comparison of the two groups, where the 
null hypothesis is that there is no significant difference between the two groups 
of towns, while the alternative hypothesis is that the performances of the 
«PHR» towns is greater than that of the «non-PHR» towns (see par. 5.3.3 for a 
detailed description of the stochastic dominance test), 
5. Heterogeneity Test. In addition to the stochastic dominance test, the test of 
heterogeneity is applied to compare the two groups of towns in terms of 
distributions. The null hypothesis is that there is no significant difference in 
terms of heterogeneity between the two groups of towns, while the alternative 
hypothesis is that the heterogeneity of performances of the «PHR» towns is 
greater than that of the «non-PHR» towns (see par. 5.3.4 for a detailed 
description of the test).  
 
 
 
7.4 RESULTS 
From the test of stochastic dominance the findings show that there is not a 
significant difference between the two groups of towns (p-value = 0.1483). Thus, 
the performances of towns close to the main means of transportation does not show 
to be greater than that of the group of towns located further than 3km from highways, 
railways and ports. 
As concerns the indices of heterogeneity, they indicate that both groups do not have 
particularly high levels of heterogeneity though the group of towns «PHR» has a 
greater index than that of the «non-PHR» (Table 7.1). 
The test of heterogeneity that compares the two groups shows that the heterogeneity 
of the group «PHR» is not significantly different from the heterogeneity of the 
group «non-PHR» (p-value = 0.5254). 
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Table 7.1. Renyi's indices of heterogeneity normalized 
 PHR non-PHR 
Renyi Index 0.7925 0.7297 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
 
 
 
7.5 FINAL REMARKS 
This analysis has shown that Dongguan is an area in which there are not significant 
inequalities in terms of performances. The performances of towns that could have 
benefited from their proximity to transport connections are instead very similar to 
those of the towns not as well connected. 
These results confirm what emerged in the previous analysis; namely that the Inner 
PRD not only had higher performances compared to the other areas, but also had 
performances that were more homogeneous compared to the other areas. Thus, 
Dongguan, confirms the fact that the areas within the Inner PRD do not show an 
unbalanced distribution of performances.  
This study concludes a path of analysis that had started with the investigation of 
territorial inequalities within China, then in Guangdong Province, and had followed 
with the assessment of inequalities within an area restricted to one prefecture. In 
the first step the analysis showed that the process of industrialization, though fast 
and intense, had not affected all the provinces. In the case of Guangdong, 
performances were not equally distributed in the entire province. The analysis had 
also showed that the Inner PRD was the only area in which industrialization had 
spread more homogeneously than in the other areas.  
The findings of this last step of the analysis referring to Dongguan show this area 
within the Inner PRD has been affected by a high level of industrialization that has 
distributed on the territory in a homogeneous way. Thus, where industrialization 
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and the economic performances have been more intense, they are also better 
distributed. 
  
 191 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
 
 
This work describe the image of a country, China, marked by a massive 
industrialization, continuous growth, and unprecedented development. This 
phenomenon has been accompanied by planning and programmes of development 
that have certainly favored certain sectors of the industry and specific geographic 
areas. 
The theoretical framework described here shows that government’s intervention is 
driven by its goals which can be categorized into three broad fields: resolving 
market failures, pursuing strategic economic objectives, and achieving meta-
economic goals. As displayed by the study of the current theoretical debate, each 
national government has tried its own mix of policies trying to achieve one or more 
of these goals.  
China is a case of significant economic growth, accompanied by heavy state 
intervention which was mainly focused on the achievement of strategic economic 
goals. China differs from traditional models of development since it has 
implemented its own strategies aimed at opening to rest of the world, favoring 
exports and FDIs. It has promoted strategic sectors, such as the high-tech industry, 
and it has protected national pillars such as the steel industry. The declared aim of 
these policies was to accelerate economic growth and foster industrialization. 
Thus, these programmes have promoted industrialization leaving aside crucial 
topics connected to a broader dimension of development. Intense economic growth 
in the name of “getting rich first” produced side costs in terms of inequalities in 
several fields. Education, health, and wealth unbalances, among others, represent 
the main concerns of the government since they cannot be tolerated in the long run.  
 192 
 
Territorial unbalances have been the focus of this work since I believe that the 
solution of this topic could assure to China a stable and continuous growth in the 
future. This topic has been studied at different levels. Starting from the national 
level, then going into the detail of the case of Guangdong province and ended with 
the analysis of Dongguan. 
What emerged from the analysis at national level was that China has actually had a 
great industrial growth in terms of economic performances in the considered period 
(1998-2010). At the same time, this incredible growth has been accompanied by 
inequalities in the distribution of performances among Chinese provinces that have 
persisted almost unchanged for the whole period. Furthermore, most of the 
provinces seem to have low performances for the entire period. Only few of them 
have experienced high levels of economic performances and Guangdong, in 
particular, is the province with the highest level of performances for the entire 
period. Thus, the analysis at this level confirms a massive increase in economic 
performances in China in the last decade and shows deep inequalities that persist 
over time.  
The analysis has continued with the study of inequalities in the case of the best 
performing province in China in terms of economic performances: Guangdong 
province. Guangdong is considered as an emblematic case because it combines all 
the characteristics of China: intense and continuous growth, strong industrialization, 
substantive government’s intervention, promotion of strategic sectors, and long-
term planning. All these elements are accompanied by the rise of side effects: 
environmental degradation and inequalities. Now the government is trying to 
address these issues through a re-shaping of planning and policies. The work 
proposed in this part has tried to assess the territorial unbalances that characterize 
the region, not only in terms of performances, but also in terms of policy 
intervention. 
At this stage the analysis shows that in Guangdong the process of industrialization 
has not affected the entire province. The picture described by this study shows an 
unbalanced distribution of economic performances. Furthermore, the territories of 
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Guangdong are involved in the industrialization process at different intensities. 
Excessive congestion in PRD continues to foster the gap with the periphery.  
Furthermore, Guangdong province shows a complex pattern of unbalances that 
cannot be synthetized with the center-periphery model. Apart from the dualism 
represented by PRD vs. non-PRD, this province shows internal differences among 
several areas. The territories of Guangdong are involved in the industrialization 
process at different intensities and growth in these areas seems to have different 
speeds. 
Moreover, as concerns the distribution of industrial policies over the territory of 
Guangdong, the findings show that interventions are not equally distributed and do 
not seem to focus on the most depressed areas. Nonetheless, in the last decade the 
government has announced measures aimed at territorial rebalancing. Since the 11th 
Five-Year Plan they have been included in the planning. These interventions, 
however, as it is clear from the analysis, seem to be unequally distributed in the 
region.  
The analysis in this work continues with the case of Dongguan. Since the opening 
up of China, Dongguan has showed a rapid and continuous process of 
industrialization. Due to its geographic location and institutional factors it has 
always been favored by investors and policies. This study has given further 
evidence of the high and equally distributed performances that now characterize the 
towns of this prefecture. 
Dongguan appears to be an area in which performances are equally distributed at 
town level. The performances of towns that could have benefited from their 
proximity to transport connections are very similar to performances of the towns 
not as well connected. These results confirm an overall homogeneity in the 
distribution of performances within the Inner PRD.  
This study concludes a path of analysis that, starting from the national level then 
going into the detail of towns, has shed light on territorial distribution of 
performances and policies.  
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The analysis returns the picture of a territory marked by strong territorial 
unbalances. Guangdong itself, which is one of the most industrialized provinces of 
China, presents a marked dualism between core and periphery, not only in terms of 
performances but also in terms of intensity of policies. Nevertheless, Dongguan’s 
case demonstrates that strong industrialization not necessarily means inequalities.  
In this scenario, a few considerations need to be highlighted. 
First, the study of inequalities in China does not end with territorial imbalances, but 
needs further study on inequalities in the field of health, education, gender, 
opportunities, etc. The statistical method used in this work, through the use of 
indices of synthesis, is also appropriate for analysis using other dimensions such as 
education and health.  
In addition, further analyses and understandings on the issue of territorial 
inequalities in China are certainly desirable and necessary. In the literature a more 
detailed analysis of the provinces is missing. Most of the studies either focus on 
coastal-inland inequalities or they focus on the rural-urban dualism. Some of them 
take into account regional inequalities, but do not consider inequalities within each 
region. (Barone, Bin, Brasili, & Fanfani, 2013; Chen & Fleischer, 1996; Fan & Sun, 
2008; Fan, Kanbur, & Zhang, 2011; Fan, Kanbur, & Zhang, 2009; Gu, Shen, Wong, 
& Zhen, 2001; Liao & Wei, 2012; Wei & Fan, 2000). It is interesting to replicate 
the study and extend it to other areas of analysis, starting with other Chinese 
provinces, but also other countries and regions. 
Another consideration that is necessary to make in conclusion of this work relates 
to policy implications. From the study presented in this work it appears that still a 
lot of efforts need to be made in order to rebalance the Chinese territory. Although 
the Chinese government has started to orient its policies towards priorities that 
deviate from the mere economic dimension, China still shows territorial unbalances. 
So far, policies implemented by the government have demonstrated to be very 
effective in the areas where they were tested. However, now China is facing the 
biggest challenge. The dream of the “harmonious society” can only be reached 
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through further planning and specific policies aimed at those territories that have 
not yet enjoyed the benefits of growth. 
The results brought by the analysis of the distribution of policy interventions in 
Guangdong clearly show that policy efforts need to be increased in the worst 
performing areas.  
Thus, the social sustainability of the Chinese economic growth remains one of the 
priorities in the policy agenda. The government needs to increase the efforts in 
rebalancing the industrialization in the Chinese territory in order to enhance the 
diffusion of the benefits of economic growth and development in remote areas. 
Moreover, further reforms in the fields of education, health and labor are desirable 
in perspective of a socially sustainable growth in the long run. 
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APPENDIX: GUANGDONG ADMINISTRATIVE 
DIVISION AT COUNTY-DISTRICT LEVEL 
 
 
 
 
PREFECTURE 
AREA 
(KM2) 
COUNTY-DISTRICT LEVEL 
  NAME  TYPOLOGY 
Guangzhou 
(capital)  
7,434 
Guangzhou UA Core municipality 
Conghua County-level city 
Zengcheng County-level city 
Yuexiu Urban district 
Haizhu Urban district 
Liwan Urban district 
Tianhe Urban district 
Baiyun Suburban district 
Huangpu Suburban district 
Luogang Suburban district 
Huadu Suburban district 
Nansha Suburban district 
Panyu Suburban district 
Shenzhen 2,016 
Shenzhen UA (SEZ) Core municipality 
Futian (SEZ) Urban district 
Luohu (SEZ) Urban district 
Nanshan (SEZ) Urban district 
Yantian (SEZ) Urban district 
Bao’an Suburban district 
Longgang Suburban district 
Foshan  3,883 
Foshan UA Core municipality 
Chancheng Urban district 
Shunde Suburban district 
Nanhai Suburban district 
Sanshui Suburban district 
Gaoming Suburban district 
Dongguan 2,520 Dongguan UA  Core municipality 
Zhongshan 1,800 Zhongshan UA Core municipality 
Zhuhai  1,560 
Zhuhai UA (SEZ) Core municipality 
Xiangzhou (SEZ) Urban district 
Doumen Urban district 
 197 
 
PREFECTURE 
AREA 
(KM2) 
COUNTY-DISTRICT LEVEL 
  NAME  TYPOLOGY 
Jinwan Urban district 
Huizhou  10,792 
Huizhou UA Core municipality 
Huicheng Urban district 
Huiyang Urban district 
Boluo County 
Huidong County 
Longmen County 
Zhaoqing 14,978 
Zhaoqing UA Core municipality 
Duanzhou Urban district 
Dinghu Urban district 
Gaoyao County-level city 
Sihui County-level city 
Guangning County 
Deqing County 
Fengkai County 
Huaiji County 
Jiangmen  9,259 
 Jiangmen UA Core municipality 
Pengjiang Urban district 
Jianghai Urban district 
Xinhui Suburban district 
Taishan County-level city 
Kaiping County-level city 
Enping County-level city 
Heshan County-level city 
Shantou 2,131 
Shantou UA Core municipality 
Nan’ao County 
Jinping Urban district 
Longhu Urban district 
Haojiang Urban district 
Chaoyang Urban district 
Chaonan Suburban district 
Chenghai Suburban district 
Shanwei  4,728 
Shanwei UA Core municipality 
Chengqu Urban district 
Lufeng County-level city 
Haifeng County 
Luhe County 
Chaozhou  3,090 
Chaozhou UA Core municipality 
Xiangqiao Urban district 
Chao’an County 
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PREFECTURE 
AREA 
(KM2) 
COUNTY-DISTRICT LEVEL 
  NAME  TYPOLOGY 
Raoping County 
Jieyang  5,057 
Jieyang UA Core municipality 
Rongcheng Urban district 
Jiedong County 
Huilai County 
Jiexi County 
Puning County-level city 
Yangjiang  7,748 
Yangjiang UA Core municipality 
Jiangcheng Urban district 
Yangdong County 
Yangxi County 
Yangchun County-level city 
Maoming  11,493 
Maoming UA Core municipality 
Maonan Urban district 
Maogang Urban district 
Dianbai County 
Gaozhou County-level city 
Huazhou County-level city 
Xinyi County-level city 
Zhanjiang  11,517 
Zhanjiang UA Core municipality 
Chikan Urban district 
Xiashan Urban district 
Potou Urban district 
Mazhang Suburban district 
Xuwen County 
Suixi County 
Leizhou County-level city 
Lianjiang County-level city 
Wuchuan County-level city 
Shaoguan  18,900 
Shaoguan UA Core municipality 
Zhenjiang Urban district 
Wujiang Urban district 
Qujiang Urban district 
Lechang County-level city 
Nanxiong County-level city 
RuyuanYao County 
Renhua County 
Shixing County 
Wengyuan County 
Xinfeng County 
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PREFECTURE 
AREA 
(KM2) 
COUNTY-DISTRICT LEVEL 
  NAME  TYPOLOGY 
Heyuan  15,440 
Heyuan UA Core municipality 
Yuancheng Urban district 
Dongyuan County 
Heping County 
Longchuan County 
Zijin County 
Lianping  County 
Meizhou  16,003 
Meizhou UA Core municipality 
Meijiang Urban district 
Meixian County 
Dapu County 
Fengshun County 
Wuhua County 
Pingyuan County 
Jiaoling County 
Xingning County-level city 
Qingyuan  18,932 
Qingyuan UA Core municipality 
Qingcheng Urban district 
Qingxin County 
Fogang County 
Yangshan County 
Lianshan County 
Liannan Yao County 
Yingde County-level city 
Lianzhou County-level city 
Yunfu  7,564 
Yunfu UA Core municipality 
Yuncheng Urban district 
Xinxing County 
Yu’nan County 
Yun’an County 
Luoding County-level city 
Source: Author’s elaboration on OECD (2010), GBS (2012), and Di Tommaso et al. (2013) 
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